‘Los Duros’: The Neo-Fascist Opposition to Chile’s 1980 Constitution, and its Francoist Connections[1]

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Abstract

The article explores the activity of Chile’s unique neo-fascist movement from the early 1970s until 1990. Whereas Jaime Guzmán and his ideological group (the *gremialistas*) believed that the military dictatorship should conclude with the creation of a protected parliamentary democracy, the so-called hardliners thought that the dictatorship’s mission was to institute a fascist-corporatist regime in Chile. First, the article shows that while Guzmán became the regime’s chief ideologue, the hardliners operated as outsiders and harshly opposed both the regime’s neoliberal model and the 1980 Constitution. Second, it examines the hardliners ’campaigns against the constitutional process, and delves into their links with Spanish neo-fascist elements. It argues that, ironically, these campaigns helped Guzmán propagate the 1980 Constitution as a moderate position between two statist ideological extremes. On the other hand, their intransigence hindered the efforts to unify Chile’s right-wing sectors into a single electoral front ahead of the 1988 constitutional referendum and 1989 elections, thus going against their intentions to control the constitutional process after 1988.

Keywords: the Constitution of 1980; Augusto Pinochet; Hardliners; neo-fascism; corporatism

Resumen

El artículo analiza la actividad del movimiento neofascista chileno desde principios de la década de 1970 hasta 1990. Mientras que Jaime Guzmán y su grupo ideológico (el gremialismo) creían que la dictadura militar debía concluir con la creación de una democracia parlamentaria protegida, los

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"duros" pensaban que la misión de la dictadura era instituir un régimen fascista-corporativista en Chile. Primero, el artículo muestra que mientras Guzmán se convirtió en el principal ideólogo del régimen, los duros actuaron como independientes y se opusieron duramente tanto al modelo neoliberal del régimen como a la Constitución de 1980. En segundo lugar, examina las campañas de los duros contra el proceso constitucional y sus vínculos con elementos neofascistas españoles. Argumenta que estas campañas ayudaron a Guzmán a propagar la Constitución de 1980 como una posición moderada entre dos extremos ideológicos "estatistas." Por otro lado, su intransigencia perjudicó los esfuerzos por unificar a los sectores derechistas en un frente electoral en vísperas del referéndum constitucional de 1988 y las elecciones de 1989, contrariando así sus intenciones de controlar el proceso constitucional después de 1988.

Palabras clave: Constitución de 1980; Augusto Pinochet; los duros; neo-fascismo; corporativismo

Introduction

For left-wing Chileans, the Constitution of 1980 has always been a symbol of frustration and capitulation. Enacted during Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship and approved in a dubious referendum on September 11, 1980, the constitution perhaps served as the basis for Chile's transition from military dictatorship to parliamentary democracy. Still, given the constitution's positioning of the executive power and Armed Forces above parliament (via its "authoritarian clauses"), it was a far cry from standard Western democratic constitutions as far as a healthy separation of powers was concerned. In turn, trying to either amend or annul the 1980 Constitution had been the Chilean Left's key political project since 1988, the year when a referendum was held that terminated Pinochet's so-called presidency. And yet, the left-wing polity was not, however, the only one opposing it. Chile's unique neo-fascist movement, too, rejected this text. While the constitution's architects could hardly be deemed heartfelt democrats, by 1977, they nonetheless accepted that a performance of parliamentarism was the dictatorship's only viable outcome. Thus, they accordingly set out to design a so-called "protected democracy," which had the appearance of a parliamentary democracy but aimed to establish a de facto dictatorship. For the neo-fascists, even this performance was redundant, if not dangerous. Instead, they put forward what they believed was an internationally legitimate alternative to Western parliamentarism, based on a neo-fascist state apparatus.

This article explores these people's ideology, activism, and influence on Chile's constitutional process. A loose network of intellectuals, publicists, and provocateurs, from the mid-1970s, they were identified in the public sphere as

the "nacionalistas" and "the hardliners" ("los duros"). They initially played an important role in laying the groundwork for the coup d'état on September 11, 1973 and continued to have intimate ties with members of the Armed Forces and secret police services in the late-1970s. Still, they always regarded themselves as outsiders to the dictatorship's institutions, a position that allowed them to launch repeated campaigns against the regime's constitutional process and the so-called "soft-liners" who led it. Faithful to the legacies of fascist Europe, they demanded that the dictatorship return to what they believed had been its true calling: establishing a totalitarian "corporatist" revolutionary state in Chile. This study poses that, similar to other transitional moments, for instance, in Spain and Argentina, the presence of a radical far-right agent at the center of the public sphere impacted the constitutional process in multiple ways. For one thing, despite initiating and endorsing the constitutional process, Pinochet betrayed his sympathies for the hardliners' positions, thereby cunningly casting doubt on his support of the motion towards parliamentarism whenever it served him politically. For another, ironically, the neo-fascists bolstered the prestige of the constitution's architects, allowing them to appear as conservative democrats espousing a realist middle ground between a communistic and fascist "totalitarian" delirium.

Even more striking was the hardliners' criticism of the dictatorship's neoliberal reforms, which echoed, if not appropriated, the left wing's agenda. Against the background of the Cold War's gradual waning, the hardliners' struggle to undo the 1980 Constitution increasingly rested on anti-oligarchic and "anti-imperial" slogans. In more concrete terms, the hardliners held two distinctive stances: for one thing, they posed that the state should reclaim its role as an omnipresent apparatus harmonizing labor and capital, thereby not only redistributing wealth but integrating the nation spiritually and culturally. For another thing, they sought to establish a unique system of representation that would surpass Western parliamentarism, based on society's "organic" units of production. In this way, they alleged, neither the capitalist oligarchies nor the working class would selfishly govern society to their benefit. If these formulas seem familiar, it is because they are refurbished versions of the political myths of 1930s fascism. Although the hardliners did not take kindly to this comparison, they still willingly evoked the memory of European fascist leaders, the most prominent of them being José Antonio Primo de Rivera (or simply "José Antonio"). Executed during the Spanish Civil War, this Spanish fascist had become, by 1973, a usable past whose concepts—"national-syndicalism" and "pending revolution," to mention but two—appeared in the hardliners' texts well into the 1990s. This article demonstrates that the hardliners not only made no effort to hide the Joseantonian mythology, they also sought to enhance their prestige and legitimacy

by intimately collaborating with Spanish neo-fascist and authoritarian leaders who, not by coincidence, recycled the very same mythology when opposing their country's democratic transition at that time. In this sense, the article adds to our understanding of Latin American corporatist thought and networks, as products of memory and as raw materials for the creation of usable pasts rather than functioning solely as political ideologies.[2]

