

# Marxism and the revision of Argentine history in the 1960s\*

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## Introduction

It is commonly thought that whereas in Europe the Left has refrained from embracing the pursuit of a grand “national” destiny among its principal objectives, the opposite is true for most of the developing world. This also goes for Latin America. As Jorge Castañeda has argued in his widely-read book about the Latin American Left, south of the Río Grande the overwhelming hegemony of the northern neighbor encouraged the Left to adopt a nationalist stance aimed at generating a national consciousness that would lead to liberation from the imperialist yoke. According to Castañeda, the Left “has first normatively identified the ‘people’ and the ‘nation.’ [...] It has then bemoaned the fact that the ‘nation’ has not belonged to the people.”<sup>1</sup> Whilst such a trend can arguably be most easily diagnosed in Central America and the Caribbean — that is in areas where US hegemony was most tangible — it was forcefully present in Argentina, too. Especially in the wake of the Cuban Revolution, many Argentine left-wing intellectuals espoused anti-imperialism and national liberation as principal tenets and portrayed Argentina as yet another oppressed semi-colonial nation, a state of affairs which in their view should be overcome by Latin American and Third World solidarity.

At first glance, the Argentine version of what Alain Touraine has called the “national-revolutionary myth,” according to which “class and nation [...] appeared as nothing but the two faces of the same protagonist of the struggles for

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national liberation,” hardly differed from its counterparts in other Latin American countries.<sup>2</sup> Similarly to their counterparts elsewhere, Argentine left-wing nationalists stressed anti-imperialism and a distinctive Latin American identity, dovetailing with some of the premises of dependency theory. On the surface, Argentine left-wing nationalism thus differed less from other contemporary examples than one might expect, bearing in mind that the country’s political situation was far from analogous to Cuba’s or Algeria’s.

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However, what has been called Argentina’s “new intellectual Left” also had its own distinctive traits.<sup>3</sup> The Argentine nationalist Left, when it came to assert its claim to represent the authentic values and goals of the nation, found itself confronted with the dubious legacy of a strand of nationalism stemming from the crisis of liberalism of the 1930s, which praised authoritarian and hierarchical qualities. This was not an exclusively Argentine problem either (Brazil would be a parallel),<sup>4</sup> but here it was perhaps more accentuated than elsewhere. In other respects, too, the Argentine case was different. Firstly — and here the contrast with Brazil is striking — Argentine intellectuals maintained a tense relationship with political power. Moreover, they were less integrated into the state’s cultural and political institutions, both in the 30s and, with the short-lived exception of the beginning of Arturo Frondizi’s presidency (1958-62), in the period after 1955.<sup>5</sup> As Silvia Sigal has convincingly argued, this led to a situation in which intellectuals pursued political legitimacy, and this left them in a state of “availability” relative to social and political actors.<sup>6</sup> This tendency weighed heavily with the contemporary political situation, which suffered a crisis of legitimacy after Juan Perón had been ousted in a military coup and his movement prohibited in 1955. Secondly, the debates of the Argentine nationalist Left in the 1960s revolved incessantly around the phenomenon of Peronism, in relation to which virtually all intellectuals felt obligated to declare their position.<sup>7</sup> This problem only grew over time, as it became increasingly evident that neither military governments (1955-58 and 1966-73) nor civilian ones (1958-62 and 1963-66) had succeeded in their aim of eradicating the working class’s loyalty to the deposed leader. Ultimately — and at least partially as a result of this crisis of legitimacy — political and intellectual debates of the past were invariably cited as justifying contemporary political goals.

This article analyses the careers and writings of a number of intellectuals who adopted a left-wing nationalist and pro-Peronist stance after 1955. The

authors in question bore many resemblances to Argentina's New Left. In the entire period between 1955 and 1973, they largely remained outside the state's cultural and political institutions. They participated in debates about Peronism and, when this movement did not disappear after its leader was removed from power, considered this proof that Peronism was firmly anchored in national traditions. They consequently bemoaned what they saw as the inability of the traditional Left — specifically the Communist and Socialist Parties, which had seen Peronism as a derivative of European fascism— to come to grips with these traditions. The reaction of Marxist writers such as Rodolfo Puiggrós or Jorge Abelardo Ramos to this claim was a rapprochement with Peronism, resulting in their political doctrines becoming virtually indistinguishable from those of left-wing Peronists. Moreover, the latter group wrote historical essays and books, even though none of them were historians by profession (they mostly pursued a career of political activism). Their essays about Argentina's social and political life presented a global version of the country's history stressing purportedly authentic national values embodied in the 19<sup>th</sup> century *caudillos*.

They drew their inspiration for such writings from historical revisionism, an anti-liberal and nationalist historiography that had emerged in the 1930s. There were, to be sure, differences between the erstwhile authoritarian variants of this historiography and the Marxist and populist neo-revisionists who are the protagonists of this article. Especially through their main institution — the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas “Juan Manuel de Rosas” (hereafter Instituto Rosas)— the right-wing nationalists of the 1930s had concentrated on the glorification of the Hispanic, Catholic and authoritarian traits of Rosas, the 19<sup>th</sup> century *caudillo*. They sought to remove “cosmopolitan” and “liberal” figures such as Bernardino Rivadavia, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento or Bartolomé Mitre from Argentina's national pantheon. In contrast, under the increasing influence of 60s Marxist nationalism, historical revisionism called for a broader spectrum of national heroes, particularly insisting on the inclusion of the provincial *caudillos*, who were seen as more popular and less oligarchic than Rosas. However, regarding their general ideological outlook, both the rightist nationalists of the 1930s and the post-1955 Marxists and populists were fervently anti-liberal. Furthermore, as I will try to show by focusing on the neo-revisionism of the 1960s, the left-wing nationalist intellectuals echoed the beliefs of their reactionary forerunners in stating that liberalism had willfully distorted Argentina's history, a situation that would be put right by the anti-liberal revisionists' disclosure of the nation's "authentic" values.

Not only did the neo-revisionism of Marxist and populist nationalist authors dovetail with the predominant climate of 1960s political culture, but by the end of that decade, the successful sale of their books had contributed a great deal

to their version being considered commonsensical among Argentines. It gained particular currency among the so-called revolutionary wing of Peronism, as the very name of the guerrilla group *Montoneros* indicates.<sup>8</sup> Given the wide repercussions of these writings, it is surprising that, the literature on neo-revisionism — be it Marxist or populist— is still scanty.<sup>9</sup> Although this article cannot fill this gap satisfactorily, it aims at clarifying a number of aspects that can further an understanding of the various permutations of nationalism. The principal sources this article relies on are the books and essays of the authors in question, but these will be supplemented by periodicals affiliated with Peronist political groups. Firstly, the article will outline the ideological trajectories and social background of the most prominent left-wing nationalist and populist intellectuals of the 1960s. Secondly, it will examine the notion of an oligarchic deformation of national values. Thirdly, it will delineate the central tenets of the left-wing nationalist discourse with regard to history. Finally, it will assess the implications of the disputes that emerged from interaction with older markedly authoritarian versions of nationalistic historiography.

