

Indian Trade and Ethnic Economies in the Andes, 1780-1880

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The image of indigenous populations of Latin America is one of marginalization and poverty. This image is largely accurate from the early twentieth century onward.¹ Historians and other social scientists have assumed that, at least since independence, Indians were politically and economically disadvantaged. The political side of this equation has enjoyed in recent years a burgeoning literature, as historians of the Andes have been inspired by Benedict Anderson's work on nation-building and have tried to show how the state failed to integrate indigenous peoples into the nation-state.² While much literature exists on the economic behavior of Andean peoples (most of whom were peasants), there has been no systematic overview.³ This study attempts to provide this overview for Peru and Bolivia,⁴ based on the insights gained from economic geography. In particular, I will use the tools of central place theory in modified form.⁵

To understand the role of the Andean Indians, it is necessary to go back to the late colonial period and see how their economic roles changed from approximately 1780 to 1880. Then we can revise our understanding of how indigenous economic activity and trade in particular helped shape the region, moving away from the assumptions of eternal indigenous marginalization and poverty. New research of the past quarter century provides us with a very different vision of the Indians' role in the Andean economy, though it has until now not been pieced together.

As part of the "core" of the Spanish empire, the Andean Indian populations had been integrated into the colonial system as peasant producers. In this sense, the Andeans were a vital part of the colonial economy, for they provided essential

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goods and services. The integration of the Andean peasantry into the colonial economy has been especially well documented for the case of the silver mines and the labor prestations of the infamous *mita*.⁶ Although the *mita* was abolished soon after independence and other reforms were attempted, in virtually all other aspects the colonial system and its economic structure in the Andes continued into the second half of the nineteenth century.

The triumph of liberal policies in the late nineteenth century and the penetration of railroads into the Andean massif represent the real breaking point of the colonial economy. In fact, one can argue that the early nineteenth century represents a period of the dominance of the Andean ethnic economies not witnessed since the middle of the sixteenth century. I will argue that both the internal and export economies of Bolivia and highland Peru in the first half of the nineteenth century were highly dependent upon what might be termed the “ethnic economies” of the Indian communities.⁷ Thus, it is vital to explore the interconnections between the largely noncommercial trade of the Andeans with the monetary and export economies.

The Temporal Context: The Early Nineteenth Century as Part of the “Long Eighteenth Century”

As a number of authors have asserted, the social and economic structures of the Andean countries did not in fact undergo much change as a result of independence. In an influential essay, Heraclio Bonilla and Karen Spalding argued that the lack of change made it possible for the English to dominate the Peruvian economy so quickly.⁸ Authors realized that there was much continuity with the colonial system after Bolivia’s independence as well. Humberto Vázquez-Machicado in the 1950s recognized the lack of social and economic change. In turn, Alipio Valencia Vega, referring to the lack of change for the indigenous population of Bolivia, termed the independence wars “a revolution without agrarian content.”⁹

For the Andean Indian population, in most ways the first half of the nineteenth century was virtually indistinguishable from the late colonial period. Particularly in the Andes, the site of the Túpac Amaru rebellions in the 1780s and subsequently the center of reaction against the liberal patriots, the social and economic structures of the late colonial period remained in place. Indians continued to pay tribute to the central government, the Indian communities remained largely intact, and the reliance on the same exports, primarily silver, continued to the middle of the nineteenth century. Even the new national boundaries, dividing

the Andean region into Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, northern Chile and northern Argentina, had little impact on trans-Andean trade patterns.

The only major change was the abolition of the *mita*. Although in 1829 the administration of Andrés de Santa Cruz attempted to reinstitute a “voluntary” labor draft, the *mita voluntaria*, this effort failed. However, in all other ways the situation for the Indians remained the same. The liberal reform projects launched under the aegis of the Colombian army under Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre, which envisioned the abolition of tribute and the division of the communities, never got off the ground either in Peru or Bolivia. Fiscal necessities required the reinstitution of these taxes almost immediately after the organization of national states.¹⁰ With the continuation of tribute, the new nations also acquired an interest in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Indian communities. As during the colonial period, the state had to protect the resource base of the communities so that the *comunarios* could pay the head tax because it remained such an important part of the national budgets.

Both the Bolivian and Peruvian states followed generally protectionist policies during the first half of the nineteenth century. Whereas the Peruvian elites were on the whole in favor of protectionist measures until the 1840s, the Bolivian economy suffered from a poor geographic position and severely deficient transportation infrastructure that, despite the best efforts of virtually all early nineteenth-century governments, imposed a commercial isolation upon the country. The powerful Lima merchants tried to reimpose some form of their colonial commercial monopoly; in Bolivia, until the 1850s a debate raged amongst the elites whether to develop an export-oriented economy or one based on internal trade.¹¹

During the eighteenth century, despite a brief revival at the very end of that century, silver mining, the industry that provided the main Andean export of the colonial period, had shrunk considerably. The Peruvian mines of the Central Highlands became relatively more important, as Bolivian production declined from its peak in the early seventeenth century. However, during the first half of the nineteenth century silver continued as the major export from both Peru and Bolivia.¹² Peru’s export orientation changed only in the 1840s, with the guano boom in the islands off the coast. However, as a number of authors have shown, the guano boom affected very little the economy of the sierra (as the Andean highlands are called) where the Indian population resided, and was essentially ignored by the Peruvian state. During the same period, the export of sheep and alpaca wool from the southern highlands of Peru began to make inroads into the sierra economy.¹³ In turn, silver in the forms of coinage and bars remained the primary export of Bolivia even in the second half of the nineteenth century.¹⁴

In indirect ways, the guano boom did affect the indigenous economy, for with the windfalls in government revenue coming from guano, the government lost its reliance on Indian tribute. President Ramón Castilla abolished this tax in 1845, but tribute was still collected in the highlands, on the departmental rather than national level. In Bolivia, this same process began somewhat later, in the 1880s, when a boom in silver also decreased the state's reliance on income from the head tax. As in Peru, tribute was not abolished but became a source of income for the local units, the departments. By this time, however, the first assaults on the integrity of Bolivian Indian community lands had taken place in the 1860s, during the Melgarejo administration.

Thus we can see some breaks in the colonial model, at least for the Andean Indian population, around the middle of the nineteenth century. As in the rest of Latin America, this period saw the first successful attempts at liberal reforms and the increasing integration of the Andean countries into the European-dominated world economy. While the indigenous economies certainly remained quite strong during this period, they came under increasing attack. The nature of the relationship between the national state and the Indian communities also began to change. As we will see, this had important repercussions on Indian trade patterns. Thus, I will restrict my analysis primarily to the first half of the nineteenth century, when colonial patterns inherited from the eighteenth century were strongest.