Historians have already scrutinized the ideas of many of the intellectuals examined in the pages below, albeit disjointedly for the most part.[3] The novelty of my analysis resides in examining these actors and initiatives as constituting one ideological movement entangled in a binary struggle that, in a way, defined the Chilean right-wing spectrum for more than two decades. The hardliners' primary rivals were those who nowadays are recognized as the 1980 Constitution's architects, namely Jaime Guzmán and the ideological movement he led ever since the late 1960s: El Movimiento Gremial de la Universidad Católica de Chile (or *gremialismo*). Transpiring from within the doctrinal body of Chile's Hispanic traditionalism of the 1930s, in the late-1960s Guzmán's ideology (which I define elsewhere as Hispanic Technocracy) differed from that of the hardliners in several fundamental ways.[4] Although they agreed on sacred conservative values such as the Catholic revelation, the family, and the nation, the two held different interpretations of what corporatism meant, what the state's role in society should be, and to what extent one should use political violence against the state's enemies. Operating ever since 1973 in a political axis with Pinochet's "Chicago boys" neoliberal economists, the *gremialistas* reached a momentary position of hegemony within the regime during the late-1970s, as ministers and in the Ortúzar commission tasked with designing the 1980 Constitution. The hardliners, on the other hand, never received cabinet positions and were entirely absent from the process of devising Chile's democratic future.

In truth, the hardliners staged several campaigns against the dictatorship's institutionalization, some of which gained the support and actual presence of prominent Spanish intellectuals. Indeed, by doggedly demanding a return to the corporatist economic models of the 1930s, this transatlantic collaboration was one of the last times "corporatism" was openly promoted and hailed as a political model in Cold War history. The ideological chasm between Chile's right-wing political currents only grew more bitter in the 1980s as Chile approached its famed October 1988 referendum. By then, the *gremialistas* gradually moved towards centrist ideological positions and rubbed shoulders with members of the democratic opposition, while the hardliners underwent a process of ideological radicalization. This fissure, between these two entirely different concepts of the state, bore detrimental consequences for Chile's right-wing polity's ability to unify politically. The article's layout is thus simple: it begins in 1970, at the

time when Salvador Allende's election finally brought to the surface a clear neo-fascist movement that sought to replace Chile's 1925 Constitution with a "nacionalista" corporatist state. Here I touch on how the neo-fascists precipitated Allende's downfall and how they fared after Pinochet's coup d'état. Next, the article explores how the hardliners mobilized against the constitutional process after 1977, when it was first publicly announced, and specifies the media apparatuses that supported them. Last, I examine the hardliners' resistance to the Chilean democratic transition in the 1980s and elucidate how they propagated their ideology during Chile's October 1988 referendum and at the outset of the democratic transition in 1989.

Technocrats versus neo-fascists in the struggle for the Armed Forces' hearts (1970-1977)

The hardliners' ideological origins date back to the 1930s and the rise of international fascism. During that time, Chile had its share of local philo-fascist movements, ranging from the Movimiento Nacional Socialista de Chile to the Falange Nacional—a party whose leaders drew from from Spanish Falangism and José Antonio's social doctrine when propagating a "third path" between communism and capitalism.[5] After 1945, with the Falange Nacional renamed the Partido Demócrata Cristiano, fascist ideology ostensibly faded from the Chilean public sphere, only to resurface in the late-1960s amid the popular mobilization of Eduardo Frei's Christian Democracy.[6] By 1970, in the wake of Salvador Allende's presidency, groups demanding the replacement of Chile's parliamentary democracy with authoritarianism loomed large in the public sphere.[7] A fissure between two groups of young activists then became evident. On the one hand, were Jaime Guzmán and his followers. A Francoist sympathizer and acolyte of Chile's famous traditionalists Osvaldo Lira and Jaime Eyzaguirre, Guzmán exemplified how one can transform Hispanic traditionalism into a post-fascist technocratic ideology centered on market-based development.[8] Guzmán thus defined his ideology as anti-totalitarian, anti-statist, and overall, as the "antithesis to fascism."[9] On the other hand, were the "nacionalistas." Openly neo-fascist for the most part, they proposed defanging communism by pioneering a corporatist (or "national-syndicalist") revolution of their own. In truth, the two groups reverberated corporatist ideology, but somewhat differently. When Guzmán spoke of a "corporate organization of society," he thought of "intermediary bodies with authentic natural right, situated between society and the State," or what political scientist António Costa Pinto has dubbed *social corporatism*.[10] The nacionalistas, on the other hand, envisioned an omnipres-

ent state harmonizing labor and capital and integrating the nation through an "organic" chamber representing all production groups—what Costa Pinto calls *political corporatism.*[11]

To be sure, the label "nacionalistas" predated Allende's tenure. Jorge Prat, the leader of Acción Nacional (the National Action Party), was the man most identified with the term ever since the early 1960s. The founder and editor of the journal *Estanquero*, and born on the same day as José Antonio, he often identified with Spanish fascism and Salazar's Portugal.[12] Other traditionalist self-labeled "nacionalistas" were Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, Mario Arnello, and Jorge Iván Hübner Gallo. The first was a Francoist sympathizer, a member of the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica in Madrid (ICH),[13] and the editor of *El Mercurio*, Chile's top conservative newspaper.[14] The second studied in Madrid and, in 1953, published his Ph.D. on National Syndicalism.[15] The third, too, was an ICH member who had completed his Ph.D. in Spain and was an undisputed authority in Francoist state-ideology. "Spain, under the visionary and providential government of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, has overcome all difficulties, all dangers [...] reaffirming the destiny that calls upon it to be United, Great, and Free," he wrote.[16] By the late 1960s, these men dominated the right-wing public sphere via journals such as *PEC*, *Portada,* and *Tizona*. The latter, the brainchild of Juan Antonio Widow, not only displayed a fierce clerico-fascist tone,[17] but collaborated with Blas Piñar—then, the leader of Spain's neo-fascist movement Fuerza Nueva and an avid devotee of José Antonio's ideology.

Still, the nacionalistas' shift from intellectual work to mobilization and violence happened in different quarters. Just before the 1970 elections, the Chilean public became privy to a new militant movement: Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad (FNPL). Founded by a young lawyer named Pablo Rodríguez Grez and recognized quickly by its ominous spider-like symbol, it played an important role in destabilizing Allende's administration. With the CIA funding its activities, it was more than merely "an instrument of political provocation" in the words of Manuel Fuentes Wendling, one of its founding members.[18] A neo-fascist brut squad, it was behind the June 1973 failed attempt at a coup d'état against Allende, and more broadly, was responsible for generating a political climate of civil war necessary for justifying the Armed Forces' coup d'état.[19] Another salient, if less conspiratorial, affiliation was Sergio Miranda Carrington's Tacna group.[20] The hardliners' future leadership originated mainly from these groups of youngsters.