### **1. The heterogeneous backgrounds of national-populist intellectuals**

By 1955, support for Peronism among the Argentine Left was not an entirely new phenomenon. From the very moment of Perón's ascent to power, there had been groups that did not agree with the Communist and Socialist Parties' branding of Peronism as fascism. Throughout the decade of Perón's government, this had led to the emergence of two principal dissident nuclei that broke away from the traditional Left in order to adopt a more populist stance.<sup>10</sup> The first group, guided by Rodolfo Puiggrós, sprang from a cell of railway workers in the Federal Capital, which split from the Communist Party in 1948/49 to form the *Movimiento Obrero Comunista (MOC)*. As Puiggrós laid out in the group's organ *Clase Obrera*, "the Codovilla tendency, of which we were a part, stands in open contradiction to the historical development which leads the Argentine people towards their liberation." In contrast, the MOC portrayed itself as "a child of 17 October, 1945,"<sup>11</sup> which also implied an increasing appropriation of the traditionalist traits of Peronism with its emphasis on the essential values of the nation and the relationship between an unequivocal leader and the masses. In the eyes of the MOC-ideologues, these traits had to be incorporated as part and parcel of a movement which could eventually lead to an emancipating national revolution and which therefore deserved to be included in a united anti-imperialist front. The second important nucleus formed by Marxist populists was the *Partido Socialista de la Revolución Nacional (PSRN)*, a faction that had broken

with the Socialist Party in 1953. Similarly to the position of the MOC, Esteban Rey maintained in December 1955 in the PSRN-organ *Lucha Obrera* that the last “ten years of tough national struggle waged by the working class and popular movement, which originates on 17 October, 1945” could be the prologue of an anti-imperialist coalition.<sup>12</sup> Intellectuals of the MOC and the PSRN later formed the core of what came to be called the *izquierda nacional*.

The prolonged crisis of political legitimacy ushered in by the coup of 1955 provided the necessary impetus for various left-wing groups to identify with nationalist traditions. In 1957, in the first issue of a fortnightly journal which bore the telling title *Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberación Nacional*, the Catholic Nationalist Fermín Chávez clarified his consent to contribute to a periodical that was explicitly Marxist:

Five or six years ago, [...] it would have been easy to deny them [the Marxists] any kind of collaboration [...]. Today, in turn, this dialogue has become possible, more than anything due to the events which have occurred in Argentina in the last two years.

Chávez went on to remark that the principal impact of these events meant that, rather than there being a dialogue that implied the modification of Nationalist positions, it had been Marxists who had opened themselves to “national reality.”<sup>13</sup> He thereby alluded to the trajectory upon which some Marxist thinkers had embarked a few years earlier —among them Eduardo Astesano, an important MOC-figure from the province of Santa Fe and now director of the *Columnas*. Emphasizing the shift from Marxism to a nationalist position, Astesano retrospectively summed up this development in 1972 by annotating his own bibliography. He described the book with which he had initiated his career as a historiographer in 1941, *Contenido social de la Revolución de Mayo*, as a “class-based analysis.” In 1949, he had finished what he now considered a “first approach to economic nationalism,” finally arriving at the “synthesis of the national vision of the process,” which he attributed to his 1967 book, *La lucha de clases en la historia argentina*.<sup>14</sup> This movement from Marxism to nationalist ideas including Peronism was followed by several intellectuals. Two more examples of this were Rodolfo Ortega Peña (who was still a Communist Party member in 1955), and Eduardo Duhalde, two lawyers who had only recently left the Faculty of Law of the Universidad de Buenos Aires and who in the early 1960s became legal advisers to the Peronist Union of Metalworkers (UOM).

However, the above examples do not indicate that there was a single linear movement from Marxism to nationalism. Transitions in the political and cultural spheres after 1955 in fact entailed a more complex intermingling of various political traditions. The ideological backgrounds of those revisionist writers who were active after 1955 was extremely heterogeneous. There were

Marxists, such as Juan José Hernández Arregui and John William Cooke, but, in contrast to Ramos and Puiggrós, they hailed from a populist background and had already defined themselves as Peronists and nationalists before 1955. Cooke, whose trajectory had also been linked to radical anti-imperialist currents had already been a Peronist congressman between 1946 and 1955, but only gained political prominence when Perón appointed him as his personal delegate during the “Peronist resistance” of 1955-58. Subsequently, Cooke’s writings, which blended nationalism with Marxism, became the inspiration for a later generation of radicalized left-wing Peronist Youth (JP) and for the guerrilla group Montoneros.<sup>15</sup> There were, however, non-Marxists also found their place in this left-wing populist movement, especially several former members of FORJA, an anti-imperialist group that had broken away from the Radical Party in 1935. The best known among them was the prolific essayist Arturo Jauretche, who, similarly to Cooke and Hernández Arregui, did not significantly modify his ideological stance after 1955. The prolific revisionist historian José María Rosa can also be considered to belong to this group; but although in the 1960s he declared his support for the Cuban Revolution, he had originally been affiliated with the authoritarian extreme Right.

Leaving aside ideological questions, it is difficult to find a common denominator in these writers' demographic or social characteristics. In contrast to other intellectuals of the New Left, such as the contributors to the journal *Contorno*, who can be called a “generation,”<sup>16</sup> the national-populist writers did not belong to a particular age group. Although many of those mentioned above were born between 1910 and 1930, Jauretche (born in 1901), Rosa and Puiggrós (both born in 1906) were older, whereas Duhalde was born only in 1941. They hailed from different parts of the country, which included both urban and rural areas. Although their activities in the 60s usually centered around the capital, a disproportionate number had not been born there, in contrast to most Argentine intellectuals at the time. Nor were their socio-economic backgrounds similar in any significant way. While Hernández Arregui came from a lower middle-class Buenos Aires background, others had had quite affluent and even politically influential parents. Both Cooke and Rosa came from upper-class families and their fathers had at some point been ministers under the military governments between 1943 and 1946, whereas Jauretche came from an upper middle-class family and had studied at the prestigious Colegio Nacional de Buenos Aires.<sup>17</sup> Ultimately, the fact that many had studied law is less a sign of the homogeneity of their backgrounds than an indication that this was a popular career choice among Argentine intellectuals at that time.

Neither their ideological nor their social origins predisposed them to develop neo-revisionist ideas regarding history. Rather, it was the political situation after

the coup of 1955 that caused this heterogeneous group of writers to form an opposition to the anti-Peronist military regime of 1955-58. In some cases, the change in regime had an immediate effect on them. For example, Cooke, who at that period was considered a Peronist agitator rather than an intellectual, was pursued by the military authorities for his political activities. He sought refuge in Rosa's house, where both were arrested in October 1955. Whilst Cooke was sent to a prison in Río Gallegos, from which he spectacularly escaped to Chile, Rosa was released after questioning, apparently regarding his historiographic revisionist activities.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, Rosa lost his post as a university lecturer in 1955, as did Hernández Arregui and Cooke, in a process of modernizing and de-Peronizing the universities that was ushered in by the coup. As a result, none of the above-mentioned revisionist writers held a post of any significance at a public university between 1955 and 1973. Consequently, most of them went on to operate independently as authors, journalists and to advise and inspire certain political groups, usually as advocates of Peronism. Despite the wide dissemination of their writings,<sup>19</sup> they thus remained outside or at best on the fringes of the state's cultural apparatus, which they verbally attacked as the bastion of the "official" intelligentsia. All of them pursued their own search for legitimacy through largely political arguments, which they bolstered by historical references extolling traditions supporting their political position. Their marginalization served to win them public notoriety as opposition essayists who sparked a growing interest in revisionism among the New Left. In this sense, as Silvia Sigal has argued, the central role of history in the writings of national-populist intellectuals was connected to the vulnerability of the cultural sphere<sup>20</sup> rather than to their common ideological backgrounds.