Market Systems and the Andean Indigenous Economy

For over the past decade and a half, the impact of the silver mining economy centered in the Potosí mines on the Andean economy has received increasing attention. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, working in colonial notarial archives, pioneered a reconceptualization of the colonial Andean economy. He posited that Potosí and Lima during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the principal "growth poles" of what he called the "Peruvian economic space" [*espacio peruano*]. This region included a vast area extending from Ecuador to the north to Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile in the south. This economic space encompassed many different subregions that specialized in different products to supply the two growth poles with all necessary goods. Thus, the pampas of Argentina supplied beef and other cattle products such as leather and tallow, while Ecuador furnished rough cloth. In turn, much of the silver mined from the vast Potosí mineral deposits circulated throughout this economic space to pay for the goods taken to these poles. Potosí was clearly the main growth pole, since the high altitude made it impossible to farm in the area around the city,

and at its height in the early seventeenth century probably contained over 150,000 inhabitants, by far the largest city in the Western hemisphere and rival to many a principal city in the Old World.¹⁵

The pattern described by Assadourian in many ways resembles the “solar central place” paradigm developed by Carol Smith.¹⁶ That is, Potosí and Lima were the only large urban centers and markets within the system and, through a variety of means, including the high prices products fetched in the mining center and the policies of the Spanish colonial state, assured that few intermediate-sized towns or market centers near the primate cities developed. Those intermediate-sized towns that did exist within the Peruvian economic space, such as La Paz, Cuzco, Quito and Tucumán, were located far from the primate centers and served as entrepôts for commerce to Potosí or Lima. The only exception was the city of Sucre (in the colonial period called La Plata), in close proximity to Potosí. However, since Sucre was the political and administrative center to the mining town and many Potosí mine owners lived in Sucre, they can be seen as complementary parts where the political center happened to be divorced from the economic center.¹⁷

In many respects, the Peruvian economic space was a dendritic system in which goods were collected in places of political authority to be exported outside of the region. In fact, as part of the Spanish colonies, the region’s main economic function after the discovery of the fabulously wealthy Potosí mines in 1545 was to export silver to Spain. Assadourian’s contribution is his recognition that the silver mining economy was far from being an economic enclave set high in the Andes, and his rigorous analysis of the ways in which the colonial system fostered the development of a complex economy to supply the mines with necessary goods. Assadourian himself saw this as a rebuttal of dependency theory crudely applied to Spanish South America during the colonial period.¹⁸ In this case, the export economy brought about significant development of domestic markets as well.

From evidence gathered particularly for the sixteenth century, the Andean Indians were very much involved in the trade revolving around the Potosí market. As Peter Bakewell has shown, the Indians initially controlled production of silver in Potosí.¹⁹ Even afterwards, the *kurakas*, or Indian headmen, controlled much of the commerce to Potosí and many became rather wealthy by utilizing the communities’ resources for their own ends. Miguel Glave showed that the Indians created their own “Indian space” to accommodate themselves to this commerce.²⁰

As silver production declined in the second half of the seventeenth century, the Peruvian economic space became dependent on Indian trade. Increasingly, Indians paid money rather than go to the mines and work and effectively

subsidized Potosí mine owners. To get this money, they presumably had to engage in the monetary economy, either as laborers or sellers of goods. Other Indians migrated in large numbers from their original communities so as to avoid the *mita* obligations altogether, thus creating a new group of Andeans without land rights (called *forasteros*) who either joined other communities, became hacienda laborers, or went to urban centers or the eastern frontiers. In addition, the infamous *repartimiento de mercancías*, in which Spanish officials forced the Indians to buy both needed and useless goods, such as donkeys and luxury cloth respectively, made it necessary for the Andeans to gain access to money. The profits made through this forced trade made it possible for the Spanish Crown to sell its offices for large sums and help pay for administrative expenses.²¹

The increasing reliance on the extraction of surplus from Andeans rather than silver production for the maintenance of the colonial system brought about an increasing ruralization of the Peruvian economic space. Even the brief revival of the silver mining industry at the very end of the eighteenth and the first decade of the nineteenth did not reverse this process. With a large sector of the indigenous population, the *forasteros*, outside the *mita* and with lower tribute obligations, brought about an expansion of the subsistence sector. Cities also tended to decrease in population. This drop was most dramatic in the mining towns, which, as all boom towns, faded as their sources of income dried up. Thus, Potosí dropped from over 150,000 inhabitants in the early seventeenth century to about half that a hundred years later. By 1780 only 24,000 inhabitants remained in the city, and in 1827 the population had been reduced to 9,000. After this low point, the city began to grow again very slowly. By 1846 Potosí contained about 17,000 inhabitants. Similar patterns of population decline from the eighteenth century to independence, and a slight recuperation in the first half of the nineteenth century, occur in other Peruvian and Bolivian cities as well.²²

Unlike northern Mexico in the seventeenth century, no large-scale hacienda expansion appears to have occurred as a result of the economic crisis of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.²³ Instead, the Spanish state continued to support the Indian community, especially as the Andean population began to recover from its nadir in the 1720s. Thus, in the early nineteenth century, communities and, with them, Andean economic organization, still prevailed over haciendas in the highlands of Peru and Bolivia. This does not mean that significant breakdown of Andean communities had not occurred. Rather than think of the communities as either vestiges of pre-Columbian forms or legacies of the colonial period, it is more fruitful to consider the communities as adapting and changing over the centuries when economic and political exigencies changed. What is clear is that the great ethnic groups still extant in the sixteenth century had broken down into their smaller components by the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries. Thus, the Quillaka confederation of central Bolivia by the early nineteenth century was split into the various great *ayllus* of which it was composed.²⁴ Similarly, evidence from the Tarabuco parish registers in southern Bolivia suggests this breakdown as well. Composed primarily of members of the pre-Columbian Aymara kingdoms around Lake Titicaca, by the middle of the eighteenth century the priest stopped noting in the baptismal records the Titicaca-area ethnic affiliations of the Tarabuco community Indians and began referring only to local community names.²⁵ While important in terms of numbers of inhabitants and the amount of land they held, the Indian communities of the “long eighteenth century” were in no sense merely a reflection of the pre-colonial period, but ever-changing entities whose comparative strength waxed and waned over the period under discussion.

Ethnic Economy and National Economy: Indian Trade in the Early Nineteenth Century

Most economic historians who have focused on the Andean republics in the nineteenth century and beyond have virtually ignored the aspect of Indian trade, despite its importance. There are many reasons for this; they include a concentration on national-level sources, the lack of much quantitative data on internal trade and the concomitant wealth of information on exports and imports, as well as the very recent application of ethno-historical concerns and methods to the nineteenth century.

Likewise, economic geography has given short shrift to Indian forms of economic organization. Curiously, Carol Smith, Gordon Appleby, and Raymond Bromley, three of the most important exponents of this type of analysis, worked in heavily indigenous areas of Latin America (in fact, the latter two in the Andean region) but have little to say about Indian markets. At best, they see the presence of periodic markets in urban centers as Spanish means of control of trade. The emphasis on urban centers and their reliance on the “ethnographic present,” at a time when Indian and peasant markets have become marginal, partially explains this shortcoming.²⁶

However, in the Andes Indian trade in the early nineteenth century was ubiquitous, though it was in a sense disguised as well, for there exist few figures for internal trade and because the Indians were able to avoid customs duties in most cases, its full extent never measured. Even in the foreigners’ travel accounts, the Indians who plied their trade on the same trails as the European travelers appear sporadically, but their function and products they carried were only dimly understood. For example, L. Hugh de Bonelli described in the middle of the

nineteenth century the “numerous herds of laden llamas ... and the various parties of Indians ... driving their donkeys loaded with vegetables, fruits, or wares, to the market of La Paz.”²⁷ While picturesque, the scant information offered in this type of description tells us little about where this produce came from, whether from communities or haciendas, for what prices it sold, and why it was sold on the La Paz market.