In their publications, FNPL and Tacna presented a detailed neo-fascist ideological platform, informed by the writings of Mussolini, but even more so, reverberating José Antonio's mythology. Indeed, Miranda Carrington not only named his son after the Spanish fascist, he also published academic analyses

on the matter, under the supervision of Hübner Gallo.[21] Rodríguez was an even more avid José Antonio disciple. The Spanish fascist was for him "what Marx was for Gladys Marín [Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Chile in the 1990s]," remarked Fuentes Wendling jokingly in later years.[22] Rodríguez, for his part, told his Spanish counterparts that José António "had appeared to him in a Santiago alley and has not left him since."[23] Indeed, Rodríguez constantly evoked José Antonio's texts, for instance, by publishing "A letter to the soldiers of Spain" from May 1936, a manifesto demanding that the Military overthrow the socialist government. He also quite plainly equated Chilean politics with that of the Spanish Second Republic on the eve of the Spanish Civil War.[24] Many of his other tropes—"neither right-wing nor left-wing" and "pending revolution," to name but two—came directly from José Antonio's textbook.[25]

To be sure, these men claimed they were not fascistic in any way. "Communism and Nazi-fascism are twin ideologies," Fuentes scolded;[26] our ideology is not based on "social-Christian Falangism," agreed Rodríguez.[27] This was, however, one part of an astute strategy utilized by almost all neo-fascist movements in Latin America at the time whereby they presented an assuaged fascist jargon as a distinctive local theory of man and state. Accordingly, in his early texts, Rodríguez rebuked totalitarianism but vowed to "organize the national community from its very foundations," thereby harmonizing all social conflicts;[28] he rejected the fascist one-party principle, only to propose a "functional democracy" where parliamentary "inorganic suffrage" gives place to a vertically-organized "corporative assembly." Non-Marxist political parties could be represented here, he said in his defense, but would never gain more than five percent of political power.[29] What is beyond doubt is that Rodríguez believed that he, rather than the communists or the *gremialistas*, held the solution for Chile's acute social conflicts and was the true "anti-imperialist" (synonymous with anti-American).[30]

One would assume that once Pinochet was in power, he would grant the nacionalistas positions of power. This was hardly the case. Whereas Guzmán and the *gremialistas* quickly became the regime's ideological powerhouse, the nacionalistas were not only unofficially barred from positions of power, they were the first to see their publications censored, indicating that the Junta had no intention of being identified with neo-fascist provocateurs once in power.[31] Frustrated, Rodríguez began criticizing the dictatorship publicly in Franco's Spain at Fuerza Nueva assemblies, of all places. Following his demand that the dictatorship give power back to civil groups instead of "relying on oppression," he was even summoned to the Chilean Embassy for explanations.[32] Next, despite having disbanded the FNPL two days after Pinochet's coup d'état, the nacionalistas began making public their political alternative to *gremialismo*. A

celebrated publication titled *Pensamiento nacionalista*, which was published in 1974 and compiled the texts of traditionalists (Enrique Campos Menéndez), neo-fascists (Miranda Carrington), and even Chile's quintessential neo-Nazi (Miguel Serrano), demonstrated how inclusive the term "nacionalismo" had become by then.[33] Additionally, Miranda Carrington launched his own periodicals, *Orden Nuevo* in 1974 and *Avanzada* in 1976, where he reaffirmed the nacionalistas' ideology and criticized the *gremialistas*.[34] These efforts were to no avail. In 1974, as Guzmán became Pinochet's dominant speech-writer, it was becoming clear which group the dictator saw fit to design his regime's ideology. Worse yet, in 1975, amid an economic recession, Pinochet appointed Sergio de Castro, Chile's exemplary "Chicago Boy," to steer the country's economy towards what became an extreme neoliberal experiment.[35] For the hardliners, this was by far the most pivotal moment in the dictatorship's history. As Rodríguez later explained, while the regime could have "fully realized" his "nacionalista option," by siding with the gremialistas and the Chicago Boys, Pinochet constituted "the antithesis" of the "nationalist-corporatist current."[36] By then, the vague term "nacionalistas" began ceding its place to "the hardliners."

The hardliners' campaign against the constitutional process (1977-1980)

Adding insult to injury, following his Chacarillas speech in 1977, Pinochet put his regime's institutionalization firmly in the hands of Guzmán and the gremialistas.[37] Now farther away from deciding the regime's future, hardliners such as Carlos Cruz-Coke promoted their own "nacionalista" constitutional model, which defined Chile as an eternal dictatorship where the executive authority becomes aware of the popular will through plebiscites and a legislative authority made of a mixture of "political" and a corporatist (or "functional") chambers. This plan was coupled with a demand for "the protection of individual, social, and economic rights" that amounted to undoing Chile's neoliberal order.[38] In his columns in the daily *La Tercera*, Rodríguez was even clearer on this issue, stating that parliamentary democracy is an "empty word" as long as the workers do not have access to power. This, he thought, could only happen "once political parties stop being the obligatory intermediary between people and ruler."[39]

Still, with Guzmán and the judicious gremialista Sergio Fernández Fernández at its helm, the constitutional process seemed unstoppable by January 1978, the time of Chile's referendum on the legitimacy of the regime's institutionalization (the "consulta").[40] Shortly after that, the Chilean press became fixated on the feud between the "hardliners" and the "soft-liners."[41] Besides Rodríguez and Miranda Carrington, the former was comprised of intellectuals such as Jorge Iván

Hübner and, importantly, Pinochet's daughter, Lucía Pinochet. "The plebiscite bill did not represent Pinochet's spirit," she declared, overtly undermining the gremialistas' project.[42] The center she directed, named Corporación de Estudios Nacionales, quickly became the epicenter of the hardliners' activity, alongside the daily *La Tercera*, and journals such as the above-mentioned *Avanzada*.[43] The soft-liners consisted of the gremialistas, members of the National Party, the Chicago Boys, and media executives such as Hernán Cubillos. They published their opinions in newspapers such as *El Mercurio*, *Ercilla*, *Qué Pasa*, and, from 1979 on, *Realidad*, a magazine dedicated almost entirely to promoting the constitution. Here, Guzmán juxtaposed his constitution against the democratic opposition and hardliners' alternatives, singling out, in his words, "the two antagonistic fronts against the constitution."[44] Deeming corporatism "disposable" as early as 1978,[45] he quite plainly ridiculed the hardliners' ideology, arguing that, although it may have been helpful for "Medieval monarchs," in actuality, it meant a totalitarian regime "identical to Italian fascism."[46] Indeed, with the democratic opposition still fairly absent from the public sphere, the gremialistas put to the Chilean public two essential visions for the future: their protected democracy and the hardliners' "fascistoid" pipe dreams.[47]

Once critical voices did appear, they pointed out the crudeness of this binary image. Chile "is comprised only of *duros* and *blandos*," commented Luis Sánchez Latorre of *Las Últimas Noticias*, adding that the difference between the two was negligible: the former wanted a "dicta-dura" with little to no voting mechanisms whereas the latter wanted a "dicta-blanda" consisting of an ideologically-limited parliament.[48] In 1980, the nascent left-wing media likewise mocked this "bitter" right-wing enmity.[49] Neither of the sides "postulates a return to democracy as we knew it in the past," remarked Marcelo Contreras, a columnist and later editor of the opposition journal *APSI*. For him, this resemblance meant that neither Pinochet nor the Armed Forces had bothered siding "with one of the contending positions or the other."[50] Even so, as *APSI* columnist Eugenio Tironi pointed out, by uniting the "regime's soft-liners and the opposition soft-liners" in a consensus that belied both the Marxists' and the hardliners' state models, the hardliners' extremism did impact Chilean politics profoundly.[51]