## **2. The notion of an oligarchic deformation of national values**

It has been argued that a left-leaning and populist current of historical revisionism had existed prior to 1955.<sup>21</sup> There are examples to support this argument, such as Cooke's vice-presidency of the Instituto Rosas in 1954-55 and those populist intellectuals who identified with FORJA, most notably Raúl Scalabrini Ortiz, who also wrote revisionist essays. However, it is not clear whether this was a trend or merely a number of individual examples. Cooke's role in the Instituto Rosas was rather marginal and he had never succeeded in persuading the Peronist regime to fully incorporate revisionist motifs in propagandist efforts or educational policy. Jauretche, the other main driving force behind FORJA, had shown little interest in history before 1955. Therefore, although there were antecedents, both the Peronist appropriation and the Marxist reformulation

of historical revisionism became fully developed only in the wake of Perón's overthrow. Populist revisionism as represented by a group of widely influential writers came full circle only after 1955. Besides the fact that its proponents were marginalized, the immediate political situation of those years was decisive in two ways. Firstly, the anti-populist and unpopular military regime of Pedro Eugenio Aramburu sought to stigmatize Peronism as a recurrence of *caudillismo*, in particular of Rosas' "tyranny," which the Peronists saw as having positive connotations. Secondly, the futility of the governmental policy of "de-Peronization" and the working class's continuing adherence to the exiled leader now appeared to confirm that the conceptions of the traditional Left were wide of the mark, as they continued to fail to appeal to the masses.

This second perception was especially important for erstwhile Marxists, as can be seen in the ideas of Puiggrós, Astesano and Ramos. They argued that the traditional Left misunderstood Peronism because it was anchored in the liberal tradition, which was generally perceived as diametrically opposed to revisionism; declarations of the leading figures of orthodox Socialism repeatedly reinforced this conviction. For example, the leader of the Socialist Party, Américo Ghioldi asserted in 1956 that Peronism consisted of "historical denigration," since Perón had slandered the "builders of nationality" whilst glorifying "the tyranny of Rosas,"<sup>22</sup> although Ghioldi did not specify whom he meant by "builders of nationality." The pantheon of heroes habitually evoked by the leaders of the Socialist Party, such as Echeverría, Rivadavia or Sarmiento, was so unequivocal that he hardly needed to be specific. These figures were precisely those who were incessantly vilified by revisionists. The motion against historical revisionism adopted by the Socialist Party Congress of 1956 further confirmed the party's grounding in liberal traditions.<sup>23</sup> Although it was more difficult to accuse the Communist Party of liberalism, the historical writings of Leonardo Paso, who was in effect the party's official historian, clearly dissociated themselves from nationalist traditions.<sup>24</sup>

From their authoritarian forerunners the new revisionists adopted the notion that liberalism had obscured the authentic essence of national identity. There was general agreement on this point between both right-wing nationalists of the 1930s and post-1955 populists. Both claimed to rescue from oblivion a real or authentic Argentina, which had until then been submerged beneath the surface. Although what the Catholic *hispanista* Ernesto Palacio had simply called "falsified history" in 1939 was perhaps not exactly parallel to what Jauretche later labeled "pedagogic colonization," both concepts were based on the belief that liberalism had systematically distorted history, resulting in an "official" version.<sup>25</sup> In both cases a local oligarchy and an intelligentsia, both of which were imbued with ideals alien to Argentina's national reality, were held responsible for the

distortion, a *leitmotiv* reiterated incessantly by the populist intellectuals of the sixties. To counter this situation, they argued, it was necessary to return to the “authentic nation,” as demanded by Jauretche in an essay published in 1959, which explicitly linked the necessity of historical revision to the exigencies of the national-populist movement.<sup>26</sup>

The concept of an official history, allegedly distorted by the “official” *intelligentsia*, was now reformulated according to Marxist categories, whose impact can be seen with even a non-Marxist author like Jauretche employing Marxist terminology. He defined his notion of “pedagogic colonization” as a “cultural superstructure,” a concept that he had learned from Ramos.<sup>27</sup> Precise definitions were not provided, so the concept of superstructure was not easily distinguished from notions of false consciousness, alienation or Marxist ideology which Raymond Williams has defined as “a system of illusory beliefs.”<sup>28</sup> In *Imperialismo y cultura*, perhaps the best example of a Marxist attack against a supposedly official ideology, Hernández Arregui avowed that “the point of departure is the consideration of cultural activity as ideology.” It followed that

...the aim is to prove how this generation [from the 1930 military coup onwards] was the instrument of imperialism, which used it to reinforce a false consciousness of the nation’s own essence and to disarm the defensive spiritual forces that struggle for national liberation [...].<sup>29</sup>

In his eyes, the dominant ideology was a direct response to Argentina’s semi-colonial position or in other words, imperialism. Hernández Arregui thus affirmed that

...the imperialist offensive goes hand in hand with ideological invasion. The entire public opinion of the country is infected to the core by this publicity that dissolves the national consciousness of a people. Institutions do not escape this propaganda. I am referring here to imperialist infiltration of the trade unions, the armed forces and universities.<sup>30</sup>

According to this view, imperialist penetration — which ran parallel to the promotion of dominant ideas and was therefore inseparable from the corruption of national consciousness — could be felt in practically all domains of public life, no distinction being made between those controlling cultural or economic capital.

On more detailed questions — for example whether foreign domination was the result of a conscious operation by identifiable protagonists or rather of a general system which historical figures had only reproduced — opinions varied considerably, sometimes even within the writings of one and the same author. Such variations were expressed through different styles and methodologies, ranging from the Rankean optimism of José María Rosa, who was convinced that the accumulation of documents sufficed to demonstrate what his protagonists *had actually been like*, to the economist rigidity of Puiggrós, who employed arguments based on a more precise Marxist ideology. As a general tendency, domestic factors were largely discounted as having any bearing on the ideological penetration of imperialism and the distortion of history. Those who related to the domestic scene generally lamented the rootless nature of Argentine society and its lack of tradition. In the eyes of Ramos, the absence of grandparents among immigrants

...makes it completely impossible for the generations after 1880 to perceive the fundamental course of the Argentine historical process, given that the offspring of these successive streams of immigrants, who lacked an oral tradition, could understand history only through the textbooks written by the oligarchy. These superstructural elements have huge importance in twentieth-century Argentine politics and in the historical imposture that still rules.<sup>31</sup>

In general, however, analysis of the configurations that had facilitated or fostered imperialist interference affirmed the existence of abominable pockets of “fatherland-sellers” (*vendepatria*).

