International Criticism and the Legitimation of Chile's Authoritarian Democracy[1]

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Abstract

This article examines how the Chilean military dictatorship utilized its constitutional process to defend itself against international criticism of its very legitimacy and stark human rights violations. By bringing to the fore the discussions held at highest echelons of the regime, the article indicates how the Constitution of 1980 was mobilized by the regime at different times as part of an effort to neutralize threats of international isolation and economic embargo. Moving chronologically, my analysis focuses on the distinctive strategies applied by Augusto Pinochet's regime, evolving from denying human rights violations entirely to tactically admitting "excesses," and then gradually turning the constitutional process—which was to secure Chile's return to being a normative parliamentary democracy—into the centerpiece of Chile's diplomatic strategy. Furthermore, the article clarifies that despite the ratification of the constitution in a national plebiscite in 1980, international campaigns against the regime did not stop. Thus, against the background of Chile's economic crisis in 1982, Chile saw a renewed effort to propagate on the international scene its so-called process of "institutionalization" abroad.

Keywords: Chilean dictatorship; Augusto Pinochet; international relations of Chile; human rights

Resumen

Este artículo examina cómo la dictadura militar chilena utilizó su proceso constitucional para defenderse de las críticas internacionales de su misma legitimidad y sus graves violaciones de derechos humanos. Al poner en primer plano las discusiones conducidas en las más altas esferas del régimen, el artículo indica cómo la Constitución de 1980 fue mobilizada por el

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régimen en diferentes momentos para neutralizar amenazas de aislamiento internacional y de embargo económico. Avanzando cronológicamente, mi análisis se centra en distintas estrategias que el régimen de Augusto Pinochet aplicó a lo largo de los años, comenzando con la negación absoluta de las violaciones de los derechos humanos, pasando por la admisión táctica de “excesos”, y finalmente, convirtiendo gradualmente el proceso constitucional, que debía asegurar el regreso de Chile a una democracia parlamentaria normativa, en el centro de la estrategia diplomática de Chile. Además, el artículo aclara que a pesar de la ratificación de la constitución en un plebiscito nacional en 1980, las campañas internacionales contra el régimen no se detuvieron. Así, en el contexto de la crisis económica chilena de 1982, Chile vio un renovado esfuerzo por dar a conocer su llamado proceso de “institucionalización” en el exterior.

Palabras clave: dictadura chilena; Augusto Pinochet; relaciones internacionales de Chile; derechos humanos

Introduction

In the 226th session held by the Chilean Junta on August 18, 1975, the Chief of the Planning Committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jaime Lavín, presented an analysis of Chile’s international situation. His main points were the effects of the so called “anti-Chilean campaign” and of diplomatic countermeasures. Referring to the upcoming September 1975 UN General Assembly, Lavín warned that “the question of human rights and the possible ratification of sanctions against Chile by the Soviet Union” would be one of the central points of debate. Moreover, Chile’s international situation had worsened, especially due to the “public opinion that had been crystallizing in relation to the situation of human rights in Chile […]; this means large parts of certain political sectors of the Right, the Center and the Left in the majority of countries are convinced that the rights and fundamental liberties of man are violated and continue to be violated in our country.”[2]

To make matters worse, Lavín said, given that in July the Junta had blocked the visit of the UN ad hoc Working Group on Human Rights in Chile to the country at the last minute, Chile might be confronted with a motion ranging from a simple “condemnatory resolution,” to a “contestation of its credentials or a petition to be expelled from international organizations.”[3] In other words, Lavín spoke of Chile being the target of a global economic boycott— a scenario that, in his opinion, not only meant economic hardship but posed a “grave danger for national security.” His words left a profound impression on the Junta members. Even Gustavo Leigh, the Commander in Chief of the Air Force stated that he was “worried” about Chile’s lack of a “defined strategy” at the

upcoming UN assembly. Opening on September 11th, the official anniversary of Pinochet's coup d'état, the assembly meant, for him, that the "destiny […] of the military government is at stake."[4] In short, after two years of unbounded persecution of their political opponents, both Chile's Foreign Ministry and the Junta acknowledged that international criticism was threatening the dictatorship's very existence.

To be sure, the legitimation of its rule was a problem that had concerned the dictatorship ever since the coup on September 11, 1973. Although the military regime had been granted international recognition by the Western bloc, and even from the People's Republic of China and Romania (all other Communist states broke relations with Chile) within weeks of the coup,[5] the exceptional brutality of its rule did not leave the international community indifferent. How the Chilean case became a catalyst for human rights activism, thus becoming a matter of international politics, stemmed from a conjunction of circumstances.[6] For one thing, the struggle against the dictatorship galvanized a global alliance of activists under the banner of human rights. At times evoking anti-imperial slogans, these networks of activists emphasized a novel humanitarian ethical ground, thereby replacing one left-wing ideological utopia with yet another, more inclusive one—the "last utopia" to use Samuel Moyn's words.[7] More concretely, the Chilean case contributed to bolstering the UN and the Organization of American States' human rights protection systems.[8] As historian Jan Eckel has explained, by making Chile the standard against which other cases would be measured, these actions ultimately led to putting the protection of human rights on the agenda of almost all Western governments. In short, human rights criticism against Pinochet's regime, Eckel has posed, was "a factor, that changed the field of international politics."[9]

For the dictatorship, the question of legitimation was of special importance, primarily given its origin in a coup d'état against a long-standing constitutional order and a legitimately elected government. Being unable to legitimize their rule through popular consent or by mobilizing dynastic or grand-scale ideologies—as would be the case for authoritarian monarchies or communist regimes—military dictatorships have tended to rely on oppression and a rhetoric of a "state of emergency" to justify their power grab. Coupled with the cooptation of local elites, these were also the initial sources of Pinochet's claim to power.[10] However, in order to "reduce the resources directed toward coercion," in the words of Carlos Huneeus, dictators seek voluntary submission to authority and, to that end, they turn to designing more substantial political programs.[11] The Chilean dictatorship pursued this path from the very beginning, thus acting not merely "reactively," but also "refoundationally"[12] by defining the contours for a new constitutional order. At the same time the regime made efforts to co-opt and

"re-socialize" a population that it considered a victim of "Marxist seduction," by excluding and extirpating all persons that were considered "Marxist" agents, in order to demonstrate that it enjoyed popular support.[13] Pinochet's dictatorship thus combined several legitimation strategies, ranging from infinitely preventing the creation of a Marxist-totalitarian dictatorship on Chilean soil, to modernizing the country's economy and society via market-based development.[14]