To understand the basis of Indian trade, it is necessary first to understand the unique economic organization that underlay Andean communities. Unlike Mesoamerica, the pre-Columbian Andean economy contained few markets as we understand them. Instead, each social unit strove for economic self-sufficiency within an extremely rugged and mountainous terrain. Rather than see the mountains as difficulties for human survival, Andean civilization turned the region’s geography to its advantage. The great diversity of altitudes in the tropical latitudes also presented a variety of ecological zones, which the Andeans exploited fully to provide a wide range of agricultural products. Thus, the high plains, the *altiplano*, was utilized for the raising of livestock such as llamas and alpacas, the salty lakebeds for *quinoa*, somewhat lower elevations for potato production, warmer, protected valleys for frost-sensitive corn, and the hot subtropical steep hills for coca production. These patterns of utilization of different altitudes for the growing of different crops, the most sensible use of the mountainous terrain, continued after the Spanish conquest and remains important even today.

Each household attempted, as an ideal, to remain as self-sufficient as possible in agricultural production. It is possible through tribute records to trace household land tenure patterns into the middle of the nineteenth century. These show, as in the case of southern Bolivia, that many households maintained control over pastures, potato and barley-producing fields, as well as corn fields at lower altitudes.²⁸ Indian communities, unlike those in many regions of central and southern Mexico, were still organized into ethnic groups and also maintained access to the different resources available to them in the various climate zones on a larger scale. This has perhaps been most intensively studied in the northern Potosí area for the early nineteenth century, where ethnic groups controlled strips of land running west to east, from the high mountains to the warm valley lands, as well as some discontinuous portions at lower altitudes.²⁹

Although many highland communities were able to hold on to valley lands, others were not as fortunate and had to turn to trade to get access to the goods needed for survival. This was the case both where the *altiplano* extended over vast distances, making the control of valley lands problematic, and where the process of hacienda expansion had taken away valley bottom lands coveted by non-Indians.³⁰ Andean trade between highlands and valleys bore certain

characteristics not found to the same extent elsewhere in Latin America, such as Mexico. Indian trade usually occurred between highland traders going to the lowlands to complement their subsistence needs, remained highly personalized, and was primarily based on barter relations.

It is important to consider each of these aspects of trade, for they created certain constraints on the Andean economies as a whole. First of all, the Indians who actually traveled from one ecological level to another tended to be those living in the highlands. In the ethnic economy, the communities in the highest reaches owned the llamas, the aboriginal pack animals of the Andes that thrived only in the high altitudes. The community members in the lower levels tended to be agriculturists, where the climate was more propitious for this type of activity. The Indians with pack animals also lived close to the mining centers, which tended to be high up in the mountains.

While some ethnic groups engaged in barter within their own ethnic group, by the early nineteenth century many of the ethnic groups had lost their ecological "islands" in the valleys. Nevertheless, even those groups that had lost their valley lands attempted to establish personal ties, such as fictive kinship relationships, with the inhabitants of the valleys. This assured that they would have reliable access to valley goods (and vice versa, the valley inhabitants to upland goods) year in and year out, even over generations, in what can be characterized as "itinerant trade."³¹

The establishment of personal relations not only assured a trading partner year in and out, but also a constant exchange rate between the various products. For example, corn was traded for pottery in the amount that it took to fill the pottery with corn. Olivia Harris has shown that since money is not very useful far away from markets, it is only accepted among the Laymis of northern Potosí as a favor to close relatives. Outsiders have to pay in goods needed by the Indians. Presumably this dynamic also functioned in the early nineteenth century, although it is possible that the ethnic economies were more monetarized than today.³² Thus, barter relations minimized the risk for both trading partners; money and the entrance into the monetary economy was often avoided because of the risks involved and the irrelevance of money in the ethnic economy.

In fact, there is some evidence that suggests that barter relations increased during the early nineteenth century and that this implied liberation from earlier restrictions, rather than a diminution of commercial ties. Guillermo Madrazo makes this point most forcefully for the Indians of Jujuy province in the high plains of northern Argentina. Finally loosened from the forced sales of the colonial period and from direct *encomendero* restrictions after independence, the community members began to barter their salt, sheep, and textiles for corn in the valleys of Tarija, now on the other side of the border in Bolivia. This trade

presumably led to an improvement in the living standards of the Jujuy *puñenos*, as they achieved access to other ecological levels.³³

Trade with other members of society was in general engaged in only after subsistence needs had been met or to get cash to pay tribute or goods available exclusively with money. Trade occurred only at certain times of the year, after the corn harvest, when the highlanders could exchange their products for this important valley crop. The nature of trade relations had serious repercussions on other portions of the Andean economy, for the Indians supplied urban and mining markets with essential goods.

Tristan Platt has characterized Indian commercial activity as closely tied to the payment of tribute. Using the paradigm developed by Witold Kula for feudal Poland, he asserted that Indian commerce was in fact “forced commercialization,” in which Indian market participation occurred because the Spanish elites forced the communities to get cash to pay their tribute. Among other things, the seasonal transhumance patterns of the highlanders, according to Platt, followed the six-month tributary cycle as a way of gaining sufficient cash to pay their imposts.³⁴ While much Indian interaction with the cash nexus was related to the acquisition of monies for tribute payments, Platt overstates his case, as the above example from Jujuy demonstrates. The Indians did not pay tribute in Jujuy, but nevertheless engaged more intensively in trade once they had been freed from their *encomenderos*’ exactions. Also, the actual value of tribute assessments in those areas where Andeans paid tribute varied over time as inflation and the amounts required changed. Although we have no studies that deal systematically with rural prices for the nineteenth-century Andes, the weight of tribute in terms of the quantity of goods or services sold to make up this amount diminished in the long run.³⁵ An analysis of the relative weight of tribute exactions is beyond the scope of this study, but it is not clear at all whether Indian trade changed significantly as a result of these changes.

Despite the overemphasis on the concept of forced commercialization for explaining Indian participation in the cash nexus, the information gathered by Tristan Platt on the activities of the ethnic groups in northern Potosí and in Lípez province, both in Bolivia, are illuminating. According to Platt, the Indians of northern Potosí supplied the Aullagas mines during the silver boomlet between 1838 and 1843 with three basic necessities: llamas for the transport of minerals down the mountain, fuel, as well as salt for the processing of the minerals. In turn, the Indians of Lípez also provided the vital salt for the mines in their district.

There were, of course, a number of shortcomings that came with the miners’ heavy reliance on Indian-supplied goods. As was to be expected, the *llameros* always gave priority to their own interests. For example, in certain years of the

1840s and 1850s, the mine administrators complained of the lack of Indians bringing salt, for they had gone farther east, towards Tarija to trade salt for corn and wheat flour.³⁶ Much of what the mine administrators perceived as unreliability lay in the Indians' different perceptions of trade and their lack of responsiveness to money incentives. Foremost in these perceptions lay the paramount importance of personal relations in the itinerant seasonal trade between uplands and valleys. To make up the lack of pack animals at certain times of the year, the mine owners promised to provide the Indians with the same goods that they bartered for in the lowland valleys plus higher recompense for utilizing their animals. However, the LÍpez Indians refused to change their regular routes, for they did not want to abandon the people with whom they bartered in the lowlands. They also knew that the relationships they had established with the Indians below provided a much greater assurance of access to these goods over generations, and at relatively constant exchange rates that would not vary to the same degree as in the mines, tied much more closely to the vagaries of the monetary economy.³⁷ Also, the personalized ties took precedence over even apparently more lucrative but more risky monetary relations. The "safety first" principle, common among peasants throughout the world, found one of its manifestations in the Andean world through the maintenance of these personalized ties.³⁸

Another important aspect of Indian trade in the early nineteenth century concerns the annual fairs. Very little work has been done on this subject, although Viviana Conti and I have argued that fairs, rather than the great Andean mining markets of the colonial period, most particularly Potosí, represented an important evolution of trading patterns in the Andes.³⁹ Nevertheless, Conti has asserted elsewhere, based on the trade in livestock, that fairs became important only by the middle of the nineteenth century. However, the information about the *puñenos* of Jujuy, who initiated intra-ethnic trade to the valleys immediately after independence, belies this assertion.⁴⁰ Perhaps the annual fairs reappeared once the region's economies began to revive, perhaps by the late 1830s in southern Bolivia and slightly later elsewhere.