Some authors, notably Hernández Arregui, emphasized that Argentina’s Hispanic roots counterbalanced the loss of tradition. In his view, the Argentine crisis stemmed partly from the economic and political replacement of Spain by Britain as a principal point of reference for the ruling classes. After assuring the reader of the far-reaching Hispanic influences in Shakespeare — as implicit proof of the cultural superiority of Spain over Britain — Hernández Arregui observed that the masses “remained Hispanic, affiliated to the past.”<sup>32</sup> Hernández Arregui’s notion of *hispanidad* constituting Argentine national identity was not only compatible with the ideas of some reactionary thinkers of *nacionalismo* and revisionists of the thirties, such as Carlos Ibarguren, Manuel Gálvez or Ernesto Palacio.<sup>33</sup> Such passages also veiled a cultural conservatism, which suspected modernization of inducing societal degeneration. Furthermore, this moralistic aversion against current cultural trends from abroad was also widespread among left-wing Peronist Youth (JP). *Trinchera* defined “the Peronist lifestyle” as negat-

ing the consumption of alcohol and visiting brothels, while Octavio Getino and Fernando Solanas' 1968 film *La hora de los hornos* pictured the students at the art school of the Instituto Di Tella as the quintessence of frivolity, emulating North American chic and showing total indifference to the misery of the masses.<sup>34</sup> For Hernández Arregui, too, the Instituto di Tella was “modern art without national roots and an empty imitation [...] of foreign fashion.”<sup>35</sup>

Generally speaking, the distortion of Argentine reality and history was the collective result of imperialism, oligarchy and domestic culturally privileged groups. Puigrós determined that

[t]he ideological infection introduced through imperialist propaganda provokes, in the colonial mentality of the liberal intellectuals and politicians, [...] a deformed vision of social reality [...].

Since the oligarchy controlled the means of communication, it was only logical that “the conquest of power cannot be learned in books.”<sup>36</sup> According to the *izquierda nacional*, there was an inevitable link between the control of the domestic cultural market, the oligarchy and imperialism. As a result, reading and other intellectual activities ultimately amounted to “alienation” from authentic Argentine culture, a concept which Hernández Arregui prided himself on having introduced into the debate.<sup>37</sup> Insofar as foreign economic domination lay at the root of this alienation, imperialism remained the chief driving economic force. Yet arguments regarding the anti-nationalist character of oligarchic literature such as *Imperialismo y cultura* hardly went beyond mere affirmation. Rather than discussing economic data or social issues, they dealt with literary products written on an inevitably material background. Hernández Arregui's texts in particular were a denunciation of the liberal oligarchy as parasites rather than exploiters. Here, too, neo-revisionist historiography had much in common with the authoritarian strand of the thirties, both of which had little interest in economic analysis.<sup>38</sup>

### 3. Nation and class in Marxist revisionism

What came closest to constituting historical revisionism's ideological common denominator was the idea of a previously falsified liberal “official history.” It posited a discursive adversary who had allegedly distorted a historiography in urgent need of revision. In other words, the starting point of the *izquierda nacional*'s discourse was an attempt to legitimize revisionism by means of *via*

*negativa*. In other respects, however, the *izquierda nacional* differed from its reactionary precursors, especially in advocating the need to rescue the history of the popular classes. Hernández Arregui, for example, called for a “reply to the official history of the oligarchy with the revolutionary revision that exposes the class content of this canonized fable of our past.”<sup>39</sup>

Although the above author made it appear as if the stress on class was an inevitable outcome of any revision of “official history,” the majority of *rosista* revisionists of the 1930s had shown little sympathy for the popular classes. In fact, many of them — most notably Julio Irazusta — firmly resisted what they saw as a leftist apotheosis of the masses. Historical revisionism *per se* was far from designating the class struggle as a principal driving force of history. Yet in *izquierda nacional*-inspired books as well, the popular classes were not given the attention that might be expected judging by their opening chapters. The title of Ramos’ best-known book, *Revolution and Counterrevolution*, epitomized the dichotomy dealt with between its covers much more accurately than the subtitle of the original 1956 edition, which misleadingly claimed that it was a study of *The Masses in Our History*. It would have been equally possible to take one of Puiggrós’ titles, such as *People and Oligarchy* or *The Left and the National Problem*, since Ramos’ most recurring invectives were directed against those such as Bartolomé Mitre and Juan B. Justo whom he saw as archetypes of the oligarchy.<sup>40</sup> Despite habitually proposing to rescue those who had supposedly been buried by “official history,” other writings, such as Hernández Arregui’s history of ideas or Rosa’s political and diplomatic histories, rarely related to the popular classes.

The fact that neither the traditionalist *rosista* currents of the 30s nor their Marxist successors produced social histories does not mean, however, that the subject of class did not play a central role in populist narrative. Here in fact lies the most palpable difference between classical *rosismo* and the *izquierda nacional*. Firstly, they depicted the pre-proletarian masses of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as a *naturally* national class. For Hernández Arregui, “the nationalism of the masses stems from the immediate, not theoretical, fact of colonization. Not from books, but from the destructive eradication that comes upon us from outside.” Whereas his interpretation referred here to imperialism, the nationalism of the masses appeared as something that had existed *a priori*. Since they were the masses, “they do not think of the *there* of the world. They think of the *here*. Of the fatherland.” It thus followed that “the masses are always national, although they do not know the definition of *nation*” and that “the [the contemporary] proletariat is, by definition, a national and revolutionary class.”<sup>41</sup> Similarly, Cooke maintained in his *Apuntes para la militancia* that after the overthrow of

Rosas “the popular masses were left over [...] as the only trustees of the moral and cultural values of nationality.”<sup>42</sup>

At the same time, combining characteristics of both class and nation allowed national liberation to be encapsulated into a single subject. The fact that this entity adhered to both *national* values and those of the *proletariat*, would — at least if it became conscious of its own destiny — ensure that national liberation would ultimately be socialist. In principle, this could just as well be a class as a historical figure. It was only a short step, then, from the conviction that “every historical individuality personifies social powers” to the discovery of figures that purportedly embodied the values of both the nation and the popular classes.<sup>43</sup> Marxist revisionists saw these values embodied above all in the federal *caudillos*, such as Ángel Vicente “El Chacho” Peñaloza or Felipe Varela, who had resisted Mitre’s *porteño* centralism in the provinces. In this respect, past and present blended together. Hernández Arregui asked

...from where did the focal points of national emancipation emerge in the last years? From the provinces, Córdoba, Tucumán, Rosario [sic], Corrientes, San Juan, Catamarca [...]. The country, crushed during the nineteenth century with the extermination of the last *montoneras* of Felipe Varela, is in the interior.<sup>44</sup>

According to Ortega Peña and Duhalde, “Mitre [...] is the symbol of the directing cattle-breeding class which organized the country according to the dictates of English financial capital,” whereas “Felipe Varela [...] is the organization of the people, of the provincial working classes.”<sup>45</sup> For them, Varela did not only do what the nation or the people wanted, but embodied the people as represented by the “provincial working classes.” Identifying the *caudillo* with the people had already been established by the title of the book: *Felipe Varela Against the British Empire. The Masses of the Unión Americana Confront the European Powers*.