Initially, the dictatorship's rhetoric also relied on religious language. The argument that the coup had taken place in order to depose an illegitimate, "tyrannical" government, Allende's Unidad Popular, had its roots in religious doctrine about the right to rebel. From there, it was a short step to justifying the violence that followed the coup with the argument that the targets had attacked the very essence of the "Chilean [Christian] way of life," therefore forfeiting their humanity, and that they needed to be rooted out by all possible means. These conservative-Catholic ideas were deeply rooted in the Chilean Right, the armed forces, and the conservative factions of the Catholic Church and were also made explicit in the *Declaración de Principios* of 1974.[15] Due to the Catholic hierarchy's growing criticism of the dictatorship, and especially the repression it practiced, this religious language lost importance.[16]

The dictatorship's constitutional legitimation was necessary for the regime's stabilization on a national scale, and was equally important on an international level. To be sure, this legitimation went beyond an initial formal recognition and touched on Chile's international image, which, in turn, impacted its access to financial markets and its standing within the Western international trade system.[17] This article demonstrates how the Junta reacted to international criticism. It elucidates how anxieties over the international campaigns rebuking its oppressive measures and the legitimation of its rule, translated into a paranoia over prospects of economic isolation, and, subsequently, over the regime's inability to fulfil its ideological and political goals. In other words, I suggest that the need to neutralize international criticism was a critical driving mechanism behind the dictatorship's so-called "institutionalization" and its pledge to establish a final "authoritarian democracy" in Chile. As importantly, I stress that during the 1980s, the new constitutional order became the fundamental component within a series of strategies of legitimation.

Research on the international relations and networks of the Chilean dictatorship has largely focused on two aspects. On the one hand, there is literature on Chile's international relations during this period, focusing mainly on diplomatic activities and international relations. One important point this literature makes is the subordination of the Foreign Ministry and policy under the Junta.[18] For the purposes of the present article, this meant that the Foreign Ministry had to convince the Junta of the importance of international legitimation and its diplo-

matic strategies. If unsuccessful, it had to follow the Junta's instructions even if this meant, in the eyes of the diplomats, opting for second-best choices. On the other hand, "Operación Condor" and the transnational repression perpetrated by the Chilean secret police have drawn the attention of journalistic and to a lesser extent academic research, as in, for example Peter Kornbluh's analysis of these activities through declassified documents from official US archives.[19] These covert activities were in stark contrast to what the dictatorship publicly claimed it would or would not do. Careful contextualization is therefore necessary. One of the rare examples that brings together research on clandestine and official foreign policy is Molly Avery's article on extra-official ties between state actors and members of the far-right in Chile and El Salvador and shedding light on the transfer of Chilean lessons from the construction of a "protected democracy" and anti-"subversive" tactics to El Salvador.[20]

This article analyzes the promotion of the constitutional process in Chilean foreign policy in the context of the dictatorship's efforts to fend off international criticism. When addressing the causal relationship between international criticism and the dictatorship's legitimation tactics, it first explores how the dictatorship leaders actually perceived international criticism. Relying on original archival sources, mostly from the Foreign Ministry and the protocols of the sessions of the Chilean Junta,[21] I uncover the internal dialogue within the regime's highest echelons and the ways in which rhetoric devices were chosen to neutralize international criticism. I then indicate how the regime's rhetoric varied over time, according to changing contexts and how it overlapped with the dictatorship's overall ideological legitimation strategies, from the 1973 coup to the plebiscite of 1988. In so doing, the article raises questions about the uniqueness of the 1980 Constitution as an ideological object in the broader history of South America's Cold War military dictatorships.

On the dictatorship's perception of international criticism

Whether or not the worldwide campaigns against human rights violations actually posed a threat to the dictatorship, for instance in the form of international embargos, is less relevant to this analysis as how the dictatorship's leaders perceived these campaigns, and how this reading of reality impacted their actions.[22] During its entire existence, the dictatorship saw international criticism as an "anti-Chilean campaign" organized by international communism. By August 1974, the Junta had discussed this "campaign" in no less than twenty-four of its sessions, blaming it for all sorts of international criticism against the regime. Towards the end of 1970, the analysis of its effects became more nuanced,

due to the perception that the threat of international isolation had diminished. However, the basic analysis remained the same.[23] It was a staple in the annual directives of the Foreign Ministry. The very first point in the directive for 1979 read: "In the last years our country was confronted with hard attacks on the international stage. This campaign, directed by the Soviet Union, Cuba and other countries from East Europe, [...] has pursued the goal of damaging the prestige of the Chilean Government with the aim of bringing it down."[24] Still in 1984, the Foreign Ministry justified its "General Plan for Information Abroad and Cultural Diffusion" with the necessity of "counter[ing] the disinformation campaign that affects Chile."[25] By and large, when speaking of a "campaign," the Junta leaders referred to various forms of international denunciations, ranging from criticisms of Chile for human rights violations and acts of international terrorism, to questioning the legitimacy of the military coup and its failure to launch a democratic transition. In the eyes of the Junta members, Salvador Allende's followers, their sympathizers abroad, and the Communist International under the control of the Soviet Union, had set up human rights organizations as façades and infiltrated left-wing and center-left parties in Western Europe and North America that pressured the governments in their respective countries to maintain a hostile attitude against Chile.

The "campaign" theory was heavily influenced by the dictatorship's ideological convictions, that were rooted in historic anti-communism in Chile,[26] and were informed by the National Security Doctrine, the central features of which were the perception of the nation as absolute and synonymous with the state, and the belief in the existence of a specific "Chilean way of life." This doctrine's crux was the conviction that a communist enemy, which acted subversively and was supported from abroad, threatened both the "nation" and the "way of life."[27] More important for the present article, this doctrine shaped Chilean foreign policy given that its framework was decidedly an international one. The regime yoked "international subversion" to guerrilla activities and the above-mentioned "campaign," attributing all three to the Soviet Union.[28] Therefore, the dictatorship's leaders found it difficult to understand why criticism against it originated in Western countries, which, in the Cold War blocs' logic, were supposed to align with anti-communist Chile. In short, the regime's anti-communist ideology profoundly distorted its understanding of international criticism and led to a dissatisfaction with the supposed lack of support from countries that the dictatorship considered its allies, especially the U.S.[29]