The hardliners, for their part, were hardly impressed by such commentaries. Sure enough, their struggle against the constitutional process led them to seek international collaborations with like-minded movements. They found them in the form of Spain's neo-fascists and Francoist diehards who, at the very same time, sought to halt the Spanish transition to democracy underway ever since Franco's death in November 1975. The first such prominent figure to arrive in Chile was Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora. Comparing Pinochet's triumph to the Spanish Civil War, in 1975, this Francoist theorist betrayed an unapologetic anti-

democratic stance when suggesting that Franco's "corporatist formula is a more organic representation and therefore more democratic than the party system,"[52] and that parliamentary democracy is "closer to taboo and superstition than to science and reason."[53] In November 1979, he returned to Santiago, this time as Lucía Pinochet's guest, to join Rodríguez and Cruz-Coke in their questioning of the constitutional process.[54] In the same year, Blas Piñar, the notorious leader of the so-called Francoist "bunker," arrived in Chile to a celebratory reception. In a meeting with Pinochet and Rodríguez, Piñar gifted his host a copy of José Antonio's writings. Expectedly, the soft-liner news outlets did not take kindly to the presence of this neo-fascist ideologue warning the Chilean public that democratization will "put at risk [Chile's] very existence."[55] *Qué Pasa* interviewed Piñar with "words like bullets," asking him whether or not Franco was all but forgotten by then in Spain, complained Piñar's publications in Spain, in what now appeared to be a transatlantic neo-fascist solidarity network.[56]

Campaigning against the transition process, 1982-1987

The hardliners' campaign against the referendum was, ultimately, abortive. Even if the referendum on September 11, 1980, could hardly be deemed legitimate or representative, the fact that two-thirds of the Chilean public ratified the 1980 Constitution marked a decisive victory for the gremialistas' political strategy. For the hardliners, this was a period of disillusion in which they became fairly muted in the public eye. Luckily for them, empowered by the public's support, Pinochet began distancing himself from the gremialistas, believing, somewhat correctly, that they had attained too much political power. His bitterness over remaining an international pariah despite the referendum, as well as the advent of Chile's 1982 economic crisis, finally led Pinochet to sack the gremialistas from their ministerial positions. With Sergio Fernández and Chicago Boy Sergio de Castro removed from the cabinet in April 1982, the hardliners consequently believed that an opportunity had finally presented itself to change the course of Chile's democratization.

To their chagrin, the economic crisis, and the civil unrest it spurred, shifted the regime's trajectory toward the other direction: liberal reforms. Also known as Interior Minister Sergio Onofre Jarpa's "spring," the most important feature of these reforms was the de facto toleration of political parties.[57] A period of political fragmentation within the Chilean Right ensued, with several center-right parties struggling for dominance, the more prominent of which were the gremialistas' Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and Onofre Jarpa's Frente Nacional del Trabajo. As the hardliners were less keen to establish a political

party—after all, this type of organization was anathema to them, they said—, they launched their most daring ideological project to date. It began when Federico Willoughby, Gastón Acuña, and Pablo Rodríguez published a book named *¿Qué es el nacionalismo hoy?: síntesis de un ideario*. Curated by the Corporación de Estudios Nacionales, this manifesto waged a direct attack on neoliberalism and the 1980 Constitution. "The purpose of September 11 [1973] was not importing televisions," was Willoughby's point of departure. The book also displayed the standard assuaged neo-fascist formulas. For instance, the three demanded an "authoritarian democratic government" that is not dependent on "popular servility" but relies on "intermediate social bodies" and on "free enterprise with rigorous state control."[58] For them, the model was far from being a theoretical abstraction but "a political position determined to triumph by attaining political power."[59] Eventually, the hardliners, too, assembled under two political parties: the Avanzada Nacional (AN) and Movimiento de Acción Nacional (MAN).[60] As could be expected, they became rivals: while the former became known for its personalist loyalism to Pinochet, the latter was more "intellectual" and neo-fascist in its doctrine.

Having been Pinochet's spokesperson and friend in the past, Willoughby, some have suggested, was the hardliner who influenced Pinochet most during these turbulent years.[61] Be that as it may, the hardliners' inability to propose anything but a neo-fascist dictatorship meant that their ideology was hardly taken seriously among army generals. Inasmuch as Pinochet's national and international respectability relied on the 1980 Constitutional process, he ultimately merely sought to influence the character of Chile's future parliamentary system rather than replacing it with an anachronistic and internationally unacceptable regime model. Accepting this reality, the hardliners turned to alternative strategies. For one, they struggled to secure Pinochet's presidency in the 1988 referendum and, more generally, strove to keep him as president for life as had been the case in Franco's Spain. For another, they persevered in their efforts to redefine the constitution by making universal suffrage merely one of several representation systems. This strategy became apparent in Rodríguez's *El mito de la democracia en Chile* from 1985. His most ferocious attack on the democratic process to date, it stated that "inorganic universal suffrage" can only lead to a "totalitarian Marxist or military parenthesis" or, worse yet, it can entrap the working classes in the hands of local and international oligarchies.[62]

Interestingly, Jarpa's political opening led some hardliners to rethink their inflexible ideology by then. Willoughby, for example, began shifting away from the hardliners' ranks and collaborated with the democratic opposition. As he had been one of the MAN's founding members, his departure in 1986 threw the party into crisis, with several MAN leaders moving to AN and the MAN's

dissolution which occurred in 1987. Others replaced clear neo-fascist theory with suggestive authoritarian lingo. Andres Benavente Urbina, a hardliner intellectual and expert on the "nacionalista alternative," stated, for example, that the global "democratic fetishism" could not solve Chile's social problems. Discounting Chile's constitutional text entirely, he stressed that the dictatorship should "institutionalize" into a novel, undefined, authoritarian "political order."[63] To this realm of vagueness one can add Fernández de la Mora's unusual 1985 Chilean visit. Invited by Gustavo Cuevas, the director of the University of Chile's Political Science Institute, and meeting in private with Pinochet, the Francoist theorist was all allusions and insinuations. Ten years after Franco's death, he still would not endorse Spain's democracy and publicly denounced Chile's constitution. As the Spanish ambassador Miguel Solano reported to his superiors, in a "series of workshops," which saw the attendance of Chile's "most prominent intellectuals and four ministers," Fernández de la Mora instead advocated Franco's "corporative" and "organic" democracy, based on the efficient work of economic and social "councils."[64] In lengthy interviews with the Chilean press, Fernández de la Mora further attacked "ideologies" as such and even insisted that the Spanish democracy "was not the exigency of the masses but the decision of Spain's political class."[65] His message was well-received amongst *La Tercera*'s hardliners, such as Hübner Gallo, who adduced the work of his friend, "one of the most brilliant contemporary Spanish thinkers," as a warning against the failures of parliamentarism.[66] Less impressed by this Francoist spectacle was Jaime Guzmán. Answering both to the hardliners and the democratic opposition's critique of the constitution as authoritarian, he opined that unlike in Spain, where King Juan Carlos had deconstructed Franco's "corporatist state" in favor of democracy, in Chile, the Armed Forces had never aimed for corporatism but rather sought a "rectifying" pluralist democracy from day one. The UDI thus urged the Armed Forces to stop stalling and advance the 1980 Constitution as it guaranteed an "efficient and stable" democracy in Chile, he stated.[67]