In any case, they often served as important articulators between the ethnic economies and the reviving export trade. The Vilque fair on the *altiplano* outside of Puno, in southern Peru, by the 1840s was thriving, essentially because of the large participation of Indians who sold their wool there. According to Alberto Flores Galindo, the participation of traders from as far away as Bolivia and Argentina represented a reconstitution of the eighteenth-century commercial circuits.⁴¹ The mules and donkeys traded in these fairs generally came all the way from central and northern Argentina; while many of these pack animals were purchased by non-Indians, during the nineteenth century wealthier Indians continued to purchase them as well. Likewise, evidence on the Colcha fair in

southwestern Bolivia at mid-century, when the Bolivian silver mines had begun their revival, shows the important participation of community members in the fair. This event also involved pan-Andean trade, for Peruvians as well as Lipeños participated.⁴²

In addition to providing the connecting points between the ethnic and nascent export economies, annual Andean fairs provided the local peasant populations, largely Indian community members, an opportunity to barter goods there as well. Other than La Tablada of Jujuy, at the extreme southern end of the Andean sphere, we know very little about the relative importance of barter versus monetarized commerce, although based on its prevalence even today in many regions, it appears to have been important earlier as well. Andean fairs were held at certain times of the year when the Indians of the surrounding communities had acquired sufficient resources to participate in this trade. In other words, the fairs followed the agricultural calendars of the Andeans and complemented their efforts to gain access to goods from all ecological levels. For example, the Achoma fair, held in August or September, occurred at a time when the indigenous population had returned from their travels to other regions.⁴³ Likewise, the Vilque fair, held during Pentecost, coincided with an agricultural slack time, during which the peasants from the communities could travel to the fair and trade their wool for other goods.⁴⁴

Significant ethnological work has been carried out particularly for the fairs in the *puna* of northern Argentina and is very useful in suggesting how these events worked over the rest of the Andes and in earlier centuries. Rabey, Merlino and González show that there are essentially two seasons during which most of these annual fairs took place: one occurred between March and April, when the sheep can be sheared and when the crops are brought in; in these fairs wool and meat were exchanged for fresh produce. During the second cycle, in October, peasants exchanged preserved goods; thus jerky is traded for *chuño* (freeze-dried potatoes) and dried corn.⁴⁵ In fact, the same two cycles can be discerned in the rest of the Andes for the early nineteenth century. Again, this trade, mostly done on a barter basis (though money may intervene with certain goods), occurred primarily between ecological levels and was a means to achieve access to goods from different ecological levels.

Particularly relevant is the moral dimension, which is apparent in the insistence of maintaining personal ties between those engaging in trade. Each fair had an established price for the exchange of certain goods, which only varied somewhat if there was a severe shortage of one good, but the exchange rates returned to customary levels once the crisis passed. While exchange rates tended to fluctuate to a greater extent in fairs than in itinerant exchange, the Indians also tried to establish personal relationships to create a certain price equilibrium.⁴⁶

Thus, the trade relationships at the fairs resembled to a great extent the types of exchanges that occurred with the itinerant trade discussed above.

It is important to note that interethnic trade, between the Indians and local merchants, also maintained fragments of this moral quality, at least as an ideal. Local merchants participated heavily in the Indians' ritual cycle. They went to carnival and other festivals, and often took on the role of sponsors at certain ritual occasions, when they provided the community with food, drink and other necessities for the celebration. Presumably, the merchants engaged in this activity as a way of maintaining good relationships with the communities and with individual trading partners as well.⁴⁷

Although this system was designed to provide consistency and security, exploitation was rampant, especially in trade between merchants and Indians. Haggling in intra-ethnic trade frequently took place, but only under a mask of joviality and politeness. In turn, town merchants often took advantage of their position in local society by intercepting Indians on their way to market and forcing them to sell their goods at lower prices before reaching the marketplace.⁴⁸ The reciprocal bonds between petty traders and Indians also did not always redound to the benefit of the latter, since merchants at times employed their positions of social and political superiority to enforce an asymmetrical relationship.⁴⁹

Thus, Indian trade was crucial to the economies of the Andean region. Mining activities depended heavily on goods and pack animals the Indians provided. Fairs thrived only where the Indian hinterland provided sufficient producers and consumers. Barter remained important, and in fact cannot be separated neatly from monetary transactions. To a large extent, the rhythms of agricultural and transhumance cycles during the early nineteenth century determined how and when trade with non-Indians took place because of the highly developed Andean strategies of providing for subsistence goods. Urban markets during this period were very small, even compared to the colonial period, and trade outside the urban centers, dominated by Indian community members, provided the underpinning of the Andean economies.

Theoretical Implications of Andean Trade

Clearly, the Indian communities in the Andes during much of the nineteenth century were far from constituting what Eric Wolf called "closed corporate communities."⁵⁰ Although the community members engaged in intra-ethnic trade if at all possible, trade with outsiders, through the Indians' insistence on personal ties, tried to reproduce in the interethnic exchange the moral dimensions

of trade between community members. Nevertheless, the high mobility of the indigenous population and their pack animals, particularly of the uplanders, inevitably brought them into commercial relations beyond the communities. Indeed, the export industries, such as they existed in the first half of the nineteenth century, depended in large measure on the participation of the Indian population and had to follow their agricultural calendars, refined to assure the subsistence of the community members. This was the case both with the silver mines and, somewhat later, the wool traders.

How does one then integrate the insights gained from economic geography and how are they modified in light of the Andean experience of the nineteenth century? First of all, the emphasis on urban economies must be largely abandoned, for they proved, if not irrelevant, not as significant as rural trade. Unlike China, for example, where rural trade rested upon the development of an interlocking network of market towns in a central place hierarchy, Indian trade in the Andes was only partially integrated into the urban economy.⁵¹ Rather than focus on urban markets, in the Andes it is useful instead to visualize different types of trade occurring in three different directions, each type dependent on each other.

First of all, and most importantly, was the intra-ethnic trade that occurred generally in an east-west direction. This trade, run almost exclusively by Indians living in the livestock-breeding uplands, involved the exchange of highland for valley goods in an effort to achieve subsistence by access to goods from the different ecological levels. Although this type of trade undoubtedly increased during the colonial period as Indian communities were unable to hold on to parcels distant from their main settlements in the uplands, the trade reproduced the interchange that existed since pre-Columbian times in the Andes. Traditionally, the movement between highlands and valleys permitted the full exploitation of agriculture in the many climate zones that the mountainous terrain afforded. Such was the case when the llama herders exchanged salt and animal products for corn and fruit.

The second type involved long-distance trade, essentially between north and south, and was often articulated through the systems of fairs that sprung up in the first decades of the nineteenth century. This type represented to a certain extent the reconstitution of what Carlos Sempat Assadourian called the "Peruvian economic space" and which has begun to be analyzed for the nineteenth century.⁵² The fairs provided for the distribution of goods both to complement the distribution of local goods from different ecological niches as well as goods produced at the margins of the Andean region, such as mules from Argentina. Long-distance merchants were mainly non-Indians (although it is not clear whether for example the coca trade from the Bolivian Yungas was dominated

by the Indian communities). The north-south trade, articulated through annual fairs, provided a mixture of goods from throughout the old "Peruvian economic space" as well as materials imported from Europe. Nevertheless, the location and timing of the fairs also depended upon the participation of the communities, for they provided the most important customers for many goods and producers of other essential materials, such as alpaca wool.