Regardless of its origins, the regime took international criticism seriously, perceiving it as a direct threat to its political goals. The immediate motive to avoid international isolation was, naturally, economic. Ever since 1975, the regime opted decidedly for a neoliberal makeover of the Chilean economy,

thereby relying more than ever on Direct Foreign Investment for its economic "liftoff." In turn, access to international trade, new export markets, and creditors became ever more crucial for the regime's survival.[30]

Another possible consequence of international isolation, the Junta members believed, was that it might compromise Chile's very national security. This became clear when Western countries began suspending arms exports to Chile by the mid-1970s, causing its military preparedness to fall behind that of its neighboring countries.[31] This threat acquired new meanings on a diplomatic level once Chile was faced with the prospects of an actual military conflict, for instance during the escalation of the Chile-Argentina Beagle Conflict in December 1978. Even then, when the Argentine dictatorship was unquestionably the aggressor, Chile could not expect, and indeed did not receive, any international military aid.[32] True enough, the dictatorship's leadership did not often refer either to the economic or military threats in its public discourse. Even so, my analysis of the regime's internal deliberations highlights that the regime's legitimacy crisis had a profound impact on its discourse, particularly in its substitution of avowed oppression with democratic "institutionalization," going beyond what would have been necessary to maintain economic and military relations.

Reactions to international criticism until 1978

In the first months, the regime rejected international criticism entirely. Perceiving it as a calculated defamation campaign, the Foreign Ministry instructed the Chilean embassies to launch propaganda initiatives in their respective countries, underscoring the Allende government's alleged economic and social failures, as well as its supposed plans for a self-organized coup. Additionally, this propaganda warned against yet another communist takeover in Chile, and underlined that the country had returned to an orderly state and that economic recovery was to be expected. In one memo, the Foreign Ministry urged the ambassador to "avoid detailed references" to the day of the coup, as well as to "events related to repression, prisoners, deaths, destructions, armed forces in action, hate or violence." It even went as far as to warn its delegates that they "not fall into the trap of repeatedly discussing numbers of victims, persecutions, supposed torture or acts of violence."[33] These efforts correlated with the dictatorship's most important propaganda effort to date, namely the publication of the *Libro Blanco del cambio de gobierno en Chile* (The White Book on the Change of Government in Chile),[34] which exposed the Unidad Popular's alleged conspiracy to orchestrate a self-organized coup and murder Chile's military leadership—also known as "Plan Z."[35]

In November 1973, the Junta earmarked US$1 million to fund propaganda activities abroad.[36] At the end of July 1974 it estimated the total spending on propaganda to add up to US$7.6 million and 4.7 million Chilean escudos.[37] However, the decision-makers slowly realized that in order for propaganda abroad to be efficient one had to systematize it beyond the embassies' sphere of activity. Thus came into being the Foreign Ministry's Plan de Propaganda y Contrapropaganda of August 1974. Its stated aim was to "make disappear from mass media in the world all news that does not originate in our own will or wish."[38] Still, officials in the Foreign Ministry were aware that such efforts alone would not make the "anti-Chilean campaign" disappear, and that the dictatorship needed to change its oppressive behavior. For example, in a debate with the Junta in the run-up to the UN General Assembly in 1974, Chile's Foreign Minister criticized how the imprisonment of Unidad Popular officials and Chile's ongoing state of emergency were the main reasons for international criticism, with the latter contradicting the dictatorship's claims that it was returning to "normality." Augusto Pinochet, for his part, was far from being persuaded and proposed applying different levels of state of emergency, stating that "we continue as before. The name changes."[39] In other words, the head of the Junta still perceived international criticism as a byproduct of the military coup that would end as soon as the regime persuaded international audiences of Allende's "crimes" and of the normalization of Chileans' daily lives.

Even so, by 1975 the Junta's internal debates indicate that it was becoming ever more concerned about the ineffectiveness of its propaganda and the ongoing interest in Chilean affairs, especially within different forums at the UN.[40] In particular, it was the founding of the UN Working Group on Human Rights in Chile that alarmed the Junta. Indicating that the investigation of Chilean human rights violations was gradually becoming institutionalized in the international arena, it put the regime in the company of Israel and South Africa as the international community's center of attention. In April 1975 Sergio Diez, Chile's ambassador at the UN, demanded that the Junta not withdraw from the UN willingly, warning that such a whimsical action would lead to Chile's "complete isolation" just as it had for Taiwan and South Africa.[41] Still holding fast to its triumphant narratives, the Junta overreacted by denying the UN Working Group entry to Chile in July 1975, as mentioned earlier.

The question of whether or not the threat of international isolation was real, especially given the U.S.' unwillingness to comply with such measures, has no conclusive answer. Still, the Junta discussed this threat in depth in its sessions.[42] In the context of the neoliberal economic reforms of 1975, the regime then publicly abandoned its so-called "anti-Marxist foreign policy" in March of that year. By using economic reasonings, the Foreign Ministry in particular was adamant

about the need to assuage Chile's anti-communist rhetoric and expressions of opposition to the Soviet Union.[43] Even though the dictatorship, urged by the Foreign Ministry, publicly opted for a less confrontational approach in order to reduce its exposure to criticism, the Junta covertly increased its repressive activities. 1974-1976 marked the high point of the repression exercised by the secret police known as DINA (Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional). In November of 1975 the transnational repression in the Southern Cone was formalized in the Plan Condor. Though from the Ministry's documents and the Junta's protocols, it is not clear if the change of the diplomatic strategy was a deliberate attempt to cover up the intensified repression, it clearly responded to the perceived need to improve the official image that was ultimately also shared by the Junta.

Ultimately, the UN General Assembly did not take any further action apart for prolonging the Working Group's mission. And while the ratification of resolutions against Chile ensued in the following years, they bore no concrete consequences. Thus, the Junta's anxieties over the prospect of being ousted from the UN evaporated. In turn, amid Chile's economic stabilization and satisfactory performances, the regime's reaction to international criticism changed, paving the way for the second phase of its propaganda efforts. Deeming the "subversive threat" a thing of the past since the structures of the guerilla group MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria), the Socialist, and the Communist Parties had been virtually destroyed in Chile and their members murdered, disappeared, or driven into exile, the Junta now made a tactical concession and admitted that "excesses" might had been committed during the "fight against subversion."[44]

At the same time, the representatives of the Junta and the Foreign Ministry felt a growing dissatisfaction with the US government that they accused in private conversations, and occasionally publicly, of not giving enough support to a dedicated (anti-communist) ally. Whereas the Ford administration, and especially Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, had a positive view of the Chilean dictatorship, the US Congress passed legislation that restricted aid to Chile. Though the US administration was at first able to circumvent those restrictions, it avoided public shows of support so as to not antagonize Congress.[45]

As these divergent developments show, the dictatorship found itself in a complex international situation at the end of 1975 and in 1976. While the Junta expanded its repression beyond Chile's borders, on the insistence of the Foreign Ministry it was also willing to abandon its overt advocacy of anti-communism as an integral part of its foreign policy and allow for cosmetic changes.