Noticeably, in the mid-1980s, Guzmán and the UDI presented themselves as a party of conservative democratic reformers who held the rectifying formula enabling Chile's democratization. The hardliners, on the other hand, could barely decide whether their affiliations were political parties or ideological "movements" of a different order. Pinochet himself added to this ambiguity when declaring that the AN "does not constitute a political party," but rather a youthful movement designed to "cover the country with a mantle of *nacionalismo*."[68] Rodríguez's insistence that his "pending revolution" would ultimately supersede the "anarchic tendency" that democracy had in store also undermined the hardliners' case that as a political party, they were fit for elec-

toral politics.[69] Remarkably, by then, even Rodríguez's notion of "revolution" contrasted with the gremialistas' new narrative of "revolution," namely UDI member Joaquín Lavín's "silent revolution." In 1987, Lavín published a book with this title, depicting the regime's reshaping of the economy as a watershed moment in Chile's process of modernization.[70] The incompatibility between the "silent" and "pending" revolutions, between the notion that Chile *had* already undergone its crucial modernization phase through neoliberalism versus the idea that this process was still yet to come through a neo-fascist revolution, strained the relationship between the camps even more. Thus, in 1988, when the two were negotiating to join forces politically, AN member Jorge Arturo Prat averred, insultingly indeed, that "here there will be no 'silent revolution'; our mission is to originate and fulfil a pending revolution."[71] Needless to say, the negotiations failed.

The 1988 campaign and the hardliners' waning as a political movement

With the October 1988 referendum decided, the hardliners set aside their neo-fascist slogans and set out to secure what they believed was the only way to save Chile from disaster: guaranteeing Pinochet's presidency for eight more years. Now formally assembled in the AN and within a new party named Partido del Sur—a local party led by former FNPL member Eduardo Díaz Herrera—the hardliners became instrumental in two significant ways: first, they fought fervently to secure Pinochet's candidacy, thereby refuting the deliberations among moderate right-wing elements over the possibility of placing a civilian at the head of the "Yes" campaign. Secondly, they eventually became Pinochet's campaigners in the streets of Chile's major cities. In effect, with Pinochet's public endorsement, the AN became "Pinochet's party" in essence and mobilized its supporters to boost the dictator's image in strategic moments.[72] For instance, during Pope John Paul II's visit to Chile in 1987, the AN orchestrated a massive rally to mark the Pontiff's encounter with Pinochet at the La Moneda Palace, thus obliging him to join his host publicly on the palace balcony and greet the crowd.[73]

More broadly, the hardliners strove to persuade the public that the Cold War was far from over and that a vote against Pinochet was a vote in favor of the Communist International. In 1988, this scare campaign was hardly as seamless as in 1973. To begin with, amid the clear decline of the Communist International, and Pinochet's earnest relationship with the Republic of China, there was barely any evidence of an imminent communistic revolution, in Chile or elsewhere. The attempt on Pinochet's life in 1986, by members of the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, was thus the hardliners' main source of rhetoric

ammunition as they now headed the effort to ascertain the existence of a global communistic "terrorist" network. When Carlos Castro Sauritaín, a hardliner and head of the Corporación de Estudios Nacionales, published his book *Politica, violencia, terrorismo* in 1987, "Marxism" and "terrorism" officially became synonymous. Or, as the hardliner theorist Andrés Benavente clarified, the words "glasnost" and "perestroika" are merely a "new soviet strategy" to conceal the USSR's violent activities "faithful to the crudest Stalinism."[74]

That the AN had become "Pinochetistas" in the months leading up to the 1988 referendum did not signify for a moment that the hardliners had become a personalist propaganda machine devoid of any ideology. On the contrary: Rodríguez, Miranda Carrington, and Serrano constantly reminded the public of their alternative theory of the state and its fascist origins. "We are not democrats but totalitarians," Serrano stated sincerely.[75] The opposition media outlets likewise readily reminded their audience of the hardliners' Joseantonian pedigrees. The left-wing Spanish media, which reported incessantly on the Chilean transition, even went as far as deeming Miranda Carrington "the Chilean Blas Piñar," thus pointing to the apparent nexus between those who saw themselves as José Antonio's heirs.[76] Indeed, as proud neo-fascists, even now, the hardliners could still not rein in the impulse to question Pinochet's neoliberal miracle and demand that the state intervene aggressively in the economy. "We are the poor people's party," said Miranda Carrington as he claimed to represent those left behind by Pinochet's economic miracle.[77]

Unfortunately, this ideological intractability made it difficult for the hardliners to forge political ties with center-right parties such as UDI and Renovación Nacional (RN). To make matters worse, in July 1988, Miranda Carrington replaced Benjamín Matte as AN's leader, thereby moving the party to even more extreme far-right territory. As Miranda Carrington was the lawyer representing General Manuel Contreras in the Letelier case, his well-known ties with the Chilean secret services (who he deemed "our forgotten battalions in the fight against Marxism"),[78] did little to persuade the public of the AN's pledge to uphold the 1980 Constitution. Indeed, his statements in August 1988 that parliamentary politics did not interest him "for the moment" and that he would vote "yes" not for the constitution but for Pinochet's leadership clarified that the hardliners rejected Chile's democratization in principle.[79] Perhaps the most illustrative example of this inclination to esteem Pinochet while questioning the constitutional order was that of Miguel Serrano, who told the press that he and his followers will vote neither Yes or No, and that his "third position" between the Left and the Right does not correlate with Pinochet's "social and economic policies."[80] While seldom rubbing shoulders with the other hardliners by then,

his stance betrayed the same ambiguity that, in his case, amounted to an actual call to damage Pinochet's electoral cause.