As this example indicates, the Marxist populists’ understanding of history was usually dichotomous. Cooke, for example, identified “two currents, which have clashed since the days of the May Revolution: that of the port of Buenos Aires, cosmopolitan, free-trade, vehicle of ideas and interests that suited Europe [...]; and another one, popularly nationalist, which saw the country as a whole and as part of Latin American unity.”<sup>46</sup> Yet the most extreme binary oppositions can be found in the works of Ramos. At the beginning of the second volume of *Revolución y contrarrevolución*, he declared that the social, cultural and political changes of the 20th century “only find themselves confronted with one invariable

factor: the cattle-breeding and commercial oligarchy." The concluding pages of the same volume claimed:

However surprising it might seem, and in spite of the transformative power of history, there is one thing that a century and a half of vicissitudes has not changed in our country: the all-embracing power of the cattle-breeding oligarchy, built from the Latin American Balkanization and the eclipse of Artigas. The oligarchic nucleus, a truly parasitic and paralyzing core, corrupter of Argentine economics, politics and culture bases itself on the same interests, the same psychology and the same myths, with which it confronted the *caudillos*, sustained the exclusivism of one port against the Nation, elevated Rivadavia, admitted Rosas, acclaimed Mitre, exterminated Paraguay, opposed Roca, overthrew Yrigoyen and exiled Perón. The entire life of the Argentine people has turned on the fight against that same power, under the most varying emblems; and the people have been defeated until the present day.<sup>47</sup>

Throughout the 20th century, struggles for liberation found their justification in those who opposed them.

Another common strategy of populist revisionist writings was to establish points of reference which were mutually explanatory, in other words, that historical distortions of liberalism led to imperialist penetration. This penetration was manifest in the distortion of economic and cultural practices and the exclusion of those who protested against them. Thus it was claimed that imperialist penetration generated a false historical consciousness. Although more elements could be included in such claims, the fact that they explained themselves *eo ipso* permanently relegated questions about determinants or about the relationship between base and superstructure to a subordinate level. It would be futile to search populist or Marxist revisionist writings for any seriously methodological debate. The same can be said of their writings regarding the intimate relationship between history and politics, which also mutually legitimized and explained each other. According to Jauretche, for example, a national policy was conducive to the revision of history just as much as historical revisionism would entail a national policy.<sup>48</sup>

Such binary oppositions and entities sustained by mutual arguments shaped a discourse that attempted to be simultaneously closed and comprehensive. It ascribed immutable significance to every historical protagonist and event within a global model of interpretation in which everything was linked with something else. However, it was not always easy to distribute the roles in such a game and

there must be some possibility of historical change. Varela or Perón, let alone Rosas, could not simply be viewed as representing a precisely defined working-class constituency. The crucial problems of Argentine history thus assumed an ethical rather than a socio-economic character. Opposing the enemy of the fatherland took precedence over specific social groups' interests. This explains why the tone of these writings was always moralistic and "betrayal" became a decisive concept allowing historical change. Urquiza's uprising against Rosas was not explained by the country's changing socio-economic structure or as a conflict of interests. Instead, Urquiza was simply accused of "betraying" Rosas.<sup>49</sup> Although such arguments appeared coherent, strong and self-sufficient, they frequently required moralistic backing.

#### 4. The problem of Rosas

The central position of history in the *izquierda nacional's* discourse could not conceal the fact that political considerations were of greater importance than conflicting interpretations of historiography. This is not to say that the populist Left did not voice varying opinions on the role of history or did not engage in interpretative debates. Whereas in Ramos' eyes it was legitimate to more or less freely manipulate history so that it could serve as a prop for contemporary political goals, Ortega Peña and Duhalde rejected such a view.<sup>50</sup> For this reason, the stance of the latter two conformed to the ideas of the Instituto Rosas, which considered the relentless pursuit of historical "truth" as its primary goal.<sup>51</sup> They thus associated themselves with the institute, engaging in debates with right-wing historians about the correct reading of the War of the Triple Alliance. In their view, this was to be understood as imperialist aggression against the autarkic Paraguay of Francisco Solano López that Mitre sought to force into integration into the world market. Their opponent, Juan Pablo Oliver — who was no longer convinced that Mitre deserved his erstwhile vilification by revisionists — condemned "a communist tactic of infiltration" among the ranks of revisionism, with Ortega Peña and Duhalde as the principal perpetrators.<sup>52</sup> This example illustrates that a number of difficulties were caused by the Marxists' combining authoritarian and Catholic strands of thought with a call for historical revisionism.<sup>53</sup>

One of the most problematic aspects of the debate regarding historiography was the classical revisionist apotheosis of Rosas. He could be depicted as a popular patriot and even, if one liked, as an embodiment of national capitalism who protected the manufacturing industries of the interior. However, there was no doubt he had also been an owner of vast lands who had acted in the name of

the cattle-breeders of Buenos Aires. If thus far it had not been necessary to apply concepts of *either* class *or* nation to historical analysis, the figure of Rosas seemed to belie the complementary character of the two categories. Jauretche's discussion of class and nation evolved around the question of "Don Juan Manuel and timid revisionism," published in a book that bore the unequivocal title *For Rosas or Against Rosas*. According to him, the socialists who had argued that Rosas was principally a member of the land-owning elite were guilty of "crude materialism." Those who from a left-wing perspective juxtaposed Rosas with the federal *caudillos* were furthermore characterized as "Mitro-Marxists." Jauretche thus thought it appropriate to rescue Rosas by reaffirming that the national question "was always the axis and this remains so."<sup>54</sup>

In contrast, most Marxists (and especially Puiggrós) could not bring themselves to glorify Rosas. Hernández Arregui tried to circumscribe a profile beyond "the nationalist tendency grouped around the figure of Juan Manuel de Rosas and the liberal one around Mayo and Caseros," since "during Rosas' government the *porteño* monopoly maintained all its vigor" and "Rosas' arguments were the same as those put forward by Rivadavia."<sup>55</sup> Similarly, when in a speech entitled "National consciousness is also historical consciousness" delivered by Cooke in Havana in 1962 he evoked historical figures as antecedents of a possible popular national revolution, Rosas was not his preferential choice, but instead the rather uncontroversial figures of San Martín and Güemes, accompanied by Mariano Moreno, who was frequently used as an icon by the Left.<sup>56</sup> However, it was not so easy to exclude Rosas from the debate. The decision of the Instituto Rosas — which despite the incorporation of some Marxists such as Ortega Peña and Duhalde continued to be a nucleus of right-wing *rosistas*— to re-launch its bulletin in 1968 was an attempt to regain ground it had gradually lost in previous years. Rosas was frequently presented as a "restorer of law" rather than a popular caudillo.

There were however also Marxists who arrived at positive conclusions about Rosas, among whom. Astesano was perhaps the most creative. After having abandoned his 1951 position —namely that Rosas had not been a champion of economic independence—, he interpreted Rosas in 1957 "according to the bourgeois revolution." Given that this revolution,

on a political level, gives rise to nationalist movements [and given that... ] in some cases it counted on the active collaboration of the popular masses, [...] the bourgeois revolution assumes in this case the character of a popular-bourgeois, or democratic-bourgeois, revolution.