Underpinning the second phase were the dictatorship's Constitutional Acts of September 1976. Consisting of several guarantees to defend fundamental civil rights, Leigh argued that these Acts were a response to a promise that Pinochet had made at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in

Santiago in June 1976.[46] Published only weeks before the Junta's assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington DC, the Acts signified the dictatorship's most visible shift towards human rights protection to date.[47] At the same time, it could also be presented as a step towards the return to a constitutional order—and perhaps the definition of a new one—and eventually to democracy. Pinochet's circle of intellectuals, of which Jaime Guzmán was the most important example, barely reined in this impulse when admitting that the regime's Constitutional Acts were designed with international audiences in mind. "The first question that they will ask [will be], if we will make a democracy or not," he said in a meeting of the Junta.[48]

The debate on the 1976 Constitutional Acts saw the Junta divided on how to deal with Chile's negative international image. While Commander in Chief of the Navy, José Toribio Merino, argued that provisions that allowed for restrictions of rights contained in the acts would impede any improvement of the country's image, Leigh insisted on prioritizing "national security over image," which shows that this opening was taking place first and foremost on a symbolic level and that it by no means meant that the Junta would relinquish its grip on power. Sure enough, at no point did Chile's image abroad overrule national security considerations, as the Junta perceived them at least. However, as the Junta's discussion on the Constitutional Acts shows, the perceived need to improve the international image of Chile did contribute to shaping the concrete provisions, whereas the decision to take this step in the first place was clearly a response to commitments made on the international stage and with an international audience in mind.

This change of rhetoric accommodated the replacement of the internationally infamous DINA with a less sinister-sounding agency named Central Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI) in 1977.[49] This step was part of the efforts to improve the rapidly deteriorating relations with the U.S. which had been damaged due to the involvement of the DINA in the murder of Letelier in the heart of Washington D.C. However, there was little prospect for improvement after Jimmy Carter was sworn in as president in January 1977 and proclaimed human rights to be a cornerstone of US foreign policy.

Importantly, this change was also motivated by domestic causes. The dictatorship intended to capitalize on its "victory over subversion" to push forward its constitutional project. By the time Pinochet made his famous speech at Chacarillas, where he announced a timetable for Chile's transition from dictatorship to an "authoritarian" and "protected" democracy,[50] it was accompanied by a rhetoric that stressed the "closing" of the regime's past of oppression.[51] The Amnesty Law of April 1978, the brainchild of Chile's new moderate Minister of Interior Sergio Fernández, that advocated pardoning the crimes "of both sides," was the

epitome of the second phase's tactics. The discursive shift of these years was the basis upon which the constitutional process was to proceed unhindered. In contrast to the 1980s and the Constitutional Acts of 1976, in the late 1970s the "process of institutionalization" was not a major element of the dictatorship's rhetoric to improve its image abroad.

The road to the 1980 Constitution and its international dimension

In turn, 1978 saw the Junta's shift towards the third phase of its efforts in crafting its international image. In January, it convoked the Chilean population to participate in the so-called "Consulta" to support Pinochet's constitutional process and his confrontational stance vis-à-vis the UN. The context of this development was the passing of yet another UN General Assembly resolution in 1977, which demanded an analysis of the link between foreign aid to Chile and the ongoing human rights violations and resolved to establish a trust fund for the dictatorship's victims. Along with growing pressure from the US government when investigations pointed to the DINA as responsible for the Letelier murder, Pinochet even finally agreed to a visit from the UN's Working Group on Human Rights in Chile in 1978. By then, the escalating conflict with Argentina's belligerent military dictatorship in the Beagle Canal made the need to appease the international community seemingly more urgent, and the confrontation between Junta members Pinochet and Leigh threatened the Junta's cohesion.[52] Still, one can hardly speak of a one-way causal relationship between international pressure and the dictatorship's newfound moderation.[53] In fact, the new context of foreign threats and power struggles within the Junta meant that its defiance of international criticism might as well become an instrument for stabilizing the Junta's fragile unity and mobilizing the population in support of the regime.[54]

With three consecutive years of unprecedented economic growth behind it, by 1979 the dictatorship's anxieties over economic boycotts had diminished considerably, allowing it to dismiss its critics abroad by adducing its so-called "economic miracle." Following its visit to Chile, the UN Commission on Human Rights dissolved the Working Group in March 1979, giving place to a new body named the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Chile. To this, Pinochet retaliated boldly by ending his cooperation with the UN human rights bodies altogether.[55] On the other hand, public relations efforts to appeal to international audiences intensified, for example, with the founding of the journal *Chile Ahora* in 1979, a platform designed almost solely to promote Chile's new successful image abroad.[56]

This diminished interest in responding to international criticism at the end of 1970s also had effects on the international promotion of the constitutional process. In the late 1970s—and unlike the Constitutional Acts—, the Foreign Ministry did not see the new constitution as a major element for improving Chile's image abroad, even if it might have been considering the constitutional process as a model to follow for allied anti-communist dictatorships such as the one in El Salvador, as Avery argues.[57] Rather, it seemed that international recognition should be achieved in order to bolster the legitimacy of the constitution in Chile. In the mission statements for the directives for 1979 and 1980, that were drafted by the Junta, the Foreign Ministry was urged to achieve "definitive support"[58] and "definitive international comprehension of the Chilean institutional process",[59] though this process was mentioned later in the directives, among the aspects that had improved the Chilean image abroad in the previous months. Consequently, the activities of the Ministry were focused on monitoring the international reaction to the government's measures rather than, at that moment, actively promoting the constitutional process as an argument to legitimize the dictatorship's continuing rule. In August 1980—immediately after Pinochet had announced the Plebiscite—the Foreign Ministry started monitoring the international reactions expressed in official and non-official statements, as well as press coverage, and forwarded its reports to the General Secretary of the Government. Week by week, an increasingly negative reaction was noted. The last report, immediately before the Plebiscite, stated: "Finally, one should be aware that the international reaction is not to be assumed to vary when the Plebiscite has taken place; there will most probably be attempts to materialize one or another of the announced condemnations in the bilateral or multilateral sphere."[60]

Indeed, in the first days after the Plebiscite, the Foreign Ministry noticed an adverse reaction abroad. In a confidential memo to all missions from early October 1980, it informed of a "reactivation of the campaign against Chile" and gave detailed instruction on how to respond to this criticism which was seen as aiming at two of the pillars of the legitimacy of the constitution, particularly in the questions about whether the vote had been free and fair and whether some provisions of the constitution might be considered violations of international laws. The Ministry had a clear sense of which provisions caused criticism abroad: the prohibition of left-wing parties, the definition of terrorism as a violation of human rights, the restrictions of the freedom of association, the restriction of civil rights during the state of emergency and the 8-year-long transitional period.[61] At this point, the Chilean Foreign Ministry was focused on avoiding or toning down an adverse international reaction to the constitution that might have had negative effects on the promulgation of the ongoing process in Chile.