With the poll numbers in the news suggesting that the No campaign might actually triumph, in their desperation the hardliners returned to evoking the FNPL slogans. Or, as Fuentes Wendling put it, unlike the Loch Ness monster, Patria y Libertad's "symbolic and monstrous spider […] scared and continues to scare politicians and governments."[81] In addition to these slogans, hardliner activists began threatening public figures ranging from left-wing politicians to theatre actors such as Fernando Gallardo.[82] In September 1988, they even returned to using political violence, as Chile witnessed a series of attacks by far-right gangs, some driving around town carrying FNPL flags and trying to run over "No" campaign supporters.[83] With the armed forces and police inactive, these efforts never resembled the neo-fascist effervescence of 1973 and even angered many center-right politicians who deemed them harmful for their image as the bearers of Chile's new democratic consensus. Thus, at this crucial period, the hardliners' behavior damaged Pinochet's cause in more than one way. First, by attacking neoliberalism, they tarnished his alleged economic achievements and the narrative of Chile's modernizing "silent revolution." Second, by becoming the leading force in Pinochet's campaign, their unwillingness to accept the 1980 Constitution and their use of violence reflected on their leader's image and foiled their unification with the center-right parties.

Pinochet's defeat at the referendum revealed the AN's inability to mobilize voters and the dire consequences of the right-wing's fragmentation at large. However, it did not deter the hardliners who, in late October 1988, attempted to unify all right-wing parties around a document named "Compromiso con Chile" (Commitment to Chile). A hardliner text, it became the basis for a new party named Alianza Unitaria Nacional (AUN), which unified the AN and Partido del Sur in what purported to be the right-wing's main electoral front. Nevertheless, by proposing none other than Pablo Rodríguez as the party's candidate for the presidency and rejecting "Chicago's technocratic elitism," they hardly even pretended to want to unify with the center-right parties.[84] Explaining this approach, Rodríguez stated that for fifteen years the technocratic Right and the hardliners "have been in conflict," not because of personal grudges but because their "philosophy and interpretation of reality are diametrically opposed."[85] Therefore, he added, it would be "politically and morally dishonest" for the hardliners and the gremialistas to unify ahead of the 1989 elections. For Rodríguez, this could mean only one thing: the time has come to finally form a novel "anti-imperialist," "anti-clerical," and "anti-oligarchic" movement.[86] Only such a youth-based "new political variant" could save Chile from ruin, he thought,

and even pledged to continue to pursue his candidacy regardless of whether Pinochet decided to run for president.[87]

Aware of his lack of popularity and devoid of the Armed Forces' support, Rodríguez eventually backed down from the race. With Pinochet's candidacy ruled out too, the hardliners were thus at a crossroads. Believing a collaboration with the UDI-RN front (Democracia y Progreso) to be impossible, many of them backed the candidacy of the independent Francisco Javier Errázuriz and joined his political alliance, the Unión de Centro. Yet again, the Chilean right-wing votes were to split between him and the center-right's candidate, Hernán Büchi. On December 15, 1989, once the election results were published, the Chilean public learned that Errázuriz had received some fifteen percent of the popular vote. An electoral achievement for him perhaps, the elections were an unmitigated disaster for the hardliners running for the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. While the UDI-RN front was able to get forty-eight chamber deputies elected (out of 120) and sixteen senators (out of 47), not one hardliner candidate entered either chamber, exposing their dismal public approval compared to the political respectability of those who had designed the 1980 Constitution and who would go on narrating "their struggle for democracy" proudly.[88] Subsequently, amid Pinochet's retirement from politics, the AN disappeared from national politics.

That is not to say that the hardliners vanished from the public eye. Far from it: in 1989, they returned with a frenzy of outcries against the upcoming democratization. Returning to his anti-communistic and anti-USA rhetoric, Fuentes Wendling's book *Chile al borde de una trampa* was a case in point. Uncovering an alleged communistic plot to take over Patricio Aylwin's future government, the book was debated extensively in pro-Pinochet media outlets.[89] Even at this stage, the hardliners emphasized that their idea of democracy transcended the standard Western parliamentary system and sought to make Chile an example of an "integrating" democracy. Still, in the following years their presence in the Chilean public sphere amounted mostly to publishing tirades against Aylwin's constitutional amendments and waging campaigns against bringing members of the Armed Forces to trial for human rights violations.

Conclusions

The hardliners' legacies have never disappeared from Chile's political landscape. Sporadically, FNPL can be found resurfacing in public, evoking the memory of the scare tactics of the 1970s, for example, by threatening academics such as Carolina Trejo in 2020.[90] Likewise, similar to other places in Latin America, Chile has recently seen the emergence of esoteric neo-fascist and

neo-Nazi groups, Alexis López's Patria Nueva Sociedad (PNS), to name one example. The hardliners' nostalgic memoirs, in which they present celebratory accounts of their violent deeds when toppling Allende's government, are also quite common in the Chilean public sphere.[91] Even so, ever since 1990, neo-fascism has been relatively absent from Chilean politics, at least as a serious ideological alternative. This, I have shown, was not the case in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, the 1980 Constitution was not born in an ideological vacuum but developed in opposition to a salient neo-fascist alternative, represented by a cohort of intransigent thinkers and promoted by powerful media outlets. Supported externally by Spain's most prominent authoritarian thinkers, the hardliners' theories seemed to have appealed to Pinochet and his daughter, thereby becoming a paradigm to which, unlike the state models proposed by the left-wing opposition, theorists such as Jaime Guzmán had to respond. As such, the hardliners' history raises a host of questions regarding the right-wing political imaginary during the 1970s. For these men, the 1980s zeitgeist was not that of imminent democratizations, or "Democracies of the Third Wave," as Samuel Huntington had it, but a one-time opportunity to salvage fascist ideology against the backdrop of a neoliberal experiment turning sour and the twilight of international communism.

Although they never attained positions of power, the hardliners' persistent campaigns against the gremialistas left a mark on the dictatorship's constitutional process. The bitter clash between two right-wing schools ever since the 1960s, drove the gremialistas away from a vaguely corporatist mindset towards a clearer conception of parliamentary democracy. The presence of Francoist ideologues such as Piñar and Fernández de la Mora in Chile perhaps bolstered the hardliners' confidence in their model, but it also arguably pushed Guzmán to redefine the gremialistas' position as the new center-right. While their constitutional framework was hardly conventional in the Western sense, it could be presented as a pragmatic path designed *despite* Pinochet's neo-fascist leanings by realist politicians now heading Chile's reputable conservative parties. In brief, the gremialistas' ability to rebuild their respectability as wholehearted democrats after years of loyally serving the dictatorship relied on their success in persuading Chile's conservative polity of their electability as the antithesis to the neo-fascist hotheads. Likewise, that the Chilean political map was divided neatly between a pragmatic center and revolutionary "anti-oligarchic" fringes in the late-1980s enabled neoliberalism and moderate constitutional reforms to become the center's new political consensus. Whether and in what ways far-right anti-capitalism hindered the rise of progressive politics in 1990s Chile is a question that calls for further historical research.