Even though Astesano, too, detected the most strenuous anti-imperialism in the interior provinces, he nonetheless curtailed the distance that separated Rosas from the federal *caudillos* of the hinterland by asserting that both forms of federalism “expressed the reaction against a dependent, colonizing and foreign capitalist development.” Astesano thus paved the way for his interpretation of Rosas as a popular leader and the founder of Argentine independent capitalism.<sup>57</sup> The other two principal Marxist defenders of Rosas, Ortega Peña and Duhalde, were less scrupulous about reconciling their attitude towards Rosas with their Marxist beliefs. In fact they suspected that the Marxist origins of the *izquierda nacional* led to an over-emphasis on historical stages and progression, overlooking the emblematic role of the *montoneras* in the contemporary political struggle. They consequently chose to call attention to the deeds of the federal *caudillos* after Rosas’ downfall in 1852 and to emphasize “the continuity between the policies of Rosas and the *montonera* [...] on the level of the historical needs of nationality” without focusing too much on the problems surrounding the former governor of Buenos Aires.<sup>58</sup>

Nevertheless, such discussions based on historiography remained subordinated to contemporary political logic. Rosa’s ideological flexibility was illustrative both of the disturbances caused by historiographic arguments within historical revisionism and of their relative insignificance. In a letter from 1958, Rosa criticized Puiggrós for not having sufficiently changed the latter’s attitude towards himself, as expressed in a 1944 book called *Rosas el pequeño*. Trying to persuade Puiggrós that “Rosas was a socialist *avant la lettre*” —based on a document in which the latter had expressed his sympathy for the European revolutions of 1848—, he felt that he had to insist that “the problem of Rosas is crucial in our history and it has not been ‘overcome by time’, as you say.”<sup>59</sup> On another occasion, however, Rosa insisted that “we must establish the following: *the essential problem is not the figure of Rosas but the different criterion that we apply to judge him.*”<sup>60</sup> In the same letter to Puiggrós, Rosa wrote that “when communism and nationalism coincide [...], the world-wide national liberation of the peoples and social emancipation of the proletariat [...] is inevitable.”<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, he had no difficulties in positing class and nation as analytical categories in a strict dichotomy. In an interview in 1968, he explained that

history sometimes shows us the internal confrontation of a national mentality and a class mentality [...]. The bourgeoisie has a *class* mentality, but I cannot find this in the so-called working class. Look what happens in our country: those above have ‘class consciousness’; those below national consciousness.

Although the above seems to be in keeping with the analyses of Marxist authors, Rosa was careful to remind his readers of “the great mistake of Marxism.”<sup>62</sup>

Behind the ideological zigzagging we can see that it was difficult for Rosa to integrate the divergent political or ideological positions which exerted their influence on the Instituto Rosas and on revisionism as a whole. At the same time, however, this reveals the secondary significance of relating to certain historical figures with ideological precision. Even those, such as Rosa, Ortega Peña and Duhalde, who insisted on seemingly “objective” historical scholarship, would readily abandon historical research for the political undertakings they considered more urgent.<sup>63</sup> This political activism led to a paradoxical situation in which the great commercial and inspirational success of national-populist (Peronist) revisionism with the young urban middle class simultaneously led to the relegation of historiography to a secondary place. The erstwhile platform of revisionism, with its insistence on social hierarchies and unearthing a golden age by means of the Instituto Rosas, became increasingly less important for revisionism as a whole. At a time when Hernández Arregui was holding discussions with the proto-Montoneros, the reactionary Catholic priest Leonardo Castellani's criticism of Ramos' Marxism in the bulletin of the Instituto Rosas went largely unnoticed.<sup>64</sup> Whilst historiographic discussion did continue to take place between the ideologically different sectors of historical revisionism, the intellectuals of the *izquierda nacional* had a far more ambitious political goal: to help effect a revolutionary transformation of Argentine society, while relegating historiography to a subordinate role.

## Conclusion

Although, as was true in other Latin American countries, left-wing Argentine intellectuals gradually embraced nationalism, this was contingent on the domestic political situation that arose following of Perón's overthrow. Before 1955 the traditional Left — i.e. the Socialist and Communist Parties — had been reduced by Perón's appearance to urban middle class cohorts; it was possible to explain this in light of the propaganda of an authoritarian regime. However, the *continuing* adherence of the popular sectors to Peronism after 1955 seemed to require a more fundamental revision of former leftist explanations. Interwoven with Marxist approaches to the so-called national question, this climate of revision permeated wide sectors of the Left, including groups such as the young contributors to *Contorno*. In the case of the *izquierda nacional*, the rejection of the traditional Left was particularly far-reaching, articulated in symbolically violent invective

against its supposed liberalism accompanied by a radical re-interpretation of the Peronist phenomenon. While not going into a detailed discussion of Marxism, the *izquierda nacional* endeavored to reconcile its Marxist beliefs with nationalist tenets. A number of left-wing populist intellectuals blamed their exclusion from the cultural apparatus of the state on the fact that the Peronist movement had been made illegal. By equating their marginal cultural status with their exclusion from political power, they arrived at the conclusion that the same forces held cultural, political and economic power. Their exclusion from public cultural institutions set Argentine nationalist intellectuals of the 1960s apart from their Brazilian counterparts.<sup>65</sup> The fact that, as Sandra McGee Deutsch has observed,<sup>66</sup> historical narratives played a less significant role in Brazilian nationalism suggests that the opposition discourse of historical revisionism might in part have been an outgrowth of its proponents' marginal position.

On the one hand, the essayist narratives of the *izquierda nacional* appropriated the *leitmotiv* of historical revisionism — an anti-liberal, nationalist and politicized strand of historical writing that had emerged in the 1930s —, which maintained that Argentine history had been falsified by an anti-national oligarchy in order to impede the fulfillment of the country's grand destiny. History therefore had to be reinterpreted according to the needs of a "national project." On the other hand, as Fernando Devoto has recently argued, it is difficult to find a common ideological denominator among the intellectuals who are usually identified with historical revisionism in the 1960s.<sup>67</sup> The authoritarian Catholicism of the revisionists of the 30s was met with some reservations by the later Marxists. The characteristics of revisionism, then, were anchored not so much in a coherent ideology expressing certain group interests, as in the juxtaposition of a number of predicaments for which revisionism provided an answer. Firstly, since the traditional Left had failed to grasp the significance of Peronism as a result of 19<sup>th</sup> century liberal orientation, such an orientation was in radical need of revision. Secondly, the revision of Argentina's history would reveal the true nation and show the future revolutionary way to national liberation and, ultimately, *socialismo nacional*. Therefore, the populist Left constructed a historiography in which past and present reciprocally legitimized each other, forging a strong bond between history and politics.

However, historical revisionism remained subordinated to the needs of political legitimization. An analysis of later developments can support this argument: the adoption of revisionist discourse led to its gradual decline. After Perón's return to power in 1973, with the exception of Hernández Arregui, most of the intellectuals mentioned in this article were appointed to minor positions in the cultural apparatus of the State, resulting in a decline of their intellectual output. Much later, in an effort to gain legitimacy, the Peronist presidential candidate

Carlos Saúl Menem drew once more on populist revisionist imagery by declaring himself a "reincarnation" of the federal *caudillo* Facundo Quiroga. Once elected, he hurriedly repatriated Rosas' remains in an official ceremony, while at the same time declaring that revisionism was finally dead and buried. Rosas' repatriation, according to him, was "an authentic pacification of profound national reconciliation" and the farewell to "an old, wasted, anachronistic, absurd country."<sup>68</sup> Not too long thereafter, Menem's *caudillo*-style sideburns disappeared. Following the profound crisis of legitimacy after 1955, revisionism remained marginal from an academic point of view, but after the reintroduction of democracy in 1983 it also increasingly lost its importance as a legitimizing tool for political aspirations.