As could be expected, the advent of Ronald Reagan's administration in 1981 reinforced the regime's self-confidence. Counting on the new US President's anti-communist zeal, Pinochet anticipated an immediate improvement in US-Chile bilateral relations, regardless of the dictatorship's human rights record. However, though the US administration was willing to improve relations with Chile, Congress continued to uphold most of the conditions for a rapprochement, especially the certification from the government that improvements in human rights had taken place and that the Chilean regime was collaborating in the clarification of the Letelier murder.[62] At the UN—then, still the one arena where Chile's critics from the communist bloc had any substantial say—criticism diminished, in spite of Chile's refusal to cooperate with its human rights bodies. In effect, by ignoring international criticism, the dictatorship leaders did implicitly admit that the efforts to win over critics or to put a conclusive end to the regime's vilification in the international arena had, in fact, failed. Many of the dictatorship's high-ranking officials increasingly voiced the opinion that the anti-Chilean campaign would not quite end, independently of how the regime treated its burgeoning domestic political opposition.[63] Underlying this sort of apathy were two essential convictions: that no matter how harsh it appears, international criticism tends to bear little to no economic consequences; and that appeasing the international community with selective humanitarian measures seldom yields any diplomatic results and that this tactic is therefore fruitless.

The defense of "institutionalization" as a justification for repression

With the onset of Chile's dramatic economic crisis in 1982, the efforts to actively promote this image abroad intensified again. Pinochet's hopes that economic progress might expunge the memory of his regime's crimes were crushed, when by 1983, amid extremely violent demonstrations against the regime's economic failure, and with the Chilean democratic opposition unified and in the open, the international community finally renewed its denunciation of the dictatorship in Chile. Baffled by this crisis that caused the death of hundreds of Chileans, the regime's leadership reacted with considerable delay. As part of this reaction, the defense of the new constitutional order and the promise of an eventual return to democracy became the centerpiece of the regime's international rhetoric to legitimize its rule. At the start, it sought to appease national and international public opinion by staging a series of shows of liberalization and allowing political association (also known as the 1983 "Jarpa Spring"). Pretending that these reforms were the natural outcome of Pinochet's "institutionalization," allowed the regime's representatives to portray any act

of civil unrest as a "terrorist threat" and a threat to Chile's democratization. Hence, speaking to the UN General Assembly in 1983, Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Schweitzer went as far as praising the 1980 Constitution for the "full freedom of the press, information, assembly, and opinion," it had granted the Chilean citizens and vowed that this legal text meant that the citizens would "exercise their rights [...] in a full democracy." Even the opposition's "cowardly assassinations, terrorist acts, or acts of vandalism," could not stop this process, he said.[64]

Slowly but surely, the regime portrayed both internal and external protests as a threat to the new "process of institutionalization." This change was evident in the 1984 Plan General de Información Exterior y Difusión Cultural (the General Plan for Information Abroad and Cultural Diffusion), a more proactive propaganda effort by the regime to tackle the broadening civil unrest and its international repercussions.[65] In one internal report, the Foreign Ministry explained that Chilean propaganda now ought to "prevent external pressure from endangering our Government's institutionalization process."[66] In more concrete terms, it urged the other ministries to put "special emphasis" on highlighting the "progress in political development" in order to counter criticism pertaining to human rights violations, as well as to assuage these criticisms' effect on "the relation with certain countries and Chile's position in the International Organizations."[67] Indeed, by 1985 the Foreign Ministry was forced to cope with a renewed wave of criticism from international organizations. At long last, it established relations with one of the Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights in Chile. Ratified by Pinochet himself, this decision answered the professional diplomatic body's ongoing demand that Chile cease its snubbing of the Rapporteur's work.[68]

These actions came about against the backdrop of the Reagan administration's change of attitude towards authoritarianism and human rights violations in the mid-1980s. Its inability to completely overturn its predecessor's human rights policy due to resistance from Congress led to an appropriation of human rights language, identifying democracy first and foremost with (formal) democracy.[69] With the Iran-Contra scandal tarnishing the Republican president's image, from 1985 onwards the US backed democratic transitions more enthusiastically and refrained from identifying with dubious leaders such as Pinochet.[70] Sensing this sea change, the Chilean democratic opposition and international human rights organizations formulated firmer demands for democratization and for guarantees that human rights would be protected.[71]

The dictatorship noticed this new approach and tried to adapt to it. The active promotion of the "process of institutionalization" on the international level was a response to the Reagan administration's emphasis on democracy

as a key human right. Moreover, promises of institutional reform and an eventual return to democratic rule had worked for Guatemala and El Salvador to improve relations with the U.S.[72] In October 1987, one year before the plebiscite that was to decide the continuation of Pinochet's presidency, the Foreign Ministry instructed its embassies to highlight more intensely Chile's "process of institutionalization,"[73] and more specifically, the regime's "projection […] within the concept of a modern and fortified democracy."[74]

The promotion of the "process of institutionalization," however, could not only be used to mitigate demands for the immediate installation of a democratic government. Stressing this process's fragility was also an argument to justify repression. Indeed, the regime presented its institutionalization's very success as hinging on the capacity to counter the left-wing's "terrorist threat." The assassination attempt against Pinochet in September 1986 marked the pinnacle of this line of argumentation. In the plenary session of the UN General Assembly, the Chilean representative accused the "Soviet bloc" of having financed and organized the terrorists' armament. With this, he intended to generate support for the dictatorship by aligning it with the democratic "Western nations" in their supposed self-defense against the "long-established criminal plot" aiming to undermine their "essential values."[75] That "international terrorism" appeared now as a political concern, rather than a military one, was also a key feature in Chile's only "counter-report" to a report from a UN Special Rapporteur from 1986. Chile's Communist Party, the counter-report stated, carried the responsibility for any human rights violation given that it "obliges the Government to apply and maintain measures to safeguard the security of the population," only to later portray these measures as "repression." According to the counter-report, supported by the USSR, the Chilean communists thus aimed to "obstruct" Pinochet's sincere efforts both to "implement a fully democratic system" in Chile and to develop the country economically.[76] In short, the regime portrayed terrorism as a menace to three pillars of its legitimation: the efforts for democratization, economic development, and its international recognition that was in danger due to the efforts to isolate it internationally.

