
patently racist pals who sought home rule did so as Englishmen abroad, not as Jamaicans. They invested nothing in valorizing Jamaicanness.

2. Rolph Trouillot, *Haiti, State Against Nation: the Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism* (New York, 1990), intro.

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MIGUEL ÁNGEL CENTENO: *Blood and Debt: War and Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.

Why did the Latin American state fail to develop in the nineteenth century beyond its limited organizational capacities? Why did international wars occur so infrequently on the continent in the 19th and especially in the 20th centuries? What are the mutual relationships between war and the nation-state in Latin America? These are the three major puzzles that Miguel A. Centeno has addressed in a seminal and original work of political sociology about the (lack of) war and the (lack of) states in Latin America. This is an engaging *tour de force* about the origins and failures of the Latin American state and the links between war and political development. The result is a very readable, incisive, broad, and extremely original research, which combines bold theoretical statements, sweeping generalizations, and a quite unconventional use of quantitative data, including tax receipts (to examine the limited reach of the Latin American state); conscription records (to assess the relative lack of mobilization of the citizens); the names of articles published in military journals (to address the peculiar absence of bellicose sentiments in the respective armies); and the naming of streets and public monuments in the major cities of the region (as a proxy for the relatively cosmopolitan and non-nationalistic political culture of the ruling elites).

To address these three puzzles, Centeno suggests the following thesis: "Latin America was relatively peaceful because it did not form sophisticated political institutions, capable of managing wars. No states, no wars" (26). The failure of the state to develop as a strong and significant institution provides the initial explanation for the relative absence of (significant) international wars. Although the author is aware of the large number of international wars that had taken place in the region between 1810 and 1883, he tends to dismiss those as mere "limited wars" that had only a minor impact upon very weak and under-developed states, as compared to the European experience of the last two

hundred years. In the Latin American context, wars had only caused “blood and debt.” These limited wars had created debts and fiscal burdens for the state, rather than enhancing its institutional capabilities. Thus, their effects have been non-existent, very limited, or at most detrimental for the further development of the state.

The explanations that Centeno offers for these puzzles include the lack of political and military culture oriented toward international violence; the lack of state capabilities to fight wars; the trade-off between international and domestic violence; the persistent notions of fragmented sovereignty (*patria chica*) with sub-national allegiances; regionalism and a physical geography that impeded the development of a centralized authority; ethnic divisions and racist sentiments; the cleavages that have characterized the social and political elites since colonial times; and a deterministic, *dependencia*-type of framework in which the regional hegemon (the United Kingdom in the 19th century, and the United States in the 20th century) advocates regional peace. The evidence that Centeno brings focuses upon the initial and *intermestic* (partly international and partly domestic) long wars of Independence (1810-1824), and the subsequent 19th century wars. The book does not address much of the diplomatic history of the 20th century, including the geopolitical competition of the 1970s and the processes of democratization in the 1980s that notably improved and “upgraded” the quality of regional peace, especially among the ABC (Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) Southern Cone countries.

Although Centeno manages successfully to disclose his arguments and evidence in a very eloquent and systematic way, leading us from the original puzzles to the limitations in making war (Chapter 2), to the failures in making the state (Chapter 3), to the shortcomings in making the nation (Chapter 4), up to the relative lack of a common civic sentiment (Chapter 5), there are several pitfalls in the empirical and theoretical analysis that should be mentioned. At the empirical level, he omits in Table 2.2 to refer to the Argentine “dirty war” of 1976-1982 (with more than 30,000 victims) as a case of civil war engaging the Argentine state (or better, regime) against its own citizens. Moreover, in his broad and impressive historical descriptions he also fails to refer to the amazing and peaceful territorial expansion of Brazil in the last part of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries; the significant differences between Central and South America, and between the Spanish-speaking Republics and Brazil; the contrasts between the 19th and 20th centuries in terms of relative political and economic development, and especially the almost complete absence of international wars in South America since 1883.

The most fascinating and illuminating sections of Centeno’s book cope with the aspects of political sociology and his analysis of the relative weaknesses

of the Latin American state, and the difficulties in forging a nation and a notion of common citizenship. By the same token, the most controversial and problematic sections refer to the implications of his sociological analysis for international relations, leading into a paradox, if not self-contradiction. As I pointed out in my own examination of the puzzle of the South American peace (in *Zones of Peace in the Third World*), this “long peace” started *after* 1883, coinciding with the relative consolidation of the Latin American states after 60-70 years of anarchy and disarray. Here is the oxymoron of Centeno’s argument: if wars in Latin America until the late 1880s were ineffectual or irrelevant because states were weak or inexistent, we should expect that after states grew stronger, they should have started fighting more “European-types” of war, not less, or even none. Thus, either his explanation is wrong, or the empirical depiction of the 19th century as relatively peaceful is skewed. As David Mares argues in *Violent Peace*, “the wars of the first 60-80 years of independence had tremendous consequences: states were created, confederations of states ceased to exist, and the position of states in the regional hierarchy was dramatically altered” (35). Although Mares does not recognize my own depiction of South America as a “zone of peace” after 1883, he concurs that states did consolidate after the 1880s. Hence, we should account for alternative explanations for the *variance* in the extent of international peace in the region before and after 1883, including the emergence and evolution of a *diplomatic* political culture in favor of peaceful norms.

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COLIN M. MACLACHLAN: *A History of Modern Brazil: The Past Against the Future*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003.

Just a few short years ago, those in search of a good history of Brazil in English had very few choices, and the principal option was the late E. Bradford Burns’ *A History of Brazil* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, 3rd ed.). How dramatically this has changed. As Burns’ text becomes more dated, instructors and the general public now have a growing list of alternatives. In just five years, five new histories have appeared: Thomas Skidmore’s *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change* (1999), the late Robert Levine’s *A History of Brazil* (1999), Boris Fausto’s *A Concise History of Brazil* (1999), and Joseph Smith’s