## NOTES

1. Jorge Castañeda, *Utopia Unarmed: the Latin American Left after the Cold War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 273.
2. Alain Touraine, *La parole et le sang: politique et société en Amérique latine* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1988), 141. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.
3. Oscar Terzariol, *Nuestros años sesentas: la formación de la nueva izquierda intelectual en la Argentina 1956-1966*, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto, 1993).
4. On the Brazilian intellectuals in the 1930s, see Daniel Pataffo, *Entre le peuple et la nation: les intellectuels et la politique au Brésil* (Paris: Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1989), 9-82. Even in Cuba, a seemingly clear-cut case of left-wing nationalism, there had been strongly authoritarian variants at an earlier stage (see Jules R. Benjamin, "The Machado and Cuban nationalism, 1928-1932," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 55, no. 1 [1975], 66-91).
5. The contrast with Brazil, in this regard, is stronger than with most Spanish American countries: see Nicola Miller, *In the shadow of the state: intellectuals and the quest for national identity in Spanish America* (London: Verso, 1999), esp. 245-259.
6. Silvia Sigal, *Intelectuales y poder en Argentina: la década del sesenta* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2002).
7. Such is one of the principal arguments of Federico Neiburg, *Os intelectuais e a invenção do peronismo: estudos da antropologia social e cultural* (São Paulo: Editora da USP, 1997).
8. The armed hordes of followers of the 19th century federal *caudillos* were called *montoneras*. The first public statement of the Montoneros in 1970 clearly showed the group's appropriation of revisionism in order to justify their violence. See "Hablan los Montoneros," in: *Cristianismo y Revolución*, no. 26, November/December, 1970, 11-14.
9. Generally on revisionism see Tulio Halperin Donghi, *El revisionismo histórico argentino* (Buenos Aires and Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1971); Diana Quattrocchi-Woisson, *Un nationalisme de déracinés: l'Argentine, pays malade de sa mémoire* (Paris and Toulouse: CNRS, 1992); Alejandro Cattaruzza, "El revisionismo: itinerarios de cuatro décadas," in

- Alejandro Cattaruzza and Alejandro Eujanian, *Políticas de la historia: Argentina 1860-1960* (Buenos Aires: Alianza, 2003), 143-182; the special section devoted to revisionism in *prohistoria*, no. 8 (2004), 165-265; and the corresponding articles in Fernando J. Devoto and Nora Pagano (eds.), *La historiografía académica y la historiografía militante en Argentina y Uruguay* (Buenos Aires: Biblos, 2004). Both Terán, *Nuestros años sesenta*, and Sigal, *Intelectuales y poder* contain valuable remarks, too, but their books are only tangentially devoted to revisionism. The same is true for Maristella Svampa, *El dilema argentino: civilización o barbarie, de Sarmiento al revisionismo peronista* (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto, 1994), whose sections on revisionism (269-281) deal with the subject from the perspective of text analysis.
10. Carlos Altamirano, *Peronismo y cultura de izquierda* (Buenos Aires: Temas Grupo Editorial, 2001), 13-25, provides a general overview of these divisions before 1955.
  11. *Clase Obrera*, no. 50, April, 1950, 3-4. Vittorio Codovilla was leader of the Argentine Communist Party. On 17 October, 1945, a large demonstration on Buenos Aires' central Plaza de Mayo had demanded Perón's release from prison. The Peronist regime subsequently ritualised 17 October as the "Loyalty Day" in yearly commemorations so that it became closely associated with the Peronist liturgy.
  12. *Lucha Obrera*, no. 5, 22 December, 1955.
  13. *Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberación Nacional*, no. 1, 14 July, 1957, 1-3.
  14. Eduardo B. Astesano, *Nacionalismo histórico o materialismo histórico* (Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1972), 207-208.
  15. The literature on Cooke is quite abundant: see especially Miguel Mazzeo (ed.), *Cooke, de vuelta: el gran descartado de la historia argentina* (Buenos Aires: La Rosa Blindada, 2000), but also Norberto Galasso, *Cooke: de Perón al Che, una biografía política* (Buenos Aires: Homo Sapiens, 1997) and Ernesto Goldar, *John William Cooke y el peronismo revolucionario* (Buenos Aires: CEAL, 1985). A good impression of him as an underground politician can be gained from his correspondence with Perón in the years 1955-57, when Cooke organised the so-called "Peronist resistance" (Juan Domingo Perón and John William Cooke, *Correspondencia* (Buenos Aires: Gráfica, 1973), 2 vols.) and, for his ideas, from his widely read *Apuntes para la militancia: peronismo crítico* (Buenos Aires: Schapire, 1973).
  16. See Altamirano, *Peronismo y cultura de izquierda*, 56-61.
  17. On Jauretche see Norberto Galasso, *Jauretche: biografía de un argentino* (Buenos Aires: Homo Sapiens, 1997). Regarding Cooke's and Rosa's fathers, it should be added that their political orientations clearly differed, as did their respective sons': Juan Isaac Cooke, a former Radical congressman who was appointed minister of foreign affairs in August, 1945 had always disliked fascism, whilst José María Rosa (senior), who was appointed finance minister in 1943, was a fervent sympathiser. See Alain Rouquié, *Pouvoir militaire et société politique en Argentine* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and CNRS, 1978), 369 (Cooke), 170, 321 (Rosa).
  18. See the *Revista del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas Juan Manuel de Rosas*, no. 17 (1958), 108 and Pablo José Hernández, *Conversaciones con José María Rosa* (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 1978), 130-131.

19. Jauretche's book *El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina: apuntes para una sociología nacional*, which was first published in 1966, was one of the biggest sales successes of the 60s. See the bestseller lists in *Primera Plana*, between no. 204, 22 November, 1966, and no. 249, 3 October, 1967.
20. Sigal, *Intelectuales y poder*, 175.
21. Quattrocchi-Woisson, *Un nacionalismo*.
22. Américo Ghioldi, *De la tiranía a la democracia social* (Buenos Aires: Gure, 1956), 91-96.
23. Daniel Omar De Lucia, "Liberalismo e izquierda: una relación poco estudiada," Paper presented at the Primeras Jornadas de Historia de las Izquierdas, Buenos Aires, 8-9 December, 2000 (Centro de Documentación e Investigación de la Cultura de Izquierdas en la Argentina), 3. There was little to support Ghioldi's judgment. As stated above, Peronist cultural policy and propaganda essentially followed a similar line of historical interpretation as had its predecessors.
24. See for example Leonardo Paso et. al., *Corrientes historiográficas* (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Marxistas, 1974), esp. 47-63 and Leonardo Paso, *Los caudillos y la organización nacional* (Buenos Aires: S?laba, 1965).
25. Both expressions were book titles: Ernesto Palacio, *La historia falsificada* (Buenos Aires: Difusión, 1939); Arturo Jauretche, *Los profetas del odio y la yapa: la colonización pedagógica*, 6th ed. (Buenos Aires: A. Pe?a Lillo, 1973).
26. Jauretche, *Política nacional y revisionismo histórico* (Buenos Aires: A. Pe?a Lillo, 1959), 51.
27. Jauretche, "Don Juan Manuel y el revisionismo tímido," in Federico Barbaro et. al. (eds.), *Con Rosas o contra Rosas: 32 escritores e historiadores emiten su opinión sobre D. Juan Manuel de Rosas* (Buenos Aires: Freeland, 1968), 15-32, 17.
28. Raymond Williams, *Marxism and literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 55. This concept of ideology coexisted relatively peacefully with others. Tulio Halperin Donghi, *Ensayos de historiografía* (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto, 1996), 111, has observed that many revisionists of the thirties saw democracy as an ideology or a false consciousness. It must be added that this was different from the writings of the *izquierda nacional*. Puiggr?s' criticism of "constitutional fetishism," for example (Rodolfo Puiggr?s, *Las izquierdas y el problema nacional*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Cepe, 1973), 15), does not amount to an anti-democratic stance.
29. Juan José Hernández Arregui, *Imperialismo y cultura*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Hachea, 1964), 15.
30. Hernández Arregui, *Peronismo y socialismo* (Buenos Aires: Hachea, 1972), 66.
31. Jorge Abelardo Ramos, *Revolución y contrarrevolución en la Argentina*, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 1965), vol. 2, 166.
32. Hernández Arregui, *¿Qué es el ser nacional? La conciencia histórica hispanoamericana* (Buenos Aires: Hachea, 1963), 29.
33. In fact, the *hispanismo* of 1930s *nacionalismo* was explicitly criticised by the *izquierda nacional*. See for example Puiggr?s' *Pueblo y oligarquía* (Buenos Aires: Jorge I?lvarez, 1969), 17.