Conclusion: Legitimizing authoritarian democracy against the background of stark human rights violations

Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorships faced international criticism from the very first hours of its existence. By putting forth the demand that the regime cease human rights violations, the unprecedented international coalition of forces that amassed against it ultimately succeeded in stirring the international

community to condemn the regime, investigate its crimes, and threaten it with economic sanctions. When eschewing criticism of its human rights violations record—which by 1989, comprised some three thousand cases of murder and forced disappearance—the dictatorship utilized the following legitimation strategies: It postulated 1) that the regime had saved Chile from a murderous Marxist-totalitarian dictatorship; 2) that the dictatorship had revived Chile's economy thereby enhancing the rule of law and facilitating democratic life; 3) that Pinochet's regime was the sole party guaranteeing Chile's democratic future and committed to the country's tradition of constitutional evolution; 4) and last, that the regime had fallen prey to a sophisticated defamation campaign that, at its peak, used terrorist tactics only to deem afterwards the regime's self-defense countermeasures as "human rights violations."

The first axiom served as the regime's utmost legitimation strategy during its first years. With the supportive anti-communist Nixon administration backing the regime politically and financially, and amid an era still dominated by the National Security Doctrine, portraying Allende's government as a preamble for a totalitarian regime (let alone falsely accusing it of planning a coup against Chile's constitutional order) was all but a natural move for the Junta. Next, after 1975, when the so-called "Chicago Boys" began navigating Chile's economy towards its short-lived "miracle," economic growth, in and of itself, became a powerful source of political legitimation. In turn, by the late 1970s the regime felt confident enough to present a triumphant narrative claiming that it had transcended the "subversive threat." As I have indicated in the pages above, Chile's economic leap forward appeared as a teleological narrative that justified the regime's very existence and mitigated anxieties over the prospects of international boycotts, sanctions, and embargos.

This led to a period, from late 1978 to the start of national protests in 1982/1983, in which the dictatorship perceived it less necessary to respond to international criticism. It used this time to push forward its political project on the national level and have the new constitution ratified in the plebiscite of 1980. In contrast to the Constitutional Acts of 1976, that were interpreted internally as a clear signal for international observers, in 1980 the regime was very much focused on the implications of the process on the domestic scale. It was, however, preoccupied with the international reaction, hoping that a positive one would bolster the legitimacy of the new constitution. Only in the mid-1980s would this "process of institutionalization" move to the center of the dictatorship's pledge for legitimacy on an international level.

With the international pressure against the dictatorship's human rights violations growing again, by the mid-1980s the constitutional process was elevated to being the centerpiece of the regime's legitimacy. Still, "institutionalization"

served as a key footing for the regime's initial legitimation with the establishment of the constitutional commission in late 1973.[77] That is to say, the 1980 Constitution was the most long-standing, and by far the more internationally appealing, legitimation strategy. The regime's leaders came to understand that anti-communism and economic success—let alone more "innocent topics" such as tourism and culture[78]—were hardly sustainable legitimations on their own, and could not defend the dictatorship from criticism and potential economic isolation.

This fact became painfully clear in 1982, once the Chilean economy imploded. Assuredly, the regime never stopped publicizing its alleged interconnected economic, social, and cultural achievements worldwide. Commemorating its tenth anniversary, it even published a lavish book showing off its economic and social success, in the midst of the most severe economic setback in Chilean history.[79] Consequently, by the mid-1980s even national security reasonings were relegated to being merely a supportive argument for "institutionalization." If in 1973 "anti-subversion" justified an infinite oppressive state of emergency, now "anti-terrorism" repression was presented to the international community as a means to one end: a secure, and quick, return to parliamentary democracy.

International legitimacy is a factor that has preoccupied almost all military dictatorships, and certainly those in South America during the Cold War. It served them to sustain their rule on a national level by obtaining the populace's voluntary support, be it reluctant or enthusiastic. Internationally, it was vital for these dictatorships' market-based economic reforms and armament programs. As in Chile, they developed a number of diplomatic efforts to neutralize criticism in international organizations and bilateral relations as well as propaganda initiatives to improve their image, the most infamous example being the instrumentalization of the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina.[80] However, none of the dictatorships in the neighboring countries undertook a project for institutional reform of a similar scope to Chile's. The project of the Argentine dictatorship quickly ran into difficulties and never materialized.[81] In Brazil the military pushed for the elaboration of a new constitution in 1967 by Congress that underwent a fundamental reform only two years later. However, this constitution was not in the same way part of a "refoundational" political project as was the "protected democracy" in Chile. The rivalries between the different factions of the Brazilian military impeded crafting a system that would have concentrated too much power in a single person. Neither did the dictatorship fully eliminate civilian participation in politics through parliament, probably due to its reasoning that its rule was preparing the ground for a fully democratic system that would be achieved via reform rather than "refoundation."[82] Shortly after the end of the dictatorship, the constitution of 1967 was replaced by a new one.

Therefore, the Chilean case was special in three ways. Firstly, international criticism aimed at the regime in Santiago was considerably higher, turning it into an emblematic case for the nascent human rights movement. This meant that the country's international image was discussed among the highest echelons of hierarchy, up to the Junta, and that the threat of economic or political sanctions was a constant worry for the regime. Though these threats never actually materialized, the Junta's fear that they might was the driving force behind its international propaganda activities. Secondly, due to the regime's duration well into the 1980s— the Argentine handed over power in 1983, the Brazilian in 1985—it was the main South American target for the Reagan administration when it increased its support for democratization by the mid-1980s. It is, thirdly, therefore little surprise that in Chile, unlike in Brazil, Argentina, or Uruguay, "institutionalization" would become the nodal point for all legitimation tactics. That the 1980 Constitution has survived until time of writing (2022) goes to show how successful this international legitimation really was.