Most of the wool brought to these fairs, such as in Vilque, was of course exported out of the region. Export to the Pacific coast and its trans-shipment to the North Atlantic economies, the third type of trade, also depended very heavily on Indian participation. This was not only the case for llama and alpaca wool, where virtually all production came from the communities, but also for silver, the other great Peruvian export until the guano boom. As Tristan Platt has shown, the Indians were essential to the functioning of the silver mines. Not only did they provide llama trains for transport of the mineral, but also salt, a vital ingredient in the processing of the ore. Despite their importance to the mining economy, the Indians were able to dictate their terms because of their preference to maintain Andean forms of reciprocal trade between *puna* and valley rather than engage exclusively in servicing the mining sector.⁵³

Thus, in many ways, the models used in economic geography largely miss the point in the case of the Andes. While we would conclude that cities in the Andes conformed a solar-system hierarchy during the first half of the nineteenth century, this does not reveal the complexities of the situation. In fact, this is one of the inherent weaknesses of the models elaborated by Carol Smith, for in her fieldwork of twentieth-century Guatemala, rural and Indian markets were by that time marginal in relationship to monetarized urban markets. This was not the case in the nineteenth-century Andes, where rural trade by Andeans predominated in a pattern that stretches back far before the Spanish Conquest.

Although far from enclave economies, given the lack of inexpensive modes of transport, the exporting activities in silver mining and wool look very much like dendritic trade, in which products are funneled out of a region through exploitative relationships that provide little economic return for the producer. However, this was hardly the case. While there was much exploitation of Andeans in this trade, one gets the sense that the Indians controlled the rhythm of trade. Significant in this regard, the *llameros* from Lipez cited above were not willing to change their seasonal migrations in return for what amounted to higher wages for transporting the silver ore. Likewise, the insistence on personal relationships with the wool traders and the holding of fairs at times when it was convenient for the Indian peasants point to a general lack of coercion necessary for what Carol Smith has posited as one of the essential characteristics of dendritic trade.⁵⁴

One can also not dismiss out of hand Indian trade as “primitive” or “traditional,” although in many ways this is implicit in much of the theoretical work done on economic geography. Urban (and non-Indian) is seen as more complex and monetarization assumes a greater and “freer” circulation of goods. There is some merit to these assumptions, but by categorizing the geographic manifestations of trade into different levels of central place theory or its permutations, the importance of rural economies is unjustly minimized and the ethnic dimensions as well as the interactions between urban and rural, export and domestic economies are largely glossed over. Thus, Gordon Appleby’s attempts to analyze the economy of Puno department in southern Peru, although placed in the “ethnographic present,” completely ignore the vertical ethnic economies that still play a role in the survival of the large peasant, primarily Indian, population of the region today. Of course, this might have meant that the unit of analysis, that of the Puno region, should have been redefined, based on these patterns of intra- and inter-ethnic trade. In many ways, Indian trade is simply ignored because it does not fit into the preconceived notions of what is important in a regional economy. An otherwise very interesting attempt to apply central-place theory to late nineteenth-century Peru, by Clifford T. Smith, also tends to overemphasize the urban over the rural, especially since diversification of professions (and thus, presumably, increased economic complexity) favors urban over rural economies.⁵⁵ Smith also ignores the ethnic dimensions. If applied to the first half of the nineteenth century, the methods used by economic geographers might miss the clear dependence of the export economies and annual fairs upon the rural Indian population and thus miss most of the story.

James Vance’s model, which he used to analyze North American trade, also does not work for the Andean area. Vance posits that the pattern of mercantile centers in North America can be explained not from the consumer’s behavior, but from the exigencies of wholesale merchants and long distance trade.⁵⁶ As with Christaller’s and Smith’s models, Vance attempted to explain the placement of urban centers, which, as we have seen, is largely irrelevant to Andean Indian trade patterns. Moreover, Vance’s mercantile model assumes that urban centers were located at strategic positions based on the needs of wholesale import and export trade flows. In the Andes or in many other regions of the Spanish empire where a dense indigenous population existed since before the Conquest, wholesale trade does not account for the location of urban centers. Rather, as many scholars have shown for Spanish America, urban centers were primarily administrative centers, placed in strategic locations to rule over the Indian population, not centers of trade. This was even more the case in the Andes, where the ethnic economies did not favor the growth of large urban centers. The Spaniards tried to integrate the indigenous population into the colonial structure

and based their economy on the exploitation of the Indians' labor and agricultural surplus.⁵⁷ This contrasts with the history of North America, where the colonial powers largely excluded the Indians because they did not consider the indigenous population a promising source of labor or tribute. European settlements in North America relied more on trade with the mother country, not the exploitation of Indian labor and tribute. In turn, the Andean cities, located in the middle of densely populated indigenous areas for administrative purposes, were in the "long eighteenth century" not terribly relevant for Indian trade. This was especially the case during this period when, as we have seen, urban centers experienced a marked population decline and thus represented relatively small markets. In fact, urban centers were largely dependent on Indian trade, for they received some of the cash generated by this trade through the tribute payments.

Of course, dependence upon Indian trade varied over time and began to diminish in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. As railroads penetrated the Andean highlands in the 1870s, the great fairs shrunk or disappeared completely. This was the fate of the Vilque fair, which by the early twentieth century had been abandoned. Instead, the railhead at Juliaca became the principal place of commercial exchange. Similarly, the fairs in northern Argentina and Bolivia also changed their character as the railroads were built to the mining centers. Most importantly, the railroads, as inexpensive means of transport, served as conduits for the import of foodstuffs and other goods that previously the indigenous population had provided. At first, there was some complementarity between railroads and muleteers, though in the end rails destroyed the "pack animal transportation complex."⁵⁸ The most spectacular case of displacement was that of wheat flour imports beginning in the 1870s, when Chilean wheat flour almost completely displaced its domestic competitor in most Bolivian cities, thus destroying the prolific wheat production of the northern Potosí Indian communities. Nevertheless, this displacement was as much a problem for southern Bolivian haciendas as it was for the Indian communities.⁵⁹

The diminution of Indian trade in the late nineteenth century was also brought about by the vigorous expansion of the hacienda at the expense of the Indian communities throughout the Andean region. While the timing, the causes, and the exact extent of this expansion are a matter of some scholarly debate, it is clear that it affected Indian communities greatly.⁶⁰ In southern Bolivia, for example, outsiders targeted especially valley lands and so undermined the basis of the ethnic economy, dependent on access to a variety of ecological levels. Because of the increasing dependence on markets on unfavorable terms and increasing indebtedness, many Indians were forced to sell off the rest of their lands bit by bit, until they finally saw themselves without recourse but to become an hacienda peon.⁶¹ In other regions, such as northern Potosí, where the process

of hacienda expansion was less ferocious, Indian communities were able to maintain their intra-ethnic trade (principally barter), but decreased their involvement significantly in trade with outsiders.⁶²

The information on the marginalization of the Andean Indians from the national economies by the late nineteenth century complements the political trajectory of the nation-state in the Andes as well. By the late nineteenth century, indigenous peoples had been effectively repressed in both Bolivia and Peru and were not integrated into the body politic.⁶³ Earlier in the nineteenth century, highland Indian peasants had played a large role in the politics of their respective countries and regions, though often they had to make their voices heard through rebellions. By the late nineteenth century, new versions of racism and social Darwinism restricted the political influence of indigenous communities.⁶⁴ It was no accident that Andean Indians were rejected as full citizens in Peru and Bolivia at the same time they were marginalized economically. The lack of full citizen rights made it possible for the elites to attack the economic bases of indigenous livelihood and so destroy the economic vigor of the Indian communities.

By the twentieth century, the model of vigorous ethnic economies, an extension of the late eighteenth century, had faded into a virtually forgotten past. Only at this point did the Andean Indian village economies begin to resemble Wolf's closed corporate communities. Interestingly, the community studies of anthropologists and research conducted by economic geographers in Latin America began only around the middle of the twentieth century, when indigenous economies had become marginalized. Their marginalization was often confused with a "traditional" peasant economy. Indeed, the models developed first for Mesoamerica were applied to the Andean region, where a similar development apparently had occurred.⁶⁵ While there might have been a similar case of marginalization, I would argue that the Andean economy, with its important trade component, was more vital to the region than we suspected. Might it not be that the models developed by economic geographers working in Latin America and the Andes, which privilege the urban market and in which ethnic economies are marginal, only work for the twentieth century? In many respects, and especially on the level of Indian trade, these models do help us analyze the complex realities of the Andean economies during the "long eighteenth century," though as this study has shown, rural markets have their own dynamics. In fact, as the continual state of crisis in the twentieth-century Andean economies has shown us, we are finding out that the reliance on "modern" urban economies and the neglect of Andean ethnic economies, which developed over millennia to best take advantage of the rugged mountain terrain, are not always the most effective means to sustain the region's population.

NOTES

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1. In the 1980s, for example, 64% of the indigenous population of Bolivia was considered poor (compared to 48% for the non-indigenous) and 79% of Peruvian Indians were poor versus 50% of the non-indigenous population. George Psacharopoulos and Harry Patrinos, "Indigenous People and Poverty in Latin America," *Finance and Development*, 31 (1994), as cited in Adolfo Figueroa, "Social Exclusion as a Distribution Theory," *Social Exclusion and Poverty Reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean*, ed. Estanislao Gacitúa, Carlos Soto, with Shelton H. Davis (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank, 2001), 38.
2. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2.ed. (London: Verso, 1991). See for Peru Florencia E. Mallon in *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) and Mark Thurner, *From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997). For Bolivia, see Marta Irurozqui Victoriano, *A bala, piedra y palo: La construcción de la ciudadanía política en Bolivia, 1826-1952* (Seville: Diputación de Sevilla, 2000).
3. Brooke Larson has recently published a superb essay on indigenous peoples in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia in "Andean Highland Peasants and the Trials of Nation Making During the Nineteenth Century," *The Cambridge History of Native Peoples of the Americas Volume III South America Part 2*, 558-703, but it focuses mainly on political issues.
4. I have not included Ecuador because we still lack sufficient information on the economic activities of Ecuadorian Indians for the period under discussion, though there has recently been an explosion of recent work on this topic.
5. My theoretical approach is inspired by the work of Walter Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany* (New Jersey, 1966); William G. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 24 (1964, 1965), 3-45, 195-228; and Carol A. Smith, "Introduction: The Regional Approach to Economic Systems," *Regional Analysis: Economic Systems*, vol. 1, ed. Carol A. Smith (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 1-63.
6. See, for example, Alberto Crespo R., "La 'mita' de Potosí," *Revista Histórica* (Lima, 1955-56), 169-182; Peter J. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545-1650* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984); Jeffrey A. Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573-1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); Enrique Tandeter, *Coercion and Market: Silver Mining in Colonial Potosí, 1692-1826* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993).
7. I am deliberately excluding a discussion of haciendas in this essay, although it might be argued that in the Andes both *hacendados* and hacienda peons engaged in very similar economic strategies as the communities. However, hacienda studies for the early

- nineteenth-century Andes are not advanced enough to formulate firm hypotheses. Some initial comparisons are made in Herbert S. Klein, *Haciendas and Ayllus: Rural Society in the Bolivian Andes in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993); Robert H. Jackson, *Regional Markets and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1539-1960* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994); Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); and Nils Jacobsen, *Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780-1930* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For an explicit but later comparison, see Erick D. Langer, "La comercialización de la cebada en los ayllus y las haciendas de Tarabuco (Chuquisaca) a comienzos del siglo XX," *La participación indígena en los mercados surandinos: Estrategias y reproducción social, siglos XVI a XX*, eds. Olivia Harris, Brooke Larson, Enrique Tandeter (La Paz: CERES, 1987), 583-601; and Andrés Guerrero, "Renta diferencial y vías de disolución de la hacienda precapitalista en el Ecuador," *Avances*, 2 (1978), 71-94. Olivia Harris coined the term "ethnic economy" in "Labour and Produce in an Ethnic Economy, Northern Potosí, Bolivia," *Ecology and Exchange in the Andes*, ed. David Lehmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
8. Heraclio Bonilla and Karen Spalding, "La independencia en el Perú: Las palabras y los hechos," *La independencia en el Perú*, 2. ed., ed. Heraclio Bonilla (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981), 70-114. For a dissenting view, see Carlos Contreras, *Mineros y campesinos en los Andes: Mercado laboral y economía campesina en la Sierra Central, siglo XIX* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1987), 23-25. Also see Jean Piel, "Las articulaciones de la reserva andina al Estado y al mercado desde 1820 hasta 1950," *Estados y naciones en los Andes*, vol. 1, eds. J.P. Deler and Y. Saint-Geours (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1986), 323-336.
 9. Humberto Vázquez-Machicado, "La emancipación y la república," *Obras completas*, v. 4 (La Paz: Don Bosco, 1988), 468; Alipio Valencia Vega, *El indio en la independencia* (La Paz: Ministerio de Educación y Bellas Artes, 1962), 357. The continuity between the late colonial period and the nineteenth century has also been recognized by Latin Americanist historians outside of the Andes. One of the latest contributions in this regard is Stuart F. Voss, *Latin America in the Middle Period 1750-1929* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 2002). The Peruvianist historiography in particular often segues from the eighteenth into the nineteenth centuries. See, for example, Sarah Chambers, *From Subjects to Citizens: Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, Peru 1780-1854* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) and Charles F. Walker, *Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999).
 10. Tristan Platt discusses the "mita voluntaria" in "The Andean Experience of Bolivian Liberalism, 1825-1900: Roots of Rebellion in 19th-Century Chayanta (Potosí)," *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*, ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 286. For issues of tribute in the early republican period, see Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, *Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978), 187-218; William F. Lofstrom, *La presidencia de Sucre en Bolivia* (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la