34. *Trinchera*, no. 3, October, 1960. The film by Getino and Solanas adopted many motifs from revisionism. One of the first quotes in the first part is by Scalabrini, stating: "The history they taught us is wrong."
35. Hernández Arregui, *Peronismo y socialismo*, 51.
36. Puiggr?s, *Pueblo y oligarqu?a*, 13 and his *Las izquierdas*, 187.
37. Hernández Arregui, *¿Qu? es el ser nacional?*, 12.
38. On the exclusion of material considerations for the characterisation of the oligarchy in 1930s revisionism, here in the influential revisionist book by the Irazusta brothers, *La Argentina y el imperialismo brit?nico*, see Tulio Halperin Donghi, "Argentines ponder the burden of the past," in: Jeremy Adelman (ed.), *Colonial legacies: the problem of persistence in Latin American history* (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), 151-173, 165.
39. Hernández Arregui, *Nacionalismo y liberaci?n* (Buenos Aires: Hachea, 1969), 19.
40. The respective Spanish titles were: *Revoluci?n y contrarrevoluci?n en la Argentina: las masas en nuestra historia* (Ramos, 1956), *Pueblo y oligarqu?a* (Puiggr?s, 1969), *Las izquierdas y el problema nacional* (Puiggr?s, 1967).
41. Hernández Arregui, *Peronismo y socialismo*, 16, 67, 70.
42. Cooke, *Apuntes*, 47.
43. Hernández Arregui, *Imperialismo y cultura*, 21.
44. Hernández Arregui, *Peronismo y socialismo*, 70.
45. Rodolfo Ortega Pe?a and Eduardo Luis Duhalde, *Felipe Varela contra el Imperio brit?nico. Las masas de la Uni?n Americana enfrentan a las potencias europeas* (Buenos Aires: Sudestada, 1966), 165-166.
46. Cooke, *Apuntes*, 41. This passage bore remarkable similarities to the historical justifications that the left-Peronist guerrilla group Montoneros published in 1970 ("Hablan los Montoneros," *Cristianismo y Revoluci?n*, no. 26, November/December, 1970, 11).
47. Ramos, *Revoluci?n y contrarrevoluci?n*, vol. 2, 7, 698.
48. Jauretche, *Pol?tica nacional* (1959), 23-25.
49. See for example Jos? Mar?a Rosa to Rodolfo Puiggr?s, Madrid, 14 March, 1958 (I would like to thank Omar Acha for drawing my attention to this letter). The examples of using betrayal to explain historical events is endless.
50. See the interview with them in *Todo es Historia*, no. 38, June, 1970.
51. The editorial of the institute's bulletin called for accomplishing "our mission to consolidate the truth up to its most extreme limits," for example (*Bolet?n del Instituto Juan Manuel de Rosas de Investigaciones Hist?ricas*, no. 4, second series, April, 1969, 3).
52. *Bolet?n del Instituto Rosas*, nos. 4, 5 (second period), April, May, 1969.
53. Large parts of Hernández Arregui's best-seller *La formaci?n de la conciencia nacional, 1930-1960* (Buenos Aires: Hachea, 1960) were devoted to differentiating reactionary from progressive nationalism. See also Puiggr?s, *El proletariado en la revoluci?n nacional*, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Sudestada, 1968), 47-66.
54. Jauretche, "Don Juan Manuel," 18, 20-21.
55. Hernández Arregui, *Imperialismo y cultura*, 15, 20.
56. Cooke, "Documentos, cartas, discursos," *Crisis*, no. 9 (1974), 4-5.
57. *Columnas del Nacionalismo Marxista de Liberaci?n Nacional*, no. 3, 1 September, 1957,

- 1-3. He fully elaborated his reading of Rosas in his book *Rosas: bases del nacionalismo popular* (Buenos Aires: A. Pe?a Lillo, 1960).
58. Ortega Pe?a and Duhalde, *Felipe Varela*, 166. For their criticism of the *izquierda nacional* see *Bolet?n del Instituto Rosas*, no. 5 (second period), May, 1969, 24.
59. Jos? Mar?a Rosa to Rodolfo Puiggr?s, Madrid, 14 March, 1958.
60. *Mundo Nacionalista*, no. 3, 5 September, 1969.
61. Rosa to Puiggr?s, Madrid, 14 March, 1958.
62. Jos? Mar?a Rosa, *Historia del revisionismo y otros ensayos* (Buenos Aires: Merl?n, 1968), 10-11. The expression “internal confrontation” supposedly referred to a confrontation within one country.
63. See on Ortega Pe?a and Duhalde: Ariel Eidelman, *Militancia e historia en el peronismo revolucionario de los a?os 60: Ortega Pe?a y Duhalde*, (Buenos Aires: Centro Cultural de la Cooperaci?n, 2004).
64. *Bolet?n del Instituto Rosas*, no. 5 (second period), May, 1969, 21. That Castellani mistakenly called the reviewed book *Ej?rcito y pol?tica* instead of *Ej?rcito y semi-colonia* shows to what extent he was out of touch with Marxist vocabulary and, by implication, with debates in the social sciences and among intellectuals in general. On Hern?ndez Arregui and the Montoneros see Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Per?n: Argentina's Montoneros* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 80.
65. In Brazil, because (at least before 1964) this left-wing nationalism found its niche in state institutions, notably the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros, founded in 1955 by presidential decree (see Caio Navarro de Toledo, *ISEB: f?brica de ideologias* (S?o Paulo: ?tica, 1977)).
66. Sandra McGee Deutsch, *Las Derechas: the extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 327-328.
67. Fernando Devoto, “Reflexiones en torno de la izquierda nacional y la historiograf?a argentina,” in Devoto and Pagano (eds.), *Historiograf?as acad?mica y militante*, 107-131.
68. *Clar?n*, 1 October, 1989.