Notes

1. This article is based on my PhD thesis in which I investigated how the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile dealt with international human rights criticism, see Philipp Kandler, *Menschenrechtspolitik kontern. Der Umgang mit internationaler Kritik in Argentinien und Chile (1973-1990)* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus Verlag, 2020). I thank Daniel Kressel and the two anonymous reviewers for comments to the manuscript of this article.
2. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 226-A" (18.8.1975), in Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional (BCN).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Heraldo Muñoz, *Las relaciones exteriores del Gobierno Militar chileno* (Santiago: Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco/PROSPEL-CERC, 1986), p. 99f.
6. Jan Eckel, *Die Ambivalenz des Guten. Menschenrechte in der internationalen Politik seit den 1940ern* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), pp. 808-813; Mark Bradley, *The World Reimagined. Americans and Humans Rights in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.131-141.
7. Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia. Human Rights in History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), pp. 140-144.
8. Patrick Kelly, *Sovereign Emergencies. Latin America and the Making of Global Human Rights Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 134-166; see also Klaas Dykmann, *Philanthropic Endeavors or the Exploitation of an Ideal? The Human Rights Policy of the Organization of American States in Latin America (1970-1991)* (Frankfurt/M.: Vervuert, 2004), p. 197f.
9. Eckel, *Ambivalenz*, p. 586.
10. These types of legitimations have been the central focus in the now-famous analyses of Juan Linz and Guillermo O'Donnell, see Juan Linz, *Totalitäre und autoritäre Regime*

(Berlin: Wissenschaftsverlag, 2000), p. 176; Guillermo O'Donnell, *El estado burocrático autoritario: Triunfos, derrotas y crisis* (Buenos Aires: Belgrano, 1982); see also Karen Remmer and Gilbert Merkx, "Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism Revisited," *Latin American Research Review*, 17:2 (1982), p. 6; Johannes Gerschewski, "The Three Pillars of Stability. Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes," *Democratization*, 20:1 (2013), pp. 13-38.

11. Carlos Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), p. 139f.
12. Manuel Garretón, "Political Processes in an Authoritarian Regime. The Dynamics of Institutionalization and Opposition in Chile, 1973-1980," in Julio Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), *Military Rule in Chile. Dictatorship and Oppositions* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 146.
13. Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, "'¡Estamos en guerra, Señores!' El régimen militar de Pinochet y el 'pueblo', 1973-1980," *Historia* 43:1 (2010), pp. 163-201.
14. Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, pp. 139-177.
15. Jorge Olguín Olate, "La derecha chilena y los principios legitimadores del pre y post golpe de Estado de 1973," *Izquierdas*, 38 (2018), pp. 149-159; Stephan Ruderer, "'Gerechter Krieg' oder 'Würde des Menschen': Religion und Gewalt in Argentinien und Chile: Eine Frage der Legitimation," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 58:12 (2010), pp. 982-985.
16. Stephan Ruderer, "'Change Direction': Influencing the National Church through the Vatican during the Pinochet Dictatorship in Chile," *Religions*, 11:595 (2020). doi:10.3390/rel11110595
17. Eckel, *Ambivalenz*, p. 652f. See also Sonia Cardenas, *Conflict and Compliance*. *State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), pp. 83-85.
18. E.g. Muñoz, *Relaciones exteriores*; Joaquín Fermandois, *Mundo y fin de mundo: Chile en la política mundial, 1900-2004* (Santiago: Editora Universidad Católica de Chile, 2005).
19. Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File. A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: New Press, 2004).
20. Molly Avery, "Promoting a 'Pinochetazo': The Chilean Dictatorship's Foreign Policy in El Salvador during the Carter Years, 1977-81," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 52:4 (2020), pp. 759-784.
21. Archivo General Histórico del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (AGH). The protocols can be found in the "Diarios de Sesiones e Intervenciones Parlamentarias. Corporaciones Legislativas y Diarios de Sesiones, 1973-1990", in BCN. URL: https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/corporaciones/periodos_legislativos?periodo=1973-1990 (Last access: 2.11.2021).
22. For the importance of perception in foreign policy see for example Klaus Dodds, "The Falkland War and a Critical Geopolitical Eye. Steve Bell and the If… Cartoons," *Political Geography*, 15:6/7 (1996), pp. 571-592; Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse. Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography*, 11:2 (1992), pp. 190-204; Gottfried Niedhart, "Selektive Wahrnehmung und politisches Handeln. Internationale Beziehungen im Perzeptionsparadigma," in Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), *Internationale Geschichte. Themen-Ergebnisse-Aussichten* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), pp. 141-157.
23. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo s/n, "Circular Secreta 7" (24.8.1979).

24. Ibid.
25. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR s/n, MRE Chile, "Circular Reservada 138" (5.7.1984).
26. Marcelo Casals, "Anticommunism in 20th-Century Chile: From the 'Social Question' to the Military Dictatorship", in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History* (Oxford University Press, 2019).
27. About the National Security Doctrine see Luis Roniger and Mario Sznajder, *The Legacy of Human-Rights Violations in the Southern Cone*. *Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 7-20; Margaret Crahan, "National Security Ideology and Human Rights," in Margaret Crahan (ed.), *Human Rights and Basic Needs in the Americas* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1982), pp. 100-116; Augusto Varas, *Los militares en el poder. Régimen y gobierno militar en Chile 1973-1986* (Santiago: Pehuén Editores, 1987), pp. 27-33.
28. Alfredo Riquelme, "La Guerra Fría en Chile. Los intrincados nexos entre lo nacional y lo global," in Tanya Harmer and Alfredo Riquelme (eds.), *Chile y la Guerra Fría global* (Santiago: RIL Editores, 2014), pp. 31-33; Giselle Munizaga, *El discurso público de Pinochet*. *Un análisis semiológico* (Santiago: CESOC/CENECA, 1988), p. 67.
29. Tanya Harmer, "Fractious Allies: Chile, the United States, and the Cold War, 1973-76," *Diplomatic History*, 37:1 (2013), pp. 109-143.
30. Joseph Ramos, *Neoconservative Economics in the Southern Cone of Latin America, 1973-1983* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 9.
31. John Bawden, "Cutting Off the Dictator. The United States Arms Embargo of the Pinochet Regime, 1974-1988," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 45:3 (2013), pp. 530-536; Muñoz, *Relaciones exteriores*, p. 163; Eckel, *Ambivalenz*, pp. 648-650; Harmer, "Fractious Allies."
32. Muñoz, *Relaciones exteriores*, p. 155; Fermandois, *Mundo y fin de mundo*, p. 418.
33. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR 73, MRE Chile, "Circular Reservada 32" (21.11.1973).
34. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR 75, MRE Chile, "Circular Ordinaria 166" (2.11.1973) and Tomo CIR 77, MRE Chile, "Circular Ordinaria 46" (8.2.1974).
35. República de Chile, *Libro Blanco del cambio de gobierno en Chile*. *11 de septiembre de 1973* (Santiago: Editorial Lord Cochrane, 1974), pp. 41-45. For a deconstruction of this argument see Steve Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds: Memory Struggles in Pinochet's Chile, 1973-1988* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 41-50.
36. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 37" (19.11.1973), in BCN.
37. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 141-A" (30.7.1974), in BCN.
38. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR 76, MRE Chile, "Circular Secreta 2" (13.8.1974).
39. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 150-A" (29.8.1974), in BCN.
40. For example, in the UN Commission on Human Rights and its sub-committees (AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR 80, MRE Chile, "Circular Telex 46" [19.2.1974]).
41. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 193-A" (23.4.1975), in BCN.
42. For example, Minister of Economy Fernando Léniz warned the Junta in 1974 about possible consequences of international criticism for foreign aid (Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 177-A" (11.12.1974), in BCN). Another example are the warnings of Lavín that are mentioned above.
43. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR 81, MRE Chile, "Circular Secreta 2" (25.3.1975).
44. Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds*, pp. 242-245.
45. Harmer, "Fractious Allies."
46. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 281-A" (9.9.1976), in BCN.