- Historia, 1987), 371-422; Nils Jacobsen, "Taxation in Early Republican Peru, 1821-1851: Policy Making between Reform and Tradition," *América Latina en la época de Simón Bolívar*, ed. Reinhard Liehr (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1989), 324-330; Víctor Peralta Ruíz, *En pos del tributo en el Cuzco rural 1826-1854* (Cuzco: Centro Bartolomé de las Casas, 1991); and Mark Van Aken, "The Lingering Death of Indian Tribute in Ecuador," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 61:3 (1981), 429-460.
11. For Peru, see Paul Gootenberg, *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and the State in Postindependence Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). For Bolivia, see Tibor Wittman, "Reflexiones sobre las ideas económicas de José María Dalence," *Estudios históricos sobre Bolivia* (La Paz: Editorial El Siglo, 1975), 177-193; Antonio Mitre, *El monedero de los Andes: Región económica y moneda boliviana en el siglo XIX* (La Paz: Hisbol, 1986); Tristan Platt, "Divine Protection and Liberal Damnation: Exchanging Metaphors in Nineteenth-Century Potosí (Bolivia)," *Contesting Markets: Analyses of Ideology, Discourse and Practice*, ed. Roy Dilley (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 131-158.
 12. For the late colonial period, see John Fisher, *Minas y mineros en el Perú colonial 1776-1824* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977); Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*; and Rose Marie Buechler, *Gobierno, minería y sociedad: Potosí y el "renacimiento" borbónico 1776-1810*, 2 vols. (La Paz: Biblioteca Minera Boliviana, 1989). The nineteenth century is treated in José Deustua, *La minería peruana y la iniciación de la República, 1820-1840* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1986); by the same author, *The Bewitchment of Silver: The Social Economy of Mining in Nineteenth-Century Peru* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999); Contreras, *Mineros y campesinos*; and Antonio Mitre, *Los patriarcas de la plata: Estructura socioeconómica de la minería de la plata* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981).
 13. Among others, see Heraclio Bonilla, *Guano y burguesía en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974); Jean Piel, *Capitalisme agraire au Perou: L'essor du neolatifundisme dans le Perou republicain*, 2 vols. (Paris: Ed. Anthropos, 1983).
 14. Alberto Flores Galindo, *Arequipa y el sur andino (siglos XVII-XX)* (Lima: Ed. Horizonte, 1977); Jacobsen, *Mirages of Transition*.
 15. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial: Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982), especially 109-221.
 16. Smith, "Introduction: The Regional Approach to Economic Systems," especially 36-39. For an application of these models to the Mexican case, see Eric Van Young, "Are Regions Good to Think?," *Mexico's Regions: Comparative History and Development*, ed. Eric Van Young (San Diego: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1992).
 17. For a historical explanation of this phenomenon, see Inge Wolff, *Regierung und Verwaltung der kolonialspanischen Städte in Hochperu 1538-1650* (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1970).
 18. Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *Modos de producción en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1973).
 19. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, passim.
 20. Luis Miguel Glave, *Trajinantes: Caminos indígenas en la sociedad colonial, siglos XVI-*

- XVII (Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1989); also see John V. Murra, "Aymara Lords and their European Agents at Potosí," *Nova Americana*, 1 (1978), 231-243; Roberto Choque C., "Pedro Chipana: Cacique comerciante de Calamarca," *Avances*, 1 (1978), 28-32. Also see the important volume edited by Brooke Larson and Olivia Harris, *Ethnicity, Markets, and Migration in the Andes: At the Crossroads of History and Anthropology* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).
21. This section relies heavily on Assadourian, *El sistema*, 126-134. For money rather than *mita* service, see Cole, *The Potosí Mita* and Tandeter, *Coercion and Market*. For Indian migration, see Nicolás Sánchez Albornoz, "Mita, migraciones y pueblos. Variaciones en el espacio y en el tiempo. Alto Perú, 1573-1692," *Historia Boliviana*, 3:1 (1983); Ann M. Wightman, *Indigenous Migration and Social Change: The Forasteros of Cuzco, 1570-1720* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); and Karen Vieira Powers, *Andean Journeys: Migration, Ethnogenesis, and the State in Colonial Quito* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995). For a discussion of the *repartimiento de mercancías*, see Karen Spalding, "Exploitation as an Economic System: The State and the Extraction of Surplus in Colonial Peru," *The Inca and Aztec States 1400-1800: Anthropology and History*, eds. George A. Collier, Renato I. Rosaldo, and John D. Wirth (New York: Academic Press 1982), 322-343 and Jürgen Golte, *Repartos y rebeliones: Túpac Amaru y las contradicciones de la economía colonial* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980).
 22. For population figures on Potosí, see Wolfgang Schoop, *Ciudades bolivianas* (La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro, 1981), 111-112; Joseph B. Pentland, *Informe sobre Bolivia*, tr. Jack Aitken Soux (Potosí: Casa de la Moneda, 1975), 58; José María Dalence, *Bosquejo estadístico de Bolivia* (La Paz: Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, 1975 [1848]), 180.
 23. For a dissenting view on hacienda expansion in the Andes in the late colonial period, see Karen Spalding, "El corregidor de indios y los orígenes de la hacienda peruana," *De indio a campesino: Cambios en la estructura social del Perú colonial* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974), 127-146. However, this hypothesis is not supported by any quantitative evaluation of evidence on changes in land tenure.
 24. Thomas A. Abercrombie, *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History Among an Andean People* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 129-314. For a similar process among the neighboring Caracara, see Roger Rasnacke, *Domination and Cultural Resistance: Authority and Power among an Andean People* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 96-137.
 25. "Libros de bautizos, 1715-45," Archivo Parroquial de Tarabuco (Chuquisaca, Bolivia). Also see Erick D. Langer, "Persistencia y cambio en las comunidades indígenas surbolivianas (siglo XIX)," *Los Andes en la encrucijada: Indios, comunidades y estado en el siglo XIX*, ed. Heraclio Bonilla (Quito: Ediciones Libri Mundi, 1991), 133-167. It is interesting to note that the Tarabuco-area Indians today do not remember their ancestral ethnic affiliations.
 26. See Carol A. Smith, "Introduction," especially 16-17, 37, and "Causes and Consequences of Central-Place Types in Western Guatemala," 255-302. Also see Gordon Appleby, "The Role of Urban Food Needs in Regional Development, Puno, Peru," 147-183, and Raymond J. Bromley, "Contemporary Market Periodicity in Highland Ecuador," 91-

- 122, all in Smith, ed., *Regional Analysis*, vol. 1. However, see Marisol de la Cadena, "Cooperación y mercado en la organización comunal andina," *Revista Andina*, 4:1 (1986), 31-58.
27. L. Hugh de Bonelli, *Travels in Bolivia; with a Tour across the Pampas to Buenos Ayres*, vol. 1 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1854), 187-8.
 28. For a general discussion of Andean practices, see Jürgen Golte, *La racionalidad de la organización andina* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980); Xavier Isko, "Comunidad andina: Persistencia y cambio," *Revista Andina*, 4:1 (1986), 59-99. The seminal work on this topic is John V. Murra, *Formaciones económicas y políticas andinas* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1975).
 29. Tristan Platt, "The Role of the Andean Ayllu in the Reproduction of the Petty Commodity Regime in North Potosí (Bolivia)," *Ecology and Exchange*; by the same author, "Mapas coloniales de la Provincia de Chayanta: Dos visiones conflictivas de un solo paisaje," *Estudios bolivianos en homenaje a Gunnar Mendoza L.* (La Paz: n.p., 1978), 101-118.
 30. In certain areas of Peru, the process of expansion was in precisely the opposite direction; because of the profitability of livestock raising on the upland pastures, haciendas tended to establish themselves there rather than in the valleys. See, for example, Florencia Mallon, *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 19.
 31. For the issue of upland traders, see David L. Browman, "Pastoral Nomadism in the Andes," *Current Anthropology*, 15:2 (1974), 188-196; Ramiro Molina Rivero, "Estrategias socio-económicas y reproductivas en la Comunidad de Pampa Aullagas Oruro," *Tiempo de vida y muerte: Estudio de caso en dos contextos andinos de Bolivia*, Javier Izko Gastón, Ramiro Molina Rivero and René Pereira Morató (N.p.: El Buitre, 1986), 169-276; Jorge A. Flores Ochoa, ed., *Pastores de puna: Uywanichiq punarunakuna* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1977). For issues of personal ties and trade, see Giorgio Alberti and Enrique Mayer, eds., *Reciprocidad é intercambio en los Andes peruanos* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1974).
 32. Olivia Harris, "The Sources and Meanings of Money: Beyond the Market Paradigm in an Ayllu of Northern Potosí," *Ethnicity, Markets*, 303-306. For an analysis of how money and goods functioned among nineteenth-century indigenous merchants, see Erick D. Langer, "El caso de Antonia Lojo, una mujer rica en Challapata: Género e intercambio a mediados del siglo XIX," *Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia Anuario 2002* (Sucre: Editorial Túpac Katari, forthcoming).
 33. Guillermo Madrazo, "Comercio interétnico y trueque recíproco equilibrado intraétnico," *Desarrollo Económico*, 21:82 (1981), 213-230, especially 214, 220-222.
 34. Tristan Platt, "Acerca del sistema tributario pre-toledano en el Alto Perú," *Avances*, 1 (1978), 33-46; Witold Kula, *An Economic Theory of the Feudal System* (London: New Left Books, 1976); Tristan Platt, "Ethnic Calendars and Market Interventions among the Ayllus of Lipés during the Nineteenth Century," *Ethnicity, Markets*, 259-296.
 35. For an analysis of prices for the nineteenth century, albeit only for Lima, see Paul Gootenberg, "Carneros y chuño: Price Levels in Nineteenth-Century Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 70:1 (1990), 1-56.
 36. Tristan Platt, *Estado tributario y librecambio en Potosí (siglo XIX)* (La Paz: Hisbol,

- 1986), 33; also his "Ethnic Calendars," 273-285, especially 283-284.
37. Platt, "Ethnic Calendars," 285-286; also see Gabriela Karasik, "Intercambio tradicional en la puna jujeña," *Runa*, 14 (1984), 80-85.
 38. For a discussion of this principle, see James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 13-55.
 39. Erick D. Langer and Viviana E. Conti, "Circuitos comerciales tradicionales y cambio económico en los Andes centro-meridionales (1830-1930)," *Desarrollo Económico*, 31:121 (April-June 1991), 91-111.
 40. Viviana E. Conti, "Articulación económica en los Andes centromeridionales (siglo XIX)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 46 (1989), 423-453; Madrazo, "Comercio interétnico," 214.
 41. Flores Galindo, *Arequipa*, 72-76.
 42. Tristan Platt, "Ethnic Calendars."
 43. *Ibid.*, 512.
 44. Flores Galindo, *Arequipa*, 74. The fair was also associated with pilgrimages to the miraculous Christ shrine. For an important discussion of the combination of religious shrines and fairs, see Michael Sallnow, *Pilgrims of the Andes: Regional Cults in Cuzco* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1987). Although these fairs also attracted non-indigenous peasants, the Cuzco highland region of Vilque was inhabited largely by Andean Indians.
 45. Mario A. Rabey, Rodolfo J. Merlino and Daniel R. González, "Trueque, articulación económica y racionalidad campesina en el sur de los Andes Centrales," *Revista Andina*, 4:1 (1986), 131-160; Karasik, "Intercambio tradicional," 57-59.
 46. Karasik, 82-85.
 47. Rabey, Merlino and González, 147.
 48. For example, see Bernardino Ancieta A., *Experiencia en Tarabuco* (Sucre: IBTSA/Laval, 1981), 38-39.
 49. For an analysis of asymmetry in the context of reciprocal relationships, see Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (New York: Aldine, 1972), 185-230.
 50. Eric R. Wolf, "Closed Corporate Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 13:1 (1957), 1-18.
 51. For China, see Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China."
 52. Assadourian, *El sistema*; Mitre, *El monedero*; Conti, "Articulación económica;" Erick D. Langer, "Espacios coloniales y economías nacionales: Bolivia y el norte argentino," *Siglo XIX: Revista de Historia*, 2:4 (1987), 135-160.
 53. For Peru, see Carlos Contreras, *Mineros y campesinos en los Andes* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1987), 141-159. For Bolivia, see Platt, "Ethnic Calendars."
 54. Carol A. Smith, *Regional Analysis*, v. 1, 34-36; Gordon Appleby, "Export Monoculture and Regional Social Structure in Puno, Peru," *Regional Analysis*, ed. Carol Smith, v. 2, 291-307. Interestingly, Appleby asserts that the wool trade was dendritic in nature, but only provides evidence to this effect for the period after 1876. One essential feature in Smith's dendritic model is, of course, that elites controlled trade through various exploitative and coercive mechanisms. For another take on this industry, see Jacobsen, *Mirages of Transition*, passim and especially, 177-180.

55. Appleby, "The Role of Urban Food Needs," *Regional Analysis*, v. 1; Clifford T. Smith, "Patterns of Urban and Regional Development in Peru on the Eve of the Pacific War," *Region and Class in Modern Peruvian History*, ed. Rory Miller (Liverpool: University of Liverpool, 1987), 77-101.
56. James E. Vance, Jr., *The Merchant's World: The Geography of Wholesaling* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970). Also consult Christaller, *Central Places in Southern Germany*.
57. See, for example, Richard Morse, "Trends and Issues in Latin American Urban Research, 1965-1970," *Latin American Research Review*, 6:1, 2 (1971), 1-27, 1-45.
58. Deustua, *Bewitchment*, 139-173.
59. Erwin P. Grieshaber, "The Survival of Indian Communities in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1977, 222-228; Tristan Platt, *Estado boliviano y ayllu andino: Tierra y tributo en el Norte de Potosí* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1982), 70-71; Platt, *Estado tributario*, 31-34; Langer, *Economic Change*, 27-29.
60. For Bolivia, where the debate has been most vigorous, see Erwin P. Grieshaber, "Survival of Indian Communities in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia: A Regional Comparison," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 12:2 (1980), 223-269; Gustavo Rodríguez O., "¿Expansión del latifundio o supervivencia de las comunidades indígenas? Cambios en la estructura agraria boliviana del siglo XIX," (Cochabamba: IESE, 1983) (mimeo); Platt, *Estado boliviano*; Silvia Rivera C., "La expansión del latifundio en el altiplano boliviano: Elementos para la caracterización de una oligarquía regional," *Avances*, 2 (1978), 95-118; by the same author, *Oprimidos pero no vencidos: Luchas del campesinado aymara y qhechua 1900-1980* (La Paz: UNRISD, 1986); Jorge Alejandro Ovando Sanz, *El tributo indígena en las finanzas bolivianas del siglo XIX* (La Paz: CEUB, 1985); Tomás Huanca, "Los procesos de desestructuración en las comunidades andinas a fines del siglo XIX: Altiplano lacustre," *Coloquio: Estado y región en los Andes* (Cusco: Centro de las Casas, 1987), 45-86; Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550-1900*; Erick D. Langer, "El liberalismo y la abolición de la comunidad indígena en Bolivia en el siglo XIX," *Historia y Cultura*, 14 (1988), 59-65.
61. Langer, *Economic Change*, 66-74.
62. Platt, *Estado boliviano*, passim; Harris, "The Sources and Meanings of Money."
63. See Note 2, as well as Platt, *Estado boliviano*, and Langer, *Economic Change*, for this consensus view.
64. For the latest summary, see Larson, "Andean Highland Peasants."
65. Robert Redfield most notably advanced the "traditional" vs. "modern" or the "folk-urban" continuum. See, for example, his *The Primitive World and its Transformations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953).