Notes

1. I would like to thank the Minerva Stiftung, the Free University of Berlin's Institute for Latin American Studies (LAI), the Golda Meir Fellowship Fund, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's Department of Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American Studies for supporting the research on which this article is based. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers of EIAL for their insightful comments and suggestions.
2. "Usable past" is a term used frequently in memory studies to depict the creation of a positive version of an unsettling past in the service of contemporary politics, see for example: Cass R. Sunstein, "The Idea of a Useable Past," *Columbia Law Review*, 95:3 (1995), pp. 601-608; Robert G. Moeller *War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
3. Marcelo Pollack, *The New Right in Chile, 1973-1997* (New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, 1999); José Díaz Nieva, *Patria y Libertad: el nacionalismo frente a la Unidad Popular* (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2015); José Díaz Nieva, "Avanzada Nacional: la derecha a la derecha de Pinochet," *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos* (January 14, 2016), https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/68842
4. Daniel Gunnar Kressel, "Technicians of the Spirit: Post-Fascist Technocratic Authoritarianism in Spain, Argentina, and Chile, 1945-1988," PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 2019.
5. Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, *Una experiencia social cristiana* (Santiago, Chile: Política y Espíritu, 1949), p. 70; see also José Díaz Nieva, *Chile, de la Falange Nacional a la Democracia Cristiana* (Santiago, Chile: Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, 2000), p. 98.
6. For more on the Chilean Right during the 1960s, see Pablo Rubio Apiolaza, *Los civiles de Pinochet: la derecha en el régimen militar chileno, 1983-1990* (Santiago, Chile: Centro de Investigaciones Diego Barros Arana, 2013), pp. 53-63.
7. For an early report on 1960s neo-fascism, see Hernán Ramirez Necochea, "El fascismo en la evolución política de Chile," *Araucaria de Chile*, 1 (1978), p. 24; see also Marcelo Casals Araya, *La creación de la amenaza roja: del surgimiento del anticomunismo en Chile a la "Campaña del Terror" de 1964* (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2016); Sofía Correa, *Con las riendas del poder: la derecha chilena en el siglo XX* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Sudamericana, 2005).
8. José Manuel Castro, *Jaime Guzmán: Ideas y política 1946-1973* (Santiago de Chile: Ediciones Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2016); Belén Moncada Durruti, *Jaime Guzmán: una democracia contrarrevolucionaria: el político de 1964 a 1980* (Santiago, Chile: RIL Editores, 2006); Renato Cristi, *El pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán: autoridad y libertad* (Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2000).
9. "Jaime Guzmán y el desafío gremial," *Qué Pasa*, 80 (October 26, 1972), pp. 38-39.
10. "Viva Franco, Arriba España!" La Revista Escolar: Colegio de los Sagrados Corazones, 436 (I trimester, 1962): p. 17.
11. António Costa Pinto & Federico Finchelstein (eds.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Europe and Latin America: Crossing Borders* (London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), pp. 2-3; more on this ideological schism, see Verónica Valdivia Ortiz de Zárate, *Nacionales y Gremialistas: El "parto" de la nueva derecha política chilena, 1964-1973* (Santiago, Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2008).
12. María del Carmen Fariña Vicuña, "El pensamiento corporativo en las revistas 'Estanquero' (1946-1955) y 'Política y Espíritu' (1945-1975)," *Revista de ciencia política*, 12:1-2

(1990), pp. 119 -142; José Díaz Nieva & Mario Valdés Urrutia, "Jorge Prat y Acción Nacional (1963-1966): La antesala del Partido Nacional," *Cuadernos de historia*, 43 (2015), pp. 83-108.

13. Letter from Arturo Fontaine to Alfredo Sánchez Bella, January 17, 1947, Archivo General del Universidad de Navarra (hereafter AGUN), document 15/08/064.
14. Arturo Fontaine Aldunate, "Marxismo y democratismo cristiano," *Estudios*, 174 (June 1947), p. 10.
15. Reseña Biográfica Mario Arnello Romo, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Mario_Arnello_Romo
16. Jorge Hübner Gallo, *El nuevo estado español* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1952), p. 11.
17. Blas Piñar, "Hipócriticas," *Tizona,* 53 (April 1974), pp. 10-11.
18. Manuel Fuentes Wendling, *Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad: y algunas confesiones sobre la guerra fría en Chile* (Santiago, Chile: Grijalbo SA, 1999), p. 9.
19. *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities*, https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2010-009-doc17.pdf
20. Rodrigo Moulián, "Nacionalista encendido, militar frustrado," *Apsi*, 262 (July 25, 1988), p. 8.
21. "Datos biográficos de don Sergio Miranda Carrington," *Avanzada*, 52 (1988), p. 7.; Moulián, "Nacionalista encendido, militar frustrado," p. 8.
22. Fuentes Wendling, *Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad*, 13.
23. J. Servando Balaguer, "La Falange y hispanoamerica," *Fuerza Nueva,* 419 (January 18, 1975), p. 29.
24. "Carta a los militares de España," *Patria y Libertad*, 1:28 (1971), p. 9.
25. Pablo Rodríguez Grez, *Entre la democracia y la tiranía* (Santiago, Chile: SP, 1972), pp. 122-126.
26. Manuel Fuentes Wendling, "Nazi-fascismo y comunismo se dan la mano en la historia," *Patria y Libertad*, 15 (1971), p. 8.
27. "Gremialismo y nacionalismo," *Patria y Libertad*, 16 (1971), p. 9.
28. Rodríguez Grez, *Entre la democracia y la tiranía*, p. 126
29. Ibid, p. 127.
30. *Manifiesto Nacionalista* (Santiago, Chile: Frente Nacionalista Patria y Libertad), p. 7; "Conceptos y metas fundamentales del frente nacionalista," *Patria y Libertad*, 9 (1971).
31. Fuentes Wendling, *Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad*, p. 29.
32. "Documento 5304," November 28, 1973, Archivo del Ministerio Chileno de Asuntos Exteriores (AMCAE) Embajada en Madrid, oficios confidenciales, 1973, caja 64.
33. Enrique Campos Menéndez (ed.), *Pensamiento nacionalista* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Gabriela Mistral, 1974).
34. Moulián, "Nacionalista encendido, militar frustrado," p. 7-10.
35. "Los Chicago Boys: De Castro enfrenta la criticas," *Qué Pasa*, 214 (May 29, 1975), pp. 10-12.
36. Pablo Rodríguez Grez, *Una revolución pendiente* (Santiago, Chile: Eves Ediciones, 1988), p. 1-2.
37. On this event and its aftermath see Felipe Reyes and Guido Arroyo, *Chacarillas: Los elegidos de Pinochet* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Alquimia, 2019).
38. Carlos Cruz-Coke Ossa, "Hacia una constitución nacionalista," *Revista de Derecho Público*, 18 (July-December 1975), pp. 317-326.

39. Pablo Rodríguez Grez, "Envoltorio nuevo para ideas viejas," *La Tercera* (December 12, 1977), p. 3.
40. Sergio Fernández Fernández, a *gremialista* himself, served as Minister of the Interior between 1978 and 1982 and was the promoter of the 1978 "general amnesty" see Sergio Fernández Fernández, *Mi lucha por la democracia* (Santiago, Chile: Editorial los Andes, 1994), pp. 29-31.
41. For more on this struggle, see Carlos Huneeus, *The Pinochet Regime* (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 205, 237 & 360.
42. Gonzalo Vial Correa, *Pinochet: La biografía* (Santiago, Chile: Aguilar, 2002), p. 422.
43. Manuel Fuentes Wendling, "Terrorismo comunista," *Avanzada*, 32 (December 1981), pp. 17-18; see also, Díaz Nieva, "Avanzada Nacional: La derecha a la derecha de Pinochet."
44. "Dos frentes antagónicos contra la Constitución," *Realidad*, 24 (May 1981), pp. 3-7.
45. Actas oficiales de la comisión constituyente, sesión 360 (April 26, 1978).
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47. "Proyecto constitucional: 'Duros' y 'blandos' opinan," *Qué Pasa*, 483 (July 17, 1980); see also "Aqui vienen los 'duros'," *Qué Pasa* (April 3, 1980), pp. 8-9.
48. Filebo, "'Duros' vs. 'blandos'," *Las Últimas Noticias* (April 5, 1980), p. 5.
49. "Enfrentamiento sesgado," *APSI*, 72 (May 1980), p. 5.
50. Mercelo Contreres, "Los caminos que se abren," *APSI*, 68, (January 1, 1980), p. 3.
51. Eugenio Tironi, "Ahí viene el lobo!", *APSI*, 73 (May 15, 1980), p. 5.
52. "Situación Española en 1939 era similar a chilena de hoy," *El Mercurio* (August 12, 1975).
53. "Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora: un apasionado de la razón," *Qué Pasa*, 226 (August 21, 1975), pp. 16-19.
54. In Gonzalo Vial Correa's words, these debates aimed to "reduce, if not eliminate, the political weight of suffrage and parties," see Vial Correa, *Pinochet: La biografía*, p. 370.
55. The interviewer dared ask him "why have the Spaniards forgotten Franco so quickly?" see "España se juega su propia existencia," *Qué Pasa,* 421 (May 10, 1979), p. 52.
56. "Especial América de Fuerza Nueva," *Fuerza Nueva*, 644 (May 12, 1979), p. 25.
57. Pollack, *The New Right in Chile,* p. 86.
58. "El 11 de septiembre no se hizo para importar televisores," *Panorama Literario e Informativo*, 65 (October 1983), p. 12.
59. Gastón Acuña, Federico Willoughby & Pablo Rodríguez Grez, *Qué es el nacionalismo hoy?: síntesis de un ideario* (Santiago, Chile: SP, 1983), p. 3.
60. Díaz Nieva, "Avanzada Nacional: La derecha a la derecha de Pinochet."
61. Pollack, *The New Right in Chile*, p. 87.
62. Pablo Rodríguez Grez, *El mito de la democracia en Chile* (Santiago, Chile: Eves Ediciones, 1985), p. 315 and by the same author *Una revolución pendiente*.
63. "El desafío de esta época es crear nuevo modelo político," *La Nación* (September 19, 1986), p. 7; see also Andrés Benavente Urbina, *La alternativa nacionalista en el régimen militar* (Santiago, Chile: ICHEH, 1982).
64. "1147, visita a Chile del embajador Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora," October 1, 1985, Archivo General de la Administración (Spain), caja 82/07900.
65. Tomas Mac Hale, "Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora: la transición española," *El Mercurio* (September 29, 1985), p. D6; "Las ideologías ya no sirven," *Ercilla* (September 25, 1985), pp. 8-10.

66. "El pensamiento de Fernández de la Mora," *La Tercera* (December 4, 1986), p. 5.
67. Jaime Guzmán, "Dos casos radicalmente diferentes," *Ercilla* (December 17, 1986), p. 9.
68. Diez Nieva, "Avanzada Nacional: La derecha a la derecha de Pinochet," p. 3; more on Chile's neofascist youth see Yanko González Cangas, *Los más ordenaditos: fascismo y juventud en la dictadura de Pinochet* (Santiago, Chile: Hueders, 2021).
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71. Libio Perez, "La increíble y caótica historia de la derecha derrotada," *Análisis*, 256 (December 5, 1988), p. 10.
72. Pollack, *The New Right in Chile*, 92.
73. "El Pontífice arrancó los aplausos de los obispos cuando pidió la democracia," *La Vanguardia de Barcelona* (April 3,1987), p. 8.
74. "El triángulo del terror," *La Nación* (Sept. 1, 1988), p. 2; see also "Presentan libro sobre violencia y terrorismo," *Las Últimas Noticias* (December 21, 1987), p. 11; Pablo Rodríguez Grez, "Política, violencia y terrorismo," *La Tercera* (November 29, 1987), p. 13; "El Marxismo es una permanente agresión terrorista a Occidente," *La Nación* (December 16, 1987), p. 9.
75. "Miguel Serrano definió la posición nacionalsocialista ante plebiscito," *La Época* (July 29, 1988), p. 10.
76. "Plebiscito en Chile. Entrevista con el 'Blas Piñar' chileno," *Diario 16* (August 30, 1988).
77. "Nuestro 'SI' no es un cheque en blanco. Es un 'SI' al general Pinochet,' *Cosas*, 310 (August 18, 1988), p. 36
78. Rodrigo Moulián, "Nacionalista encendido, militar frustrado," p. 7.
79. "Nuestro 'SI' no es un cheque en blanco," p. 37
80. "Miguel Serrano definió la posición," p. 10.
81. Fuentes Wendling, *Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad*, p. 347.
82. "Patria y Libertad amenazó de muerte al conocido actor Fernando Gallardo," *La Época* (October 18, 1988), p. 17.
83. "La cara iracunda de la ultraderecha," *Análisis*, 249 (October 17, 1988), p. 6.
84. Pérez, "La increíble y caótica historia," p. 10.
85. Pablo Rodríguez Grez, "Honestidad política," *La Tercera* (December 3 1988), p. 3.
86. Ibid.
87. Pablo Rodríguez Grez, "Una nueva opción política," *La Tercera* (October 29, 1988), p. 3; Diez Nieva, "Avanzada Nacional: La derecha a la derecha de Pinochet", p. 8.
88. This was the case of Sergio Fernández's self-praising book titled "My struggle for democracy," see Fernández, *Mi lucha por la democracia*.
89. "Alertan sobre planes del comunismo en eventual gobierno de P. Aylwin," *La Nación* (Oct. 24, 1989), p. 13
90. https://www.laizquierdadiario.cl/Usach-Comunidad-de-la-Escuela-de-Periodismo-rechaza-amenazas-de-ultraderecha-contra-academica-y
91. This was the case of Manuel Fuentes Wendling's *Memorias secretas de Patria y Libertad* from 1999, which remains, in fact, one of the more informative accounts of the movement's history; another example is José Díaz Nieva, *Patria y Libertad: La vanguardia juvenil contra Allende* (Madrid: Ediciones Barbarroja, 2013).