47. About the internal situation in Chile in the second half of the 1970s, see Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, pp. 152-168; Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds*, pp. 137-195; about the international context see Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals. U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 121-147.
48. Secretaría Junta de Gobierno, "Acta No. 281-A" (9.9.1976), in BCN.
49. Cardenas, *Conflict and Compliance*, pp. 76-83; Eckel, *Ambivalenz*, p. 657.
50. "Anoche en Chacarillas. S.E. indicó grandes líneas institucionales," *El Mercurio* (10.7.1977), S. 33; see also Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, pp. 151-162.
51. In Steve Stern's words, this was the moment the regime began treating the memory of oppression as "a closed box," see Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds*, pp. 242-245.
52. About this complex situation see Stern, *Battling for Hearts and Minds*, p. 144-155.
53. Such a direct link was postulated in the so called "spiral model," in Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction," in Thomas Risse, Kathryn Sikkink and Stephen Ropp (eds.), *The Power of Human Rights. International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 1-38. The model was criticized for its weak empirical basis. Eckel argues that it does not apply to the Chilean case, in *Ambivalenz*, p. 659.
54. An indicator for this complex situation are also the diverging evaluations in the academic literature: Eckel, *Ambivalenz*, p. 649; Bawden, "Cutting Off," pp. 530-536; Darren Hawkins, *International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), pp. 173-178.
55. AGH, Fondo OI, Tomo 855, Delegación de Chile en Ginebra a MRE Chile, "Telex 92-94" (1.2.1979).
56. See the first issue: "Carta Editorial," *Chile Ahora*, 1:1 (1979), p. 1.
57. Avery, "Promoting a 'Pinochetazo,'" p. 761.
58. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo s/n, "Circular Secreta 7" (24.8.1979).
59. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo s/n, "Circular Secreta s/n" (21.2.1980).
60. AGH, Fondo Ministerios, Tomo 597, MRE to Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, "Oficios Reservados 47, 48, 51, 53, 55, 56, 58" (19.8.-10.9.1980).
61. AGH, Fondo Circulares, Tomo s/n, MRE Chile, "Circular Reservada 118" (3.10.1980).
62. Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, pp. 148-180; Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, *Reagan and Pinochet. The Struggle Over U.S. Policy Toward Chile* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 26-52.
63. Eckel, *Ambivalenz*, p. 659; Walker, "End of Influence", pp. 125-127.
64. UN, General Assembly, 38th Session, 16th Plenary meeting (3.19.1983): Mr. Schweitzer (Chile). A/38/PV.16.
65. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR s/n, MRE Chile, "Circular Reservada 138" (5.7.1984).
66. AGH, Fondo Ministerios, Tomo 805, MRE Chile a Ministerio del Interior, "Oficio Secreto 8637" (21.8.1986).
67. Ibid.
68. AGH, Fondo OI, Tomo s/n, Delegación de Chile en Ginebra a MRE Chile, "Oficio Reservado 175/84" (3.7.1984); AGH, Fondo OI, Tomo s/n, Delegación de Chile en Ginebra a MRE Chile, "Oficio Secreto 005/85" (2.5.1985).
69. Dykmann: *Philanthropic Endeavors*, S. 318-329; Eckel: *Ambivalenz*, S. 544-567.
70. Kornbluh, *Pinochet File*, pp. 426-434.
71. Edward Cleary, *The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. 12.

72. Jennifer Schirmer, "The Looting of Democratic Discourse by the Guatemalan Military: Implications for Human Rights," in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg (eds.), *Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship, and Society in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 85-97.
73. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR s/n, MRE Chile, "Circular Secreta 140" (7.10.1987).
74. AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR s/n, MRE Chile, "Circular Secreta 161" (7.12.1987).
75. UN, General Assembly, 41st Session, 15th Plenary meeting (30.09.1986): Mr. del Valle (Chile). A/41/PV.15.
76. UN, General Assembly: *Report of the Economic and Social Council. Protection of Human Rights in Chile. Letter Dated 25 July 1986 From the Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General* (1.9.1986). A/41/523.
77. On the constitutional process see Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime*, pp. 151-162.
78. Among the first measures the Foreign Ministry recommended to the embassies was the promotion of these topics: AGH, Fondo MRE, Tomo CIR 73, MRE Chile, "Circular Confidencial 32" (21.11.1973).
79. República de Chile, *Chile 1973-1983. Diez años de realizaciones. Ten Years of Achievement* (Boulogne: Delroisse, 1983).
80. For an overview see Kandler, *Menschenrechtspolitik kontern*, p. 381-386.
81. E. g. Paula Canelo, *El Proceso en su laberinto: La interna militar de Videla a Bignone* (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2008), pp. 215-224.
82. E.g. Thomas Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-85* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 156-159; Maria José de Rezende, *A Ditadura Militar no Brasil: 1964-1984* (Londrina: Eduel, 2001), pp. 